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ABSTRACT
Korea adopted Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD) in November 2002. Regulation FD, 
designed with a goal of levelling the playing field among market participants, has 
created considerable debate among practitioners and academics. This thesis examines 
the effect of Regulation FD on the Korean securities market, using a large sample of 
161,343 forecast-year observations and 2,311 firm-year observations from 2000 to 2007. 
We uncover four main sets of findings. First, we find that analysts‘ forecast accuracy 
has increased after the adoption of Regulation FD. We attribute this finding to the 
improved quality of public information and reduced importance of private access to 
managers in the post-FD period. Second, we provide evidence of significant change in 
firms‘ disclosure policy in the post-FD period. We report that private earning guidance 
and private information in analysts‘ forecasts have decreased as a consequence of 
curtailing selective disclosure in the post-FD period. Our findings are consistent with 
the intentions of Regulation FD to increase management disclosure to the general public. 
Third, we find no evidence of an increase in herding behaviour in the post-FD period. 
Our results contradict Regulation FD‘s opponents‘ claims that elimination of private 
channels may lead to increasing herding behaviour due to the chilling effect. We find no 
evidence that Regulation FD makes firms withhold their disclosure. To the contrary, our 
evidence suggests that Regulation FD has led to an increase in the quality and quantity 
of public information. Finally, we provide strong evidence for a reduction in informed 
trading and information leakage prior to unscheduled earnings announcement and 
release of analysts‘ recommendations. Overall, our results suggest that Regulation FD 
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has been successful in eliminating selective disclosure and levelling the playing field for 
investors.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Analysts have been regarded as important providers of information in capital markets 
for a long time. They are also known to play a role in resolving the imbalance in 
information between investors and firms and enhancing efficiency in the market (Givoly 
et al., 1979, Imhoff et al., 1992). A firm transmits information to analysts who then 
perform their duty through a press release, investor relations (IR), and reference call, 
before making public disclosure to investors. However, the analysts‘ reports may cause 
information asymmetry among investors if analysts depend on management-guided 
information as an information interpreter. A typical feature of the practice called 
selective disclosure is to provide material information to favoured investors in advance, 
which arguably forms an ―uneven playing field‖ in terms of information asymmetry.  
 
This practice of a firm disclosing private information selectively to privileged 
individuals is prevalent (Bailey et al., 2003; Strazer, 2002; Sunder, 2002; Lee et al., 
2004). The practice has long been criticized as a scourge plaguing information 
dissemination because selective disclosure can act as a factor hindering the development 
of the securities market and lowering the investor‘s faith in the financial market (Arya et 
al., 2005). The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) viewed the practice of selective 
disclosure as a serious threat to fairness to public investors and thus implemented 
Regulation Fair Disclosure (hereafter ―Regulation FD‖) from October 2000. Korea 
adopted Regulation FD in November 2002. Regulation FD is represented as follows;1  
                                                 
1  Arthur Levitt, the 25
th
 Chairman of the SEC, served from 1993 to 2001, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/about/commissioner/levitt.htm 
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Whenever a public company, or any person acting on its behalf, discloses 
material private information to certain enumerated persons, the company 
must simultaneously, in the case of intentional disclosures, or promptly, in the 
case of unintentional disclosures, make public disclosure of that same 
information (Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, SEC 17 CFR pts 
243,100, August 2000).  
 
The basic purpose of Regulation FD is to prevent selective disclosure, expand the scope 
of public disclosure, and realize information democracy. SEC intended that Regulation 
FD should curtail analysts‘ private channels to management that they had previously 
enjoyed. Numerous empirical research supports SEC‘s view, while complaints and 
opposition to the new regulation emanated from critics, who suggested that Regulation 
FD may lead to more return volatility and less information disclosure in the capital 
market.2  
 
At the time of the adoption of Regulation FD, many pros and cons were also raised in 
Korea. However, the view of the financial supervisory authority3 is superior to that of 
the critics because investors were aware that the Korean economy was on the point of 
escaping from the economic crisis, and that unfair trading like insider trading thrives in 
the securities market. The amicable atmosphere meant that the regulation was settled 
without disturbance. Actually, most Korean researchers report that Regulation FD plays 
a positive role in enhancing the efficiency of the Korean capital market.4 Researchers 
provide evidence that Regulation FD reduces imbalanced information among market 
                                                 
2 See section 8.1 in Chapter 2 and section 1 in Chapter 3.  
3 Financial Supervisory Committee (FSC, now the ―Financial Service Committee‖) and Financial 
Supervisory Service (FSS).  
4 See section 8.2 in Chapter 2. 
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participants and improves the fairness and reliability of information in the Korean 
securities market.  
 
This thesis consists of four distinct essays (chapters) on the different six areas affected 
by Regulation FD. Our first essay is on the effect of Regulation FD on the analysts‘ 
forecasts performance (i.e., forecast accuracy and forecast dispersion). The second essay 
looks at whether Regulation FD affects the firms‘ disclosure policy by examining 
changes in private earnings guidance and private information in analysts‘ forecasts. The 
third essay examines whether Regulation FD leads firms to suppress the disclosure to 
the public by exploring the change in herding behaviour among analysts. In the last 
essay, we discuss the effect of Regulation FD on the informed trading prior to earnings 
announcement and information leakage of analysts‘ recommendations.  
 
However, we study one common topic: How has Regulation FD influenced the Korean 
securities market? Our study empirically analyzes the implications of Regulation FD on 
several changes in the information environment among market participants. Using 
analysts‘ forecasts made for a large of sample of 161,343 observations for 2,311 firms 
over two time intervals: (1) two years pre-FD period (24,969 observations) and (2) five 
years post-FD period (136,374 observations), we verify whether firms stop providing 
private information or choose public disclosure as a substitute for selective disclosure 
after the adoption of Regulation FD. To our knowledge, our research covers the most 
comprehensive sample size and longest sample period in analysts‘ forecasts research, 
compared to those of existing Korean research, which use at most about ten thousand 
forecast observations.  
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In response to concerns about Regulation FD decreasing analysts‘ forecasting ability, 
the first empirical study examines whether Regulation FD influences their forecast 
performance. We expect that there will be a significant difference in analysts‘ forecasts 
in the post-FD period since Regulation FD influences firms‘ disclosure policy. We find 
that forecast errors and forecast dispersion have decreased after the adoption of 
Regulation FD. The finding is consistent with the Korean research, Oh et al., (2005). 
We extend previous research by analysing analysts‘ forecasts performance in 
accordance with the level of information uncertainty. Specifically, we examine the 
change in (absolute) forecast errors (AFE) and forecast dispersion (DISP) for lower 
information uncertainty groups (earnings decrease firms and sell-side 
recommendations) as compared to higher information uncertainty groups (earnings 
increase firms and buy-side recommendations) after the adoption of Regulation FD. We 
find greater improvements in forecast accuracy and forecast dispersion for lower 
information uncertainty groups than for higher information uncertainty groups in the 
post-FD period. This study contributes to the current debate over the effectiveness of 
Regulation FD. Our results provide positive evidence of analysts‘ forecasting 
performance after the adoption of Regulation FD.  
 
The second empirical study explores the effect of Regulation FD on private earnings 
guidance. Regulation FD prohibits managers from communicating privately with groups 
of favoured analysts. Therefore, analysts are likely to depend on public information in 
their earnings forecasting instead of private access to management. In order to measure 
private earnings guidance, following Matsumoto (2002) and Wang (2007), we calculate 
the change in private earnings guidance in analysts‘ forecasts. We find evidence of a 
 5 
 
decrease in private earnings guidance after the adoption of Regulation FD. Our study 
contributes to the research on the effect of Regulation FD by calculating the change in 
disclosure practice of firms. 
 
The third empirical study is to provide evidence of the effect of the Regulation on 
private information in analysts‘ forecasts. In order to measure private information in 
analysts‘ forecasts, we adopt the model designed by Barren, Kim, Lim and Stevens 
(1998), who show that the content of information affects forecast dispersion and 
forecast errors in the mean value of these forecasts. If Regulation FD has a positive 
effect on alleviating the imbalance in information, there should be a significant 
difference in private information in the post-FD period. We also find evidence of a 
decrease in the ratio of private information in earnings forecasting after the adoption of 
Regulation FD. Our study differentiates itself by measuring the private information in 
analysts‘ forecasts in order to corroborate the effect of Regulation FD. 
 
The fourth empirical study provides unified results on analysts‘ herding behaviour after 
the adoption of Regulation FD. Previous empirical evidence regarding the effects of 
Regulation FD on herding behavior in analysts‘ forecasts shows mixed results. Some 
literature suggests that herding behaviour may be more pronounced in the post-FD 
period as the regulation reduces private information (Zitzewits, 2002; Arya et al., 2005).  
On the other hand, using two different methods (DHI and S-statistic test), Mensah et al., 
(2008) find no evidence that Regulation FD results in an increase in analysts‘ herding 
behaviour since the regulation has not led to a negative influence on the analysts‘ 
forecast ability. In order to measure changes in herding behaviour in analysts‘ forecasts, 
 6 
 
we calculate herding propensity (i.e., S-statistic and Boldness) developed by Bernhardt 
et al., (2006) and Clement et al., (2005). We find evidence of anti-herding behaviour in 
Korean analysts‘ forecasts. This finding is not consistent with Ahn et al., (2007). We 
also provide evidence that herding behaviour in analysts has not significantly changed 
in the post-FD period since analysts gain available public information complementing 
their lost private information after the adoption of Regulation FD. Our research 
reconciles the opposing papers on the effect of Regulation FD on herding behaviour by 
providing a convincing interpretation of the conflicting results.  
 
The fifth empirical study looks at whether Regulation FD influences informed trading 
prior to unscheduled earnings announcement. In order to provide evidence of informed 
trading, we measure the abnormal trading volumes (CAV, AV) and abnormal stock price 
returns (CAR, AR) over six event windows 5  around an unscheduled earnings 
announcement date. We expect to see a reduction in abnormal stock returns and trading 
volume prior to unscheduled earnings announcement if the regulation contributes to a 
decrease in selective disclosure. We find that cumulative abnormal volumes (CAV) and 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) prior to unscheduled earnings announcements have 
significantly decreased in the post-FD period. This research contributes to the previous 
research on the Regulation FD by exploring informed trading prior to unscheduled 
earnings announcements.   
 
Our last empirical study examines whether important clients of securities companies 
possess private information on the analysts‘ recommendations after the adoption of 
                                                 
5 [Day-9, Day-1], [Day-7, Day-1], [Day-5, Day-1], [Day-3, Day+1], [Day+0, Day+1], and [Day+0, 
Day+3]. 
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Regulation FD. In order to examine the effect of Regulation FD on the information 
leakage of analysts, following Heggen et al., (2008) and Jackson et al., (2003), we also 
measure the abnormal volumes (CAV, AV) and abnormal returns (CAR, AR) around 
release of analysts‘ recommendations. We find that for buy-side recommendations, 
there is a significant decrease in cumulative trading volume and stock returns in the 
post-FD period, compared to the pre-FD period. On the other hand, for sell-side 
recommendations, there is no significant difference in abnormal volumes and abnormal 
returns. This research extends the research on the effect of Regulation FD by examining 
informed trading prior to the release of analysts‘ first buy-side recommendations as a 
way of offering more reliable evidence.   
 
This research can be found to be of interest by academics and regulators. Our research 
contributes to studies on Regulation FD in several ways. First, our study differs 
basically from the extant research in the way we assess consistently various approaches 
on the effect of Regulation FD in the capital market. Information can be transmitted to 
markets via several channels. To assess the effect of the regulation, we analyze 
collectively changes in information environment among market participants: (1) firms 
and analysts (2) analysts and brokers‘ clients (3) analysts and analysts (4) firms and 
recipients from insider information.  
 
Second, our research contributes to research on the positive effects of Regulation FD. 
Numerous opponents claim that Regulation FD has had an adverse effect on the capital 
market. We discuss the potential effect of Regulation FD on six aspects of the 
disclosure practices of firms, forecasts practices of analysts and informed trading. Our 
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empirical results provide a reliably and comprehensively positive interpretation of the 
effect of Regulation FD on the Korean capital market. We do not support the arguments 
developed by Regulation FD‘s opponents suggesting that the regulation has impaired 
firms‘ disclosure policy.  
 
Third, we provide evidence based on a more comprehensive sample than those in other 
researches. We analyse 161,343 observations for 2,311 Korean firms over a period from 
2000-2007 while previous Korean studies used a small sample of the latest forecasts just 
before earnings are announced. If analysts enjoy selective disclosure from managers, 
there is more room for information advantage over forecasts with a longer forecast 
horizon than the latest forecasts just before earnings announcement. Managers usually 
have little room for selective disclosure by the time earnings are released in public. 
However, our sample includes most forecasts by analysts employed by Korean 
securities companies. Therefore, our study can cover the various forecast behaviours of 
analysts, not just the latest forecasts. This feature of our analysis is of practical value to 
researchers who are interested in the effect of Regulation FD.  
 
We have several main findings. First, we find evidence that Regulation FD provides a 
level playing field for all market participants. The most important reason given by the 
SEC for the adoption of Regulation FD is selective disclosure. The SEC asserts that 
Regulation FD has a positive effect on eliminating unfair trading in advance and 
alleviating imbalances in information between institutional investors and individual 
investors. In order to assess the effect of Regulation FD on selective disclosure, we 
extend previous studies by examining the relation of Regulation FD and four different 
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research aspects (i.e., private earnings guidance, private information in analysts‘ 
forecasting, informed trading and information leakage). The results of the four analyses 
consistently support the SEC‘s intention, indicating that Regulation FD contributes to 
the change in firms‘ disclosure practice and the information leakage of analysts‘ 
recommendations. We suggest that Regulation FD has decreased the differences in 
information symmetry among market participants.   
 
Second, we find no evidence that quantity of information reduced drastically due to 
firms‘ non-disclosure after the adoption of Regulation FD. The finding is not consistent 
with some U.S. research results. Regulation FD‘s opponents suggested that Regulation 
FD would result in a cutting off of the communication between companies and market 
participants, what we call the ―chilling effect‖. For example, the Association for 
Investment Management and Research (AIMR, now the CFA institute) generally 
opposed Regulation FD. According to their survey conducted in October 2001, a 
majority of financial analysts and managers responded that the quality and quantity of 
information had decreased after the adoption of Regulation FD. Another survey 
conducted later showed no significant change in that point (The CPA Journal, 2001).6 
This now raises the question of herding behaviour among analysts. Arya et al., (2005) 
and Zitzewitz (2002) report evidence that Regulation FD results in an increase in 
                                                 
6 The CPA Journal (2001) stated as follows; 
―Regulation FD promised fair disclosure, and it seems to have achieved that, but apparently at the 
expense of full disclosure‖ said AIMR president and CEO Thomas A. Bowman. ―Everyone has access to 
the same information at the same time, and that‘s laudable, but if there is less information in the 
marketplace, that‘s lamentable. Our focus now needs to be getting corporations to be more forthcoming in 
their public disclosures, to provide the level of detailed information investors need to make better-
informed investment decisions.‖ 
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analysts‘ herding behaviour7 since regulation may suppress firms‘ disclosure. However, 
we are opposed to this criticism of Regulation FD. We find no evidence that Regulation 
FD makes analysts mimic their colleagues‘ forecasts and makes firms withhold the 
voluntary disclosure of material information. To the contrary, we find evidence that 
Regulation FD encourages firms to increase the amount of information available to the 
public.8 
 
Third, Regulation FD influences analysts‘ ability to accurately forecast earnings. This 
finding is different from the U.S. research results of Regulation FD‘s proponents, 
indicating that Regulation FD may lead analysts‘ forecasts to become more difficult 
because the regulation prohibits private communications between management and 
analysts. For example, Mohanram et al., (2002) find that a decrease in analyst 
forecasting performance occurs after the adoption of Regulation FD because analysts 
with top initial placements on forecast accuracy have less of an information advantage 
than they did in the pre-FD period. Similarly, Findlay et al., (2006) also find that 
analysts‘ forecasting accuracy declines overall in the post-FD period. Their findings are 
consistent with Shane et al., (2002), Agrawal et al., (2006) and Kwag et al., (2007). On 
the other hand, in this study we find no evidence of a significant deterioration in 
analysts‘ earnings forecasting. To the contrary, we find that forecast accuracy has 
increased and forecast dispersion has decreased after the adoption of Regulation FD.  
 
                                                 
7 The herding behaviour used in the paper is rooted in the information cascades model. See section 
2.6.1.1 in Chapter 2.  
8 See section 3.6 in Chapter 3.  
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The remainder of this thesis is structured in the following manner. Chapter 2 contains a 
review of the theoretical and empirical literature. Chapter 3 reviews the effect of 
Regulation FD on analysts‘ forecasts performance and earnings management. Chapter 4 
provides evidence of the effect of Regulation FD on private earnings guidance and 
private information in analysts‘ forecasts. Chapter 5 presents empirical results on the 
effect of Regulation FD on herding behaviour in analysts‘ forecasts. Chapter 6 presents 
a discussion on the effect of Regulation FD on information leakage and informed 
trading prior to unscheduled earning announcement and analysts‘ recommendations. 
Finally, Chapter 7 presents concluding remarks, limitations of the research and some 
suggestions for future research.  
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter focuses on several aspects of the research literature on analysts‘ forecasts‘ 
properties, earnings management, management guidance and information content levels, 
analysts‘ herding behaviour, informed trading and Regulation FD. The following 
section summarizes the important findings for these areas. Section 2.2 reviews the types 
of analysts‘ forecasts‘ properties. Section 2.3 discusses the research on earnings 
management. Section 2.4 discusses the literature on management guidance. Section 2.5 
reviews the research on the analysts‘ information environment. Section 2.6 addresses 
herding behaviour in analysts‘ forecasts. Section 2.7 reports on information leakage and 
informed trading. Section 2.8 reviews the empirical studies of Regulation FD in the U.S. 
and Korea.  
 
2.2. The Properties of Analyst Forecasts 
Analysts gather information from private communications and public disclosure, assess 
the current earnings performance that they cover and forecast about their future earnings. 
This evidence indicates that analysts play an important role in the capital market. For a 
long period of time, researchers have examined analysts‘ forecast properties such as 
forecast bias, forecast accuracy and forecast dispersion. Several questions arise about 
analyst forecast properties. We provide a review of these issues. First, why do analysts 
forecast optimistically? Second, what determines forecast accuracy? Third, what are the 
different interpretations of forecast dispersion?  
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2.2.1. Forecast Bias 
Early research related to analysts‘ performance in earnings forecasting focuses on the 
superiority of the analyst forecast relative to time-series models. Analyst forecasts are 
found to be accurate relative to random walk model forecasts and time series model 
forecasts (Brown et al., 1979; Givoly, 1985; Brown et al., 1987; Capstaff et al., 1995; 
Abarbanell et al., 2003). For instance, Brown et al., (1987) compare analysts‘ forecasts 
with forecasts derived from statistical models. They prove evidence that the sources of 
analysts‘ forecast superiority are better utilization of information and timing advantage. 
Their finding is in line with Abarbanell et al., (2003) and Givoly (1985), who suggest 
that analysts‘ forecasts are not biased and are formed in an efficient manner. Similar 
results have been reported for the U.K. (Capstaff et al., 1995). In contrast, despite 
analysts‘ superiority over time-series models, some literature argues that analysts‘ 
forecasts are biased.9 The literature suggests that analysts set optimistic forecasts of the 
next periods‘ earnings per share.  
 
Broadly, as shown in Table 2-1, there are at least three incentives for forecast bias (i.e., 
analyst optimism): (1) relationship with management (2) relationship with an interested 
party (3) selection bias. The first incentive for forecast bias is related to management. 
Management may limit or cut off analysts‘ contact with themselves to impose a penalty 
on the analysts based on the content of the forecasts. For instance, Francis et al., (1993) 
provide evidence that analysts report unjustifiably favourable earnings forecasts as a 
way of managing good relations with management. The results are consistent with their 
premise that optimistic forecasts are intended to cultivate or maintain good management 
                                                 
9 Ciccone (2005) suggests that forecast optimism decreases as analysts move from being optimistically 
biased to being pessimistically biased as earnings announcement approaches. 
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relationships. Ke et al., (2006) also show evidence that analysts‘ forecasts tend to be 
optimistically biased in order to curry favour with a firm‘s management to get better 
access to that management‘s private information.  
 
[Insert Table 2-1 about here] 
 
The second incentive for forecast bias is to resolve conflict with interested parties such 
as the investment banking and research departments. For example, Dechow et al., 
(2000) shows evidence that affiliated analysts are motivated to issue more optimistic 
forecasts than unaffiliated analysts. Lin et al., (1998) find that favourable relationships 
with investment banking can optimistically bias analysts‘ forecasts. Their findings are in 
agreement with Dugar et al., (1995), Das et al., (1998) and Lim (2001), indicating that 
analysts are reluctant to issue unfavourable forecasts because they fear jeopardizing the 
client relationship. These results indicate that analysts are rewarded for providing 
optimistic forecasts that generate stock trading volume and investment banking fees for 
their brokerage house.  
 
The third explanation for forecast bias is selection bias.10 Selection bias assumes that 
analysts report their forecasts selectively based on their private information about firms‘ 
favourable prospects. McNichols et al., (1997) suggest that self-selection by analysts is 
a commonly observed phenomenon that leads to analysts‘ forecasts being generally 
overoptimistic. They suggest that the ratings analysts assign to stocks they have just 
                                                 
10 Analysts tend to adopt firms they view favourably and drop firms they view unfavourably. If analysts 
add new stocks to their forecasts portfolio, their forecasts about the stocks will be more positive than the 
existing consensus forecast. On the other hand, if analysts exclude some stocks from their forecast 
portfolio, their forecasts about these stocks will be lower than the mean of all expectations. If analysts 
reported without self-selection, their forecasts would be more exact. 
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added to their list of followed stocks are more heavily weighted toward strong buy 
recommendations relative to previous recommendations. However, recent studies report 
that analyst have reduced in their forecast optimism over time (Matsumoto, 2002; 
Richardson et al., 2005).  
 
Added to these findings, several researchers have examined whether there is any 
relation between analyst decisions and other variables. Their findings suggest that 
forecast bias is more prominent (1) at higher forecast dispersion (Ackert et al., 1997) (2) 
at the first few month of the year (Richardson et al., 1999) (3) with negative earnings 
(Ali et al., 1992). On the other hand, Lim (2001) finds that forecast bias is inversely 
correlated to firm size analyst coverage.  
 
2.2.2. Forecast Accuracy 
Early research concludes that there is no evidence of differential forecast accuracy 
(O‘Brien et al., 1990; Butler et al., 1991). However, recent researchers provide evidence 
that forecast accuracy has been the major basis of investment decisions (Ertimur et al., 
2007). What determines analysts‘ forecasts? Table 2-2 suggests that studies of forecast 
accuracy have explored whether it varies systematically with major variables 
surrounding the firms‘ and analysts‘ information environment. The literature suggests 
that forecast accuracy is correlated the following characteristics of firms or analysts: (1) 
firm size (2) forecast dispersion (3) analyst turnover (4) analyst experience (5) analyst 
following (6) earnings volatility (7) special items (8) forecast frequency (9) broker‘s 
specialty in industry (10) forecast horizon (11) broker size (12) number of firms or 
industries followed (13) conservative accounting policy (Bhushan, 1989; Brown et al., 
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1987; Wiedman, 1987; O‘Brien, 1988; Stickel, 1992; Bamber et al., 1997; Alford et al., 
1999; Clement, 1999; Jacob et al., 1999; Mensa et al., 2004; Ahn et al., 2006).  
 
[Insert Table 2-2 about here] 
 
For instance, Brown et al., (1987) suggest that firm size and forecast dispersion are the 
key determinants of forecast accuracy. Mikhail et al., (1999) find that lower analyst 
turnover and greater analyst experience lead to higher forecast accuracy. Dugar (1995) 
finds that analysts issuing accurate forecasts are likely to issue more profitable stock 
returns. Alford et al., (1999) show evidence that forecast accuracy is associated with 
analyst following.11 They also find that forecast accuracy is negatively associated with 
two information uncertainty related variables: earnings volatility and special items12.  
 
Jacob et al. (1999) find evidence that forecast accuracy is affected by forecast frequency, 
broker-industry specialisation, forecast horizon, analysts following and broker size. 
Clement (1999) finds that more experience and bigger broker size and less number of 
firms and industries followed lead to higher forecast accuracy. Mensah et al., (2004) 
suggest that conservative accounting policy choices influence forecast accuracy. Stickel 
(1992) finds that All-Americans Research Team13 forecasts are more accurate and 
                                                 
11 The results are consistent with Bhushan (1988). 
12 The variables represent variance of price-relevant information during the year and absolute value of 
lagged nonrecurring or unusual items affecting pre-tax income. 
13 In October each year, Institutional Investor (II) asks about 2,000 managers to evaluate analysts on the 
basis of four criteria: stock picking, earnings forecasts, written reports, and overall service. Stickel (1990) 
documents that analysts on the Institutional Investor (II) All-Americans Research Team forecasts are less 
likely to follow other colleagues‘ forecasts, and are less predictable, indicating that All-Americans are 
leaders in their field. 
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frequent than other analysts and All-Americans who are about to become Non-All-
Americans issue less accurate forecasts than other All-Americans.  
 
On the other hand, several Korean researchers have studied forecasts accuracy since 
year 2000.14 Jeong (2003) suggests that Korean analysts‘ forecasts are more accurate 
than random walk models. Jeong (2003) find that firm size, business group affiliation 
and leverage are significantly related to forecast accuracy. Ahn et al., (2006) find that 
forecast accuracy is significantly higher for analysts with more forecast frequency and 
for industry specialised analysts. They also provide evidence that forecast accuracy is 
associated with forecast horizon, analysts following, return volatility, return on invest, 
leverage and financial clique. The above results suggest that analysts and firms 
characteristics may be useful in predicting differences in earnings forecasts. 
 
2.2.3. Forecast Dispersion 
Previous empirical research shows two implications in forecast dispersion. Forecast 
dispersion refers to disagreement among analysts with regard to a firm‘s future earnings 
performance (Brown et al., 1987; Imhoff et al., 1992; Lang et al., 1996; Barron et al., 
1998; Dische, 2002). Forecast dispersion is also used as a benchmark for information 
uncertainty, which captures both the volatility of a firm‘s underlying fundamentals and 
poor information (Irani, 2003; Zhang, 2006; Au, 2007). In Table 2-3, previous research 
on the effect of forecast dispersion on market reaction provides mixed results.  
 
                                                 
14 FNGuide, which could collect analysts‘ earnings forecasts and recommendation from forty domestic 
brokerage houses and six economic research institutions, was established in 2000. Before this, researchers 
could only study limited data on analysts‘ forecasts from some daily economic newspapers and analysts‘ 
reports in brokerage houses.  
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[Insert Table 2-3 about here] 
 
First, some researchers report that forecast dispersion is positively associated with 
future returns (Cragg et al., 1982; Barron et al., 1998; Athanassakos et al., 2003; Dische, 
2002). The researchers use forecast dispersion as a proxy for information uncertainty. 
Their findings suggest that high forecast dispersion implies low forecast ability, 
indicating a decrease in public information and increase in information uncertainty 
around earnings announcement. Therefore, the results suggest that high market returns 
are a reward for high uncertainty about future earnings. By contrast, other researchers 
find that forecast dispersion is negatively related to future returns (Ackert et al., 1997; 
Diether, et al., 2002; Alexandridis et al., 2007). These researchers use forecast 
dispersion as a proxy for differences of opinion. They provide evidence that higher 
forecast dispersion, on average, leads to lower future stock returns.  
 
In addition, several studies document that forecast dispersion is positively associated 
with (1) value stocks rather than growth stocks (Fama et al., 1993; Diether et al., 2002) 
(2) the number of forecast revisions (Barron et al., 1998), while additional studies 
document that there is less dispersion for high-tech firms than for low-tech firms (Kwon, 
2002).  
2.3. Earnings Management  
Earnings management15 has become one of the most important topics in recent years 
because of the influence of a series of major accounting scandals (e.g., WorldCom, 
                                                 
15 Schipper (1989) documents that earnings management is a purposeful intervention in the external 
financial reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some private gain (as opposed to, say, merely 
facilitating the neutral operation of the process). He insists that management could manage earnings by 
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Enron). In Table 2-4, studies of earnings management offer more systematic evidence of 
managers‘ incentives as follows: (1) gaining positive stock returns (2) gaining 
compensation (3) avoidance of negative earnings surprise or losses. 
 
[Insert Table 2-4 about here] 
 
Managers‘ first incentives for earnings management are to achieve higher market 
returns. Kasnik et al., (2001) find that managers use their discretion over accounting 
accruals to gain a market premium over those firms that miss their forecasts. Bartov et 
al., (2002) also find that firms that meet or beat analysts‘ expectations enjoy a higher 
stock returns than firms that fail to meet these expectations. Their findings are 
consistent with Barth et al., (1999) and Lopez et al., (2002). Second incentives for 
earnings management are closely related to managers‘ bonuses. Managers are likely to 
manage earnings upward for their own compensation if earnings are near the acceptable 
range. Healy (1985) finds that changes in accounting procedures are related to the 
modification of a bonus plan. Clinch et al., (1993) find that income from discretionary 
transactions influences the CEO compensation function. Similarly, Matsunaga et al., 
(2001) find evidence of a significant negative effect on a manager‘s bonus when the 
firm reports earnings below the analysts‘ forecasts or below the earnings of the previous 
year. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
selecting accounting methods within generally accepted accounting principles (here after ―GAAP‖) or by 
applying given methods in particular ways such as changing estimates of services lives of depreciate 
assets. Healy et al., (1999) suggest that earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in 
financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports in order to either mislead some 
stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual 
outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers. Dechow et al. (2000) and Graham et al. (2005) 
point out that earnings management can incorporate both fraud and aggressive accounting practitioner 
choice within GAAP. 
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Third, managers are likely to manage earnings by taking action to avoid a negative 
earnings surprise or loss when the firm releases earnings. Burgstahler et al., (1997) find 
evidence of unusually low frequencies of small decreases in earnings and small losses 
and unusually high frequencies of small increases in earnings and small positive income. 
DeGeorge et al., (1999) find an extra pileup of observations or a long jump around zero 
in the histogram of the explanation variables. Brown (2001) also shows evidence that 
the median surprise for profits exceeds that for losses in a full 16 years. In a similar 
paper, Matsumoto (2002) suggests that firms are likely to manage earnings upward or 
guide analysts‘ forecasts downward to avoid missing expectations at the earnings 
announcement. These results have much in common with Payne et al., (2000). In the 
same vein of research, Charoenwong et al., (2008) find that there is a considerable jump 
around zero-value in Singapore and Thailand. This discontinuity suggests that both 
firms in Singapore and Thailand manage earnings to avoid losses. 
 
2.4. Management Guidance  
Table 2-5 shows that studies of management guidance16 raise the question of why 
managers voluntarily guide. Previous literature has offered motives for management 
guidance as follows: (1) screening their firms from other firms (2) avoidance of 
litigation risk (3) avoidance of negative earnings surprises.  
 
[Insert Table 2-5 about here] 
                                                 
16 Management guidance can take several forms such as preannouncements, management forecasts, 
conference calls, and the use of other more elaborated investor relations (Lin, 2006). Analysts could often 
email detailed spreadsheets to members of the firm‘s investor relations group, who would review the 
future earnings performance and provided detailed comments if they maintained favourable relations with 
the firms (Hutton, 2005). 
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First, managers make good news disclosures to screen their firms out from other firms. 
Lev et al., (1990) suggest that managerial information implies that firms‘ values is 
larger than the average valuation assumed by the market and means that the firms‘ value 
will be revised upward. Therefore, market values of firms without managerial 
information can be expected to decrease.17  
 
The second motivation for management guidance is to pre-empt litigation. Managers 
tend to voluntarily disclose bad information as the legal costs of disclosure increase. 
Voluntary disclosure of bad news may contribute to the decrease in litigation risk. For 
instance, Skinner (1994) argues that managers voluntarily preannounce bad news to 
reduce legal risks like shareholder suits18 caused by large stock price declines on 
earnings announcement. Kasznik et al., (1995) find that firms in high-litigation 
industries have a higher probability of warning before large negative earnings surprises. 
Johnson et al., (2001) suggest that high litigation risk firms issue significantly more 
forecasts containing specific quantitative information as well as more forecasts of 
general qualitative information. Similarly, Rogers et al., (2008) find that management 
pre-announces bad news when it knows that the current earning news is adverse for 
legal or reputational reasons. Their findings provide direct evidence of the relation 
between the litigation environment and firms‘ managerial disclosure of forward looking 
information. 
                                                 
17 On average, firms disclose good news more frequently than bad news (Penman, 1980; Waymire, 
1984). 
 
18 This example is drawn from Skinner (1994). Stockholder lawsuits based on earnings disclosures are 
typically brought under SEC Rule 10b-5 which makes it unlawful for any person to make any untrue 
statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements 
made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading. 
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Third, managers guide analysts‘ forecasts in order to avoid negative earnings surprises. 
In general, managers have a strong incentive to provide management guidance since 
analysts‘ forecasts are optimistically biased at the beginning of the fiscal period.19 
Therefore, firms systematically fail to meet or beat analysts forecast without analysts‘ 
forecast revisions. This motive is of particular interest to our research. Several studies 
document a decline in the level of optimism over time. For instance, Richardson et al., 
(1999) find evidence of a switch from upward-biased to downward biased forecasts as 
the earnings announcement date approaches. Brown (1997) shows evidence that 
optimistic forecast bias from 1993 to 1996 has significantly diminished over time as 
earnings announcement approaches. Matsumoto (2002) finds evidence consistent with 
managers being more likely to guide analysts downward in order to meet or beat the 
forecasts when the initial forecast is optimistic. Their findings indicate that firms are 
increasingly prone to provide management guidance over time. 
 
Other literature shows whether analysts react to public management guidance. Cotter et 
al., (2006) provide evidence that the majority of analyst activity takes place immediately, 
in direct response to management guidance. Stickel (1989) shows evidence that analysts 
avoid revising for two weeks before management guidance and more frequently revise 
immediately after the guidance. Similarly, Soffer et al. (2000) conclude that managers 
choose to guide earnings to create positive earnings surprises on the assumption that 
firms with negative earnings surprises have more negative returns. Their findings 
indicate that analysts quickly revise their earnings forecasts following public 
                                                 
19 However, analysts‘ forecasts become systematically pessimistic prior to the earnings announcement. 
See section 2.2.1. Forecast Bias. 
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management guidance. Managers are likely to guide analysts‘ forecasts and tailor their 
earnings performance so as not to miss analysts‘ expectations. 
 
2.5. Analysts’ Information Environment 
In Table 2-6, studies of analysts‘ forecasts show that analysts can acquire information 
about firms from three main sources: (1) firms‘ public disclosure (i.e., financial reports) 
(2) managers‘ transactions (i.e., trading their stocks) (3) analysts‘ private information 
searching. The research suggests that disparity of knowledge among analysts is usually 
generated by the acquisition of private information, because analysts are likely to have 
equal access to public information (Abdel-khalik, 2008). The issue of how private and 
public information affects firms‘ information environments has several implications.  
 
[Insert Table 2-6 about here] 
 
There are two implications around acquiring public information. First, public 
information reduces information asymmetry among analysts. Public disclosure 
eliminates the information asymmetry that prevailed in the pre-announcement period 
between informed and uninformed traders. For example, Bushman et al., (1997) suggest 
that an earnings announcement, which reduces an insider‘s private information, may 
lead to a less liquid market in the post-announcement period. Kreps (1990) suggests that 
managers should provide full disclosure of private information for investors, in order to 
mitigate the information asymmetry between managers and other investors. Healy et al., 
(2001) suggest that the best solution for information asymmetry is that managers have 
to fully disclose their private information.  
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The second discussion around public information, also raised by Hui et al., (2007), 
proposes that public disclosures stimulate market participants to acquire more private 
information. Holthausen et al., (1990) and Indjejikian (1991) find that trading volume 
increases at the time of earnings announcements and that trading volume is positively 
correlated with the absolute value of the unexpected component of earnings 
announcements. Their results indicate that public announcements can create 
idiosyncratic beliefs. Kim et al., (1994, 1997) suggest that earnings announcements 
motivate analysts to generate the acquisition of private information. Barron et al., 
(2002) conclude that idiosyncratic information increases over time after earnings 
announcements.  
 
Thirdly, private information increases information asymmetry among analysts, which 
leads them to generate different predictions. For example, analysts‘ forecasts 
immediately before the earnings announcement are more informative relative to their 
forecasts immediately after earnings announcements. Ivkovic et al., (2004) find that 
analysts‘ forecasts immediately prior to the earnings announcement are significantly 
more precise than the consensus. Ivkovic et al., (2004) also find that market reactions to 
analysts‘ forecasts issued prior to earnings announcement are stronger than the forecasts 
issued after earnings announcement, which indicates that the forecasts before earnings 
announcement may be informed by private information. This explanation has 
implications for academics examining the association between private information and 
information leakage.  
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In addition to the research discussed above, Barron et al., (1998) measure the private 
information in analysts‘ forecasts. Using the component of forecast dispersion that is 
not explained by publicly available information, they present a model of how analysts‘ 
forecasts are related to their information environment. They develop a model that allows 
for the inference of fundamental properties of analysts‘ information from observed 
forecasts. Barron et al., (1998) base their analysis on a model of expectations in which 
analysts‘ forecasts are determined by common information or idiosyncratic information. 
They show that the quality of public and private information available to analysts can be 
measured by using the overall uncertainty and the average covariance among analysts‘ 
beliefs. 
 
2.6. Herding Behaviour in Analysts’ Forecasts 
Why herd? We review three possible theories explaining why analysts herd. We provide 
several factors that provide incentives for analysts to ignore their own private 
information and follow the consensus forecast. We briefly discuss the empirical study of 
herding behaviour.20  
 
2.6.1. Models of Herding Behaviour 
Recent research on herding behaviour in analysts‘ forecasts improves our understanding 
of analysts‘ forecasting behaviour (Scharfstein et al., 1990; Stickel, 1990; Trueman, 
1994; Welch, 2000; Clement et al., 2005; Bernhardt et al., 2006; Mensha et al., 2008). 
The herding studies can be divided into three explanation models: (1) the informational 
                                                 
20 Previous literature suggests that herding behaviour occurs when individuals follow their predecessors 
to modify their private beliefs. 
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cascades model (2) the principal-agent model (3) the information acquisition model. 
This theoretical background offers insights into why analysts choose to mimic previous 
colleagues‘ forecasts. 
 
2.6.1.1. Informational Cascade Model 
The most general explanation of herding may be the informational cascade, and this is 
applied in a variety of social and business settings (Devenow et al., 1996). Informational 
cascade indicates that the sequence in which information is received may affect 
analysts‘ herding. An informational cascade occurs when it is optimal for an analyst, 
having observed the forecasts of those ahead of him, to follow the preceding analysts‘ 
forecasts regardless of his own information (Bikhchandani et al., 2000). When acting in 
a herd, analysts undertake the same action, but they may have acted differently from one 
another if the realisation of their private signals had been different. In an informational 
cascade, an analyst considers it optimal to follow his predecessors‘ forecasts without 
heeding his private signal.
21
 This domino-like model is often referred to as cascade. 
Papers by Gul et al., (1995), Gale (1996), Zhang (1997), Hirshleifer et al., (1998), and 
Smith et al., (2000) fall into this group.  
2.6.1.2. Principal-Agent Model 
This model was introduced early in herding research and has been called the 
reputational herding model. Reputational herding occurs when analysts choose to ignore 
                                                 
21 Similarly, bank credit policy changes are correlated with changes in fundamental business conditions. 
Rajan (1994) provides evidence from banking in New England in the early 1990s of delays in increasing 
loan-loss reserves and finds that bank managers with short horizons set credit policies which influence 
and are influenced by other banks. Rajan (1994) finds that market observers don‘t blame a banker as 
much for setting aside loan-loss reserves if other banks admit to poor earnings, despite the dramatic 
deterioration of the financial environment. These phenomena trigger a delay in increasing loan-loss 
reserves.  
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their own private information. Scharfstein et al., (1990) examine how managers might 
herd their opinion. There are two types of manager facing identical binary investment 
choices (i.e., smart or dumb) in their research, although neither manager nor capital 
market can identify the type. The smart manager receives informative (true) signals 
about investment projects, while the dumb manager receives purely uninformative 
(noisy) signals. This herding explanation model shows the phenomenon that the smart 
manager tends to choose whatever the signals indicate, while the dumb manager always 
mimics the action of the previous manager regardless of his own signal. If a second 
manager follows their own signal, the observer‘s assessment puts both managers in 
trouble, because observers doubt both managers‘ ability.  
 
On the other hand, if the second manager herds after the first manager, even though the 
results are bad, the reputation of both managers‘ ability stays high and there is an 
assumption that the poor result happened accidently. Consequently, when an analyst 
forecasts with lower accuracy in a firm, it reveals his poor forecasting if the other 
analyst did not forecast the same. Thus, lower accuracy in analyst forecast is not as bad 
for reputation when other analysts make the same mistake. This ―sharing-the-blame 
effect‖ arises because smart analysts tend to receive the correct signals unlike dumb 
ones. Such a result causes analysts to follow the other analysts‘ forecasts instead of 
giving a better performance although they have private information.
22
  
 
                                                 
22 This view is congruent with the result of Graham (1999). Graham (1999) develops the model and 
shows pertinent evidence for analysts who publish investment newsletters. He finds that a newsletter 
analyst is likely to herd on Value Line‘s recommendation (market leader) if (1) follower analyst ability is 
low (2) private informative signals are highly correlated (3) follower analyst initial reputation is high (4) 
prior information is strong and consistent with the leader‘s announcements.  
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2.6.1.3. Information Acquisition Model 
Another line of research is the information acquisition model, which is known as 
investigative herding. This model assumes that information that uncovered only slightly 
later is less valuable even if it has not yet been publicly revealed (Hirshleifer et al., 
1994), and the payoff may also drive the decision of agents for which stocks they 
acquire information (Devenow et al., 1996). Under certain circumstances, investigative 
herding happens when analysts choose to investigate a piece of information they think 
other analysts also will cover. Froot et al., (1992) suggest that analysts tend to focus on 
information that they think other analysts will forecast. An analyst tends to ignore the 
information, if he/she thinks other analysts will not soon discover the information. The 
analyst will herd toward consensus forecast even if he/she is the first recipient who will 
get a benefit or share the valuable information about the price of stock market.
23
 Papers 
by Brennan (1990) and Dow et al. (1994) also fall into this group. In addition, there are 
numerous models in which there is a strong but not dominant influence of early agents 
on later agents (Genotte et al., 1990; Romer, 1993; Bulow et al., 1994; Maug et al., 
1995; Persons et al., 1995). 
2.6.2. Incentives to Herding and Anti-Herding Behaviour 
Table 2-7 shows that studies of herding behaviour fail to reach an agreement as to the 
existence of herding behaviour. The theoretical literature has identified several models 
of analysts‘ herding behaviour, while empirical evidence to corroborate these rationales 
shows mixed results.  
 
                                                 
23 Hirshleifer et al., (1994) suggest that investors who discover information early aggressively in the 
initial period and then partially can profit by the information with lower long-term risk associated with 
price movements that arise from future events they cannot predict. On the other hand, the late informed 
appear to ―follow the leader‖ as they are positively correlated with those of the early informed. 
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On the other hand, the empirical literature is filled with diverse findings. Analysts 
choose to herd toward prior forecasts even if their private information justifies more 
extreme earnings forecasts. Analysts tend to be decided more by forecast consensus 
based on their colleagues‘ opinion than their own information (Olsen, 1996; Cote et al., 
1997; DeBondt et al., 1999; Kim et al., 2003; Ahn et al., 2006; Krishnan et al., 2006). 
 
[Insert Table 2-7 about here] 
 
Do analysts have motives to herd? Previous research suggests that analysts have 
incentives to herd for the following reasons: (1) reputation concerns (2) forecast ability 
(3) difficulty of task. We provide a brief review of this research. First, firms will reward 
analysts who can keep a good reputation since economic profits accrue to firms based 
on analysts‘ reputations. As a result, analysts have a motive to engage in herding 
behaviour in order to protect their reputation by avoiding the downside risk of a unique 
opinion (Trueman, 1994; Cote et al., 1997; Cote et al., 1999; Holmstrom, 1999).
24
   
 
Second, in order to enhance analysts‘ demand, analysts should demonstrate their 
superior forecasting ability. High-ability analysts may receive wages and bonuses in 
accordance with their forecast performance and business ability (Stickel, 1990, 1992, 
1995; O‘Brien, 1990). However, it is difficult to keep up consistently superior 
                                                 
24 Trueman (1994) suggests that herding behaviour is undertaken in order to decrease the downside risk 
of a sole opinion and favourably affect investors‘ assessment of the analysts‘ forecasting ability. Such 
recent change in the environment of securities analysis makes analyst research reports liable to not 
contain their private analyses and just follow prior expectations, in order to avoid risk.  
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performance in their competitive industry.
25
 Average analysts can sustain their services 
by engaging herding behavior because herding behavior mitigates the probability of 
being perceived as an inferior analyst (Cote et al., 1997; Graham, 1999; Clement et al., 
2005). 
 
Third, the higher difficulty of the analysts‘ task associated with diversified companies is 
likely to lead to more herding behaviour (Olsen, 1996).
26
 As the environment of 
security analysts industry is characterized by a high degree of competition, weak 
analysts may have an incentive to use the opportunity to act in their self-interest. 
However, the analysts have extreme difficulty in evaluating their own product since the 
forecasts they offer are actually other experts‘ opinions (Cote et al., 1997; Kim et al., 
2003). 
 
On the other hand, other literature suggests that anti-herding behaviour is prevalent in 
analysts‘ forecasts (Bernhardt et al., 2006; Naujoks et al., 2007; Mensah et al., 2008). 
Studies of anti-herding behaviour are all associated with the Bernhardt et al., (2006). 
Using a simple non-parametric S-Statistic, for evaluating degree of herding, Bernhardt 
et al., (2005) developed an innovative new methodology. Computing the probability of 
anti-herding, they report that S equals 0.592 (59.2%), which means that analysts 
overshoot earnings in the direction away from the consensus.  
 
                                                 
25 The Wall Street Journal (19
th
 June, 1995) suggests that only 33 of the original 215 analysts on the first 
All-Star List remained on this list for three consecutive years.  
26 Olsen (1996) highlights the importance of the level of disclosure to forecast accuracy. Using a sample 
of 520 stocks over the 1985-1987, Olsen (1996) separates the stocks into five portfolios on the basis of 
the earning predictability index. He finds that analysts‘ forecast errors, negative abnormal returns and 
herding behaviour gradually increase as the level of predictability declines. 
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Several studies provide evidence on analysts‘ incentives to deviate toward consensus 
forecast. Laux et al., (1999) document that analysts have a tendency to forecast 
according to their best knowledge. In a subsequent paper, Zitzewitz (2001) analyses 
high-ability analysts who will have opinions that are differ more greatly from the 
consensus forecast. Finally, Bernhardt et al., (2006) find that performance compensation 
causes later analysts to bias their forecasts away from those of earlier analysts as they 
try to distinguish themselves from other analysts. 
 
To concentrate on Korea, in addition, using Ahn‘s model developed by Cote et al., 
(1997), Ahn et al., (2006) examine whether analysts‘ herding behaviour exists in the 
Korean securities market. They find that herding behaviour occurs from 2001 to 2003 
and the level of herding behaviour is related to the number of the companies that the 
analyst covers and forecast accuracy. They also find analysts employed by smaller 
brokers and analysts covering companies with a higher ratio of institutional investors 
are likely to follow their colleagues‘ forecasts. They interpret the results as being due to 
the environmental factors surrounding analysts, and suggest that analysts employed by 
smaller brokers are more likely to have an incentive to mimic the consensus forecast in 
order to reduce the danger of unemployment or loss of bonus caused by forecast 
inaccuracy, than analysts employed by larger broker.  
 
2.7. Information Leakage around Public Announcement 
Finance researchers have considered the case of informed trading leading to information 
asymmetry based on private information prior to public announcements. We provide a 
review of these studies in Table 2-8. The above evidence suggests that abnormal trading 
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volume and stock returns increase where information asymmetry exists among market 
participants. Collett (2004) find evidence that abnormal trading volume and market 
reactions before earnings announcement provide evidence of informed trading in U.K. 
firms. Therefore, an understanding of informed trading prior to earnings announcements 
is also essential to an understanding of trading volume and market reactions to earnings 
announcement, because stocks are traded primarily due to differences in private 
information. Thus, trading volume and market reactions are considered to be important 
measures of information asymmetry prior to earnings announcements.  
 
Additional questions arise as to whether market reactions to earnings announcements 
differ systematically with firm size. Schneible Jr et al., (2005) suggest that abnormal 
trading volume around earnings announcements increases over time and that this 
increase is greater for large firms than small firms. This finding is in line with Atiase 
(1985), who finds that large firms are likely to have informed traders because private 
information acquisition increases with firm size.  
 
Another branch of finance research reports the difference in inequality of opportunity 
between institutional investors (informed traders) and individual investors (uninformed 
traders). Institutional traders are likely to possess superior private information regarding 
actual earnings to that of individual investors. For instance, Lee (1992) finds that 
individual investors trade less often and generally depend on a different set of 
information sources to a firm‘s professional investors. Cready (1988) finds that trading 
volume reaction around earnings announcement is weaker in small traders due to the 
different information they, as opposed to large traders, possess. More comprehensive 
discussion of this literature is provided by Bhattacharya (2001), who shows evidence 
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that the trading activities of small traders may not stimulate large price or volume 
reactions because they tend to rely more heavily on the seasonal random-walk model.
27
 
Their findings indicate that small investors respond to different information signals than 
do large professional traders. To the contrary, Lev (1988) finds no evidence on trading 
volume reactions of individual and institutional traders. 
 
Several studies provide evidence that Korean analysts tend to offer recommendations 
information first to their important clients and then to the public. For example, Kim et 
al., (2005) find that Korean analysts start to leak their recommendations information 
from 20 days prior to the release. Lee et al., (2003) find that Korean analysts tend to 
leak upward recommendations to their important clients from 7 days before the 
announcement date, but no information leakage of downgrade recommendations prior to 
the release.  
 
On the other hand, empirical evidence also suggests how the market incorporates 
private information into stock prices. Kyle (1985) suggests that all private information 
is incorporated into the stock price by the end of trading. Kim et al., (1997) find that an 
informed trader can earn substantial 3% stock returns for 10 minutes after the stock 
market opens. These results are consistent with Holden et al., (1992), who suggest that 
informed traders trade very aggressively and cause most of their private information to 
be revealed very rapidly. 
 
                                                 
27 The Random Walk Model by Ross et al., (1993) in corporate finance is used to characterize the weak 
form efficient market, which is a market whose investors only have full information on past stock prices. 
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Much of the evidence shows a positive correlation between insider trading
28
 and market 
reaction. The implication of the literature is that insiders capitalize on their 
informational advantage by realizing abnormal stock returns. Trading strategically, the 
insiders are likely to release their insider information to the market after they trade. 
Therefore, insiders are indeed better informed traders and earn abnormal future profits. 
For example, Seyhun (1992) reports 2.6 and 5.3% abnormal profits, respectively, in the 
six-month period following insider purchase and sale transactions. Chakravarty et al., 
(1999) provide evidence that insider traders have a differential impact on price 
discovery to non-insider trades.  
 
2.8. Regulation Fair Disclosure 
Is Regulation FD likely to materially solve the SEC‘s concerns over market 
imperfections? Numerous researchers and the business press have reported widely 
differing effects of Regulation FD. Researchers suggest that the information transfer 
process in the securities market has changed after the adoption of Regulation FD while 
others indicate that firms are providing less disclosure. We provide an overview of the 
empirical results on Regulation FD in the U.S. and in Korea.  
 
2.8.1. Empirical studies on Regulation FD in the U.S. 
In order to shed some light on the reviews in this field, we have divided this review into 
six sections: (1) analysts‘ forecast performance (2) earnings guidance (3) informed 
trading (4) volatility of stock returns (5) trading cost (6) other factors. In Table 2-9, 
                                                 
28 Insider trading refers to transactions by top officers, directors, and large shareholders who own 10 
percent or more of a company‘s shares (Lakonishok et al., 2001). 
 35 
 
some empirical studies show evidence of decreasing selective disclosure without 
impairment of information after the adoption of Regulation FD. However, other studies 
question the positive impact of Regulation FD on the financial market. We summarize 
the previous research on Regulation FD. 
 
[Insert Table 2-9 about here] 
 
2.8.1.1. Analysts’ Forecasts Performance 
The change in analysts‘ forecasting ability has been of interest to finance researchers, 
since Regulation FD prevents managers from disclosing selectively to analysts. 
However, empirical findings showed mixed results. First, some researchers argue that 
earnings forecasting has become more difficult after the adoption of Regulation FD. For 
example, Mohanram et al., (2002), Shane et al., (2002) and Agrawal et al., (2006) find 
that analysts closely linked to management are more likely to decline in forecast 
accuracy in the post-FD period. They suggest that analysts who were likely to enjoy 
superior information access through their private contacts with managers in the pre-FD 
period are more likely to be adversely affected in the post-FD period.  
 
In addition, Findlay et al., (2006) and Kwag et al., (2007) also find that analysts who 
had relatively high levels of forecast accuracy prior to the adoption of Regulation FD do 
not maintain their performance afterwards. They suggest that Regulation FD adversely 
affects forecast accuracy. One possible explanation for these findings is that Regulation 
FD eliminates private communications between managers and analysts. 
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On the other hand, other researchers argue that forecast ability has not been changed in 
the post-FD period because Regulation FD has not led to a deterioration of information 
flow. For example, Heflin et al., (2003) find that informational efficiency has improved 
after the adoption of Regulation FD and that there is no significant change in analyst 
forecast accuracy and forecast dispersion.  
 
In contrast to the proponents‘ research, opponents of Regulation FD argue that 
Regulation FD leads to less forecast accuracy and higher forecast dispersion since the 
regulation leads to ‗cookie cutter‘ disclosure resulting in a ―chilling‖ effect on 
information. Irani et al., (2003) find that forecast dispersion has increased in the post-
FD period since Regulation FD may lead to a decrease in the quantity and quality of 
available information.  
 
In addition to the research discussed above, Chen et al., (2006) examine whether 
managers provide more information to analysts based on their more favourable 
recommendations. Managers generally discriminate among analysts by providing more 
private access to an analyst issuing more positive reports and by retaliating against an 
analyst releasing negative reports of the firms (Kelly, 2003). Chen et al., (2006) find 
that the relatively greater increase in relative accuracy for the more favourable 
recommendation groups does not exist in the post-FD period. Chen et al., (2006) 
suggest that Regulation FD has not eliminated the manager‘s ability to provide or 
withhold information to analysts with its recommended changes.  
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2.8.1.2. Earnings Guidance  
As we studied in section 8.4, prior research has generally focused on the motivation for 
management guidance. How does Regulation FD influence firms‘ disclosure policy? 
What are the economic consequences of this regulation? Studies of Regulation FD have 
offered several explanations for changes in earnings guidance after the adoption of the 
Regulation. For example, Wang (2007) finds that about half of the firms classified as 
pre-FD private disclosers replace private disclosure with nondisclosure. These firms 
suffer from an economically significant deterioration in their information.  
 
In contrast, pre-FD private disclosers that replace private earnings guidance with public 
disclosure experience no significant deterioration in their information environments. 
The above evidence suggests that firms replace pre-FD private disclosures with post-FD 
new public disclosures that are valuably informative. The most significant conclusion of 
this study is that the regulation influences the firms‘ disclosure policy. 
 
Studies of earnings guidance examine whether managers now issue their guidance to the 
public instead of disclosing it to a selective group of analysts after the adoption of 
Regulation FD. Feldman et al., (2006) suggest that investors can now access the 
information disclosed by firms in their earnings guidance as the regulators intended. 
Their evidence suggests that there has been a considerable change in management 
guidance in the post-FD period.  
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2.8.1.3. Informed Trading  
Are managers and analysts still leaking their forthcoming earnings information or 
recommendation information? Studies of Regulation FD assume that informed trading 
decreases in the post-FD period since the regulation contributes to equal access to 
material information. Therefore, these studies addressing the effect of Regulation FD on 
informed trading prior to public announcement are of particular interest to academic and 
our research.  
 
Studies provided by Chiyachantana et al., (2004), Gadarowski et al., (2008) and Ahmed 
et al., (2007) conclude that Regulation FD contributes to the elimination of informed 
trading and information leakage. For example, Chiyachantana et al., (2004) find that 
Regulation FD has been effective in decreasing the level of information asymmetry in 
the days both immediately prior to and after the release of earnings. Gadarowski et al., 
(2008) find evidence of positive correlation between stock returns two days before 
earnings announcement in the pre-Regulation FD period, but not in the post-Regulation 
FD period. They ascribe this to the reduction in informed trading. Ahmed et al., (2007) 
compare abnormal trading volume and absolute abnormal stock returns around earnings 
announcements in post-FD quarters. They find strong evidence of a decrease in 
information asymmetry in the post-FD period. Their results suggest that Regulation FD 
accomplishes its goal by decreasing information asymmetry. However, Collver (2006) 
finds no evidence of decline in informed trading during earnings announcement in the 
post-FD period.  
 
 39 
 
In addition to the research discussed above, Cornett et al., (2007) examine whether a 
potential disparity of material information between affiliated and unaffiliated analysts 
exists with the passage of Regulation FD. They find that stock price reactions to 
analysts‘ (both affiliated and unaffiliated) recommendation changes decrease after the 
passage of Regulation FD. Cornett et al., (2007) suggest that Regulation FD is 
successful in curbing selective disclosure among competing analysts. The pattern of 
findings suggests that Regulation FD contributes to reducing informed trading and 
information leakage.  
 
2.8.1.4. Return Volatility  
Higher stock returns indicate more informative prices. Atiase (1985) suggests that a 
larger market response would be consistent with increased market volatility. Ross 
(1989) verifies that a more informative price should be more volatile. Papers studying 
Regulation FD examine whether the regulation influences returns volatility around 
earnings announcement. The researchers show no evidence of increase in return 
volatility around earnings announcement after the adoption of Regulation FD. For 
example, Shane et al., (2002) find evidence that market reaction to earnings 
announcement has significantly reduced after the adoption of Regulation FD. They 
suggest that investors have been more successful in gathering uncertainty-reducing 
information in the post-FD period. Heflin et al., (2003) find no significant increase in 
returns volatility to earnings release in the post-FD period. They report that Regulation 
FD results in more discrete information by means of significant information releases 
from firms.  
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Adopting a similar approach, Eleswarapu et al., (2004) find no evidence of change in 
volatility at the time of mandatory announcements in the post-FD period. This finding 
would be consistent with Regulation FD‘s proponents‘ case that firms adopt other forms 
of public disclosure to convey information previously released by selective disclosure. 
Bailey et al., (2003) also evidence that market reaction around earnings releases 
displays no significant change in return volatility. Overall, this evidence indicates that 
Regulation FD does not influence stock return volatility.  
 
On the other hand, other researchers, such as Ferreira et al., (2006) examine the 
markets‘ response to investment recommendation change after the adoption of 
Regulation FD. Ferreira et al., (2006) find that markets respond to analysts‘ 
recommendations change in the same way since Regulation FD as they did before, 
which suggests that the regulation does not influence the analyst recommendation 
process.  
 
2.8.1.5. Trading Cost  
Some studies of the effect of Regulation FD examine whether the regulation influences 
trading cost.29 Studies report evidence that firms that adopted selective disclosure face 
higher bid-ask spreads compared to firms that did not disclose selectively. Research 
shows that except for one study, most of the research coincides on their results. For 
example, Eleswarapu et al., (2002) find that the risk of adverse selection during 
                                                 
29 The trading cost measures the bid-ask spread and includes both an adverse selection component and a 
pure trading cost component. The adverse selection component compensates market makers for the risk of 
inadvertently trading against superior information (Eleswarapu et al., 2002). The adverse selection 
component should be an increasing function of the fraction of traders who are informed and the quality of 
their superior information (Glosten et al., 1985). 
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information events has significantly reduced in the post-FD period. The results indicate 
that the regulation has reduced the degree of preferential access to material information 
around earnings announcements. Sunder (2002) subsequently verifies that there are no 
longer differences in bid-ask spreads for open and restricted firms in the post-FD period. 
Sunder (2002) ascribes these results to the decrease in information asymmetry in the 
post-FD period. Once again, Lee et al., (2004) find evidence of little or no increase in 
the adverse-selection component after the adoption of Regulation FD, not supporting the 
critics of the regulation. 
 
In contrast, Straser (2002) finds that the bid-ask spread has increased and the proportion 
of informed traders has significantly decreased. He suggests that firms provide a lower 
quality of public information in the post-FD period, as Regulation FD limits private 
information. 
 
2.8.1.6. Other Factors 
Some research on Regulation FD examines whether there can be information 
asymmetry among institutional investors even after the adoption of Regulation FD. The 
research indicates that credit analysts at rating agencies have access to confidential 
information that is not available to securities analysts because some favoured 
investment professionals have exclusive power to access non-public disclosures. For 
example, Jorion et al. (2005) examine the changes in the information content of ratings 
announcement in the post-FD period. Jorion et al., (2005) find that market reaction to 
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upgrades, generally insignificant in prior research,30  has become significant after 
Regulation FD. They interpret these results as indicating that Regulation FD gives them 
an unexpected advantage. 
 
Other research has looked into the effect of Regulation FD on the first-forecast 
horizon. 31  Janakiraman et al., (2007) find that the first-forecast horizon has 
significantly decreased in the post-FD period. However, their research has been 
criticized by Brown (2007). Brown (2007) points out the unreasonableness of 
Janakiraman et al., (2007) as follows; citing Campbell et al., (1966): (1) quite different 
test years; (2) no control group; (3) inability to control when the intervention occurs; (4) 
inability to determine whether there is both an intercept shift and a slope shift by using 
only time-series data.  
 
2.8.2. Empirical studies on Regulation FD in Korea  
How does Regulation FD influence the Korean market? As shown Table 2-10, most 
papers show positive evidence of the effect of Regulation FD on the Korean stock 
market. There is a consensus in the research that selective disclosure decreases and 
public information increases after the adoption of Regulation FD as reported in, for 
example, Lee et al., (2003), Kim et al., (2005), Jang et al., (2007) and Oh et al., (2006).  
 
[Insert Table 2-10 about here] 
 
                                                 
30 See Holthausen et al., (1986), Hand et al., (1992) and Dichev et al., (2001). 
31 The forecast horizon is computed as the number of calendar days between the issue of the analysts‘ first 
earnings forecast for a quarter and the fiscal quarter-end date. For further details of forecast horizon, see 
Bandyopadhyay et al., (1995), Das et al., (1998), Raedy et al., (2006), Lustgarten et al., (2008).  
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The first three studies examine the change in market reaction to public announcement 
around public release in the post-FD period. Lee et al., (2003), the first Korean 
empirical research on Regulation FD, tries to answer the research question: Has 
Regulation FD contributed to the levelling of information asymmetry among market 
participants? They find clear evidence of information leakage before recommendation 
announcement in the pre-FD period, but not in the post-FD period. Similarly, using a 
sample of 1,500 Korean firm-observations during 2002-2003, Kim et al., (2005) 
examine the information asymmetry between firms and market participants. They find 
that both return volatility and trading volume around earnings release have decreased 
and that the quantity of the disclosures has significantly increased in the post-FD period. 
Kim et al., (2005) find that promotional disclosures32 do not generate any significant 
price action while earnings-related disclosures have a strong market reaction. Oh et al., 
(2006) find evidence that forecast errors and forecast dispersion have decreased in the 
post-FD period. Their results are not consistent with U.S. results. They ascribe the 
results to an increase in the dissemination of available public information.  
 
This result led us to research further. Jang et al., (2007) show evidence of a decrease in 
stock returns to good-news and trading volume to bad-news in the post-FD period. They 
suggest that informativeness of earnings may have increased after the adoption of the 
regulation. Overall, the results above imply that Regulation FD compells firms to 
disseminate material information effectively to all market participants, consistent with 
Regulation FD‘s goal in eliminating selective disclosure.  
                                                 
32 Kim et al. (2005) classified firms‘ fair disclosure into two categories: promotional disclosure and 
earnings-related disclosure. Promotional disclosures include corporate disclosures regarding contract 
signing, corporate planning, investor relationships and new product development, and account for about 
60% of the cases; and earnings-related disclosures include look-forwarding financial information and 
earnings guidance (i.e., earnings warnings). 
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On the other hand, Lee et al., (2005) have taken a position against the proponents of 
Regulation FD. They find that the quantity of earnings forecasts by analysts covering 
small-size firms has decreased. They interpret their results as following a notion that 
small-size companies may have a chilling effect on information due to the comparative 
large cost of information. They also find that forecast accuracy has not changed in the 
post-FD period. 
 
In conclusion, analytical research provides evidence that Regulation FD has performed 
as expected by the SEC, specially reducing selective disclosure among market 
participants. To date, however, empirical research documents mixed results regarding 
analysts‘ forecast ability and quality of information to the public after the adoption of 
Regulation FD, especially outside US. Specifically, many proponents of Regulation FD 
suggest that the regulation made forecasting more difficult due to the decrease in private 
communications between analysts and management.  
 
In addition, some opponents of the Regulation FD‘s suggest that the regulation may 
lead firms suppressing their disclosure. On the other hand, one can argue that analysts‘ 
forecasts ability should not decrease since private information can be compensated by 
more available public information in the post-FD period. We address the above 
controversial issues by providing novel evidence, utilizing the most comprehensive data 
set on Korean market.  
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ANNEX 1 
Table 2-1 Summary of Empirical Studies on Forecast Bias 
Study Sample Source Sample 
Country 
Sample 
Size 
Firm  
Type 
Type of Data Time 
Period 
Econometric 
Measures 
used 
The Result of Empirical Analysis 
Givoly  
(1985) 
S&P U.S. 6,020 NYSE Annual Forecasts 1969-1972 Regression Analysts‘ forecasts are formed in a rational manner in 
the sense that they incorporate available information 
in the forecasts. 
Brown et al., 
(1987) 
Compustat, I/B/E/S 
Value Line 
U.S. 702 Firms included in 
the Value Line 
Quarterly Forecasts 1977-1982 Regression Analysts‘ forecasts are superior to the time series 
model. 
Ali et al., 
(1992) 
Compustat, I/B/E/S U.S. 5,365 NYSE, NASDAQ Forecasts 1978-1989 Regression Overestimation bias in forecast is most pronounced 
for firms that recently experienced negative earnings  
Francis et al., 
(1993) 
Value Line Investment 
Survey 
U.S. 918 Firms included in 
the Value Line 
Quarterly and 
annual forecasts 
1987-1989 Regression Analysts‘ forecasts are optimistic, on average, and are 
more optimistic for sell and hold stocks than buy 
stocks. 
McNichols et 
al., (1997) 
Research Holdings, 
Limited 
Standard &Poor 
U.S. 1,832 All Annual forecasts 07.1987-
12.1994 
Regression Analysts revise their forecasts of newly added stocks‘ 
earnings more frequently than for other stocks, 
suggesting that more intense effort may underlie the 
greater accuracy. 
Ackert et al., 
(1997) 
Compustat, I/B/E/S U.S. 34,876 All Consensus Forecasts 1980-1991 Brown-Mood 
Test 
Analysts are not overoptimistic for firms with low 
uncertainty as proxied by forecast dispersion. 
Dechow et 
al., (2000) 
Securities Data Company, 
Inc Compustat, I/B/E/S 
Compustat 
U.S. 1,179 Firms with 
Common stock 
offerings 
forecasts within 12 
months surrounding 
the offer date 
1981-1990 Regression Analysts affiliated with the lead underwriter of an 
offering tend to issue more overly optimistic forecasts 
than unaffiliated analysts. 
Lin et al., 
(2000) 
Securities Data Company, 
Inc Compustat, I/B/E/S 
Compustat, Research 
Holdings, Limited 
U.S. 2,400 Firms with 
Common stock 
offerings 
Lead underwriter 
annual forecasts  
1985-1994 Regression Underwriter analysts‘ forecasts are significantly more 
favorable than those made by unaffiliated analysts 
although their earnings forecasts are not generally 
greater. 
Lim (2001) Compustat, I/B/E/S U.S. 103,242 All Quarterly Forecasts 1984-1996 Regression Company size and analyst coverage are inversely 
related with forecast bias 
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Abarbanell et 
al., (2003) 
Compustat, I/B/E/S U.S. 123,822 All Quarterly Forecasts 1985-1998 Regression Analysts‘ forecasts errors are relatively small but 
statistically influential asymmetries. 
Richardson et 
al., (2005) 
Compustat, I/B/E/S U.S. 703,877 All Annual Forecasts 1983-1997 Regression Forecast errors are more pessimistic in recent years 
(1992-1997). At the beginning of the fiscal year, 
analysts place more weight on pleasing management 
and less on forecast accuracy, and so report optimistic 
initial forecasts. 
Ke et al., 
(2006) 
First Call/Thomson 
Financial Insider Research 
Services Historical Files 
I/B/E/S, Securities Data 
Company 
U.S. 228,904 All Quarterly and 
annual forecasts 
01.1983-
06.2000 
Regression Analysts try to please firms‘ management and obtain 
the associated benefits by issuing optimistically 
biased forecast. 
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Table 2-2 Summary of Empirical Studies on Forecast Accuracy 
Study Sample Source Sample 
Country 
Sample 
Size 
Firm  
Type 
Type of Data Time 
Period 
Econometric 
Measures 
used 
The Result of Empirical Analysis 
Brown et al., 
(1987) 
Compustat, I/B/E/S 
Value Line 
U.S. 702 Sample Quarterly 
Forecasts 
1977-1982 Regression Analysts‘ forecasts are superior to the time series model. 
Forecast accuracy is positively related to firm size and 
forecast dispersion. 
Bhushan 
(1988) 
Nelson‘s Directory of 
Wall Street Research 
U.S. 1,409 Firms listed in 
NYSE, AMEX 
Forecasts 1985 Regression Analyst following is associated with higher forecast 
accuracy. 
Stickel 
(1992) 
Compustat, I/B/E/S 
ZACKS 
U.S. 211,054 All Annual 
Forecasts 
1981-1985 Regression Members of the Institutional Investor All-American 
Research Team supply more accurate earnings forecasts 
than other analysts. 
Dugar (1995) Compustat, I/B/E/S 
CRSP 
U.S. 32,147 All Quarterly 
Forecasts 
04.1994-
03.2000 
Regression Profitability of the stock recommendations of superior 
earnings forecasters significantly outperforms the 
recommendations of inferior forecasters. 
Mikhail et 
al.,(1997) 
Compustat, I/B/E/S 
ZACKS 
U.S. 38,505 All Quarterly 
Forecasts 
1980-1995 Regression Analysts‘ experience improves the consensus forecast 
accuracy. 
Mikhail et 
al.,(1997) 
Compustat, I/B/E/S 
ZACKS 
U.S. 5,434 All Quarterly 
Forecasts 
1985-1995 Regression An analyst is more likely to turn over if his forecast 
accuracy is lower than that of his peers. 
Jacob et al., 
(1999) 
Compustat, I/B/E/S 
ZACKS 
U.S. 31,406 All Quarterly 
Forecasts 
1981-1992 Regression Forecast horizon, analysts following, forecast frequency, 
broker industry specialization, and broker size are 
associated with higher forecast accuracy, while outgoing 
broker analyst turnover is associated with lower forecast 
accuracy. 
Clement 
(1999) 
Compustat, I/B/E/S 
 
U.S. 890,429 All Annual 
Forecasts 
1983-1994 Regression Forecast accuracy is positively associated with analysts' 
experience and broker size and negatively associated with 
the number of firms and industries followed by the 
analyst.  
Mensah et 
al., (2004) 
Compustat, I/B/E/S 
 
U.S. 3,716 All Annual 
Forecasts 
1987-1999 Regression Accounting conservatism is associated with higher 
forecast errors and forecast dispersion. 
 48 
Table 2-3 Summary of Empirical Studies on Forecast Dispersion  
Study Sample Source Sample 
Country 
Sample 
Size 
Firm  
Type 
Type of Data Time 
Period 
Econometric 
Measures 
used 
The Result of Empirical Analysis 
Dische et al., 
(2002) 
I/B/E/S 
 
Germany 2,384 German firms Annual forecasts 1987-2000 Regression Dispersion in analysts‘ consensus forecasts contains 
incremental information to predict future stock returns 
Kwon (2002) Compustat 
CNNFN.com 
U.S. 2,728 Sample Annual forecasts 1990-1997 Regression Forecast error and forecast dispersion for high-tech firms is 
lower relative to that for low-tech firms. 
Ackert et al., 
(1997) 
Compustat, 
I/B/E/S 
CRSP 
U.S. 59,643 Firms listed in NYSE, 
AMEX and NASDAQ 
Annual forecasts 1976-2000 Regression Stocks with higher dispersion in analysts‘ earnings forecasts 
earn lower future returns 
Athanassakos 
et al., (2003) 
Compustat, 
I/B/E/S 
CRSP 
U.S. 30,720 All Consensus 
forecasts 
1981-1996 Regression There is a strong and positive relationship between analysts‘ 
forecast dispersion and future return volatility 
Alexandridis 
et al., (2007) 
Thomson 
Financial 
Datastream 
U.K. 4,641 U.K public firms Annual forecasts 1986-2002 Regression Negative long-run abnormal returns are mainly detected 
when opinion dispersion is high 
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Table 2-4 Summary of Empirical Studies on Earnings Management  
Study Sample Source Sample 
Country 
Sample 
Size 
Firm 
Type 
Type of Data Time 
Period 
Incentive to sooth 
Management 
Econometric 
Measures 
used 
The Result of Empirical Analysis 
Barth et al., 
(1999) 
I/B/E/S, CRSP 
Compustat,  
U.S. 21,173 All Annual actual 
earnings and 
analysts forecast 
1982-
1992 
To achieve market 
premium 
Regression Firms with increasing earnings have higher stock 
returns than other firms. 
Kasnik et al., 
(2002) 
I/B/E/S, 
Compustat 
U.S. 3,373 All Annual analyst 
forecast 
1988-
1993 
To achieve market 
premium 
Regression Firms meeting forecasts‘ expectations have a 
market premium than those for missing the 
expectations. 
Bartov et al., 
(2002) 
I/B/E/S U.S. 64,872 All Quarterly actual 
earnings and 
analysts forecast 
1983-
1997 
To achieve market 
premium 
Regression Firms that meet or beat analysts‘ forecasts enjoy a 
higher return than firms that fail to meet these 
expectations. 
Lopez et al., 
(2002) 
I/B/E/S, 
Compustat, 
CRSP 
U.S. 73,151 All Quarterly actual 
earnings and 
analysts forecast 
1983-
1998 
To achieve market 
premium 
Regression Meeting analysts‘ forecast is a powerful variable in 
explaining abnormal return than profit or loss 
position of the firms.  
Healy (1985)  Moody's 
Industrial 
Manual 
U.S. 1,527 Companies listed on 
the 1980 Fortune 
Directory of the 250 
largest U.S. firms 
Bonus plan 
information  
1964-
1980 
To maximize their 
compensation 
Regression,  
 
Managers are more likely to choose income-
decreasing accruals when their bonus plan upper or 
lower bounds are binding, and income-increasing 
accruals when these bounds are not binding. 
Clinch et al., 
(1993) 
bank holding 
companies on 
survey of 
Forbes 
U.S. 63 Banks Compensation for 
CEOs -Salary plus 
bonus- 
1985-
1989 
To maximize their 
compensation 
Regression Income from discretionary transactions influences 
the CEO compensation function. 
Matsunaga  
et al., (2002) 
ExecuComp, 
First Call, 
Compustat, and 
CRSP 
U.S. 1,324 All Quarterly actual 
earnings and 
analysts forecast 
1993-
1997 
To maximize their 
compensation  
Regression CEO bonus provides CEOs with economic 
incentives to meet earnings forecast and earnings 
from the prior year. 
Matsumoto 
(2002)  
Zacks, 
Compustat, 
Spectrum, and 
CRSP 
U.S. 29,460 All Quarterly actual 
earnings and 
analysts forecast 
1993-
1997 
To report positive 
profits. 
Regression Managing earnings likely yields more optimal 
terms of trade with stakeholders. 
Firms are likely to manage earnings upward or 
guide analysts‘ forecasts downward to avoid 
missing expectations at the earnings announcement. 
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Burgstahler  
et al., (1997) 
Compustat 
database 
U.S. 64,466 All  Price-scaled 
earnings change 
1976-
1994 
To avoid negative 
earnings surprise  
and achieve 
compensation 
Cross-
sectional 
distribution 
Frequencies of small earnings decreases and small 
losses are abnormally low relative to adjacent 
regions of the distributions, while the frequencies 
of small earnings increases and small positive 
earnings are abnormally high.  
Degeorge et al. 
(1999) 
Abel-Noser, 
I/B/E/S 
U.S. 5,387 All Quarterly actual 
earnings 
1974-
1996 
To avoid negative 
earnings surprise 
T-statistic test Positive profits threshold proves predominant. 
Payne et al.,  
(2000) 
I/B/E/S U.S. 13,532 All Analyst forecast 1988-
1997 
To avoid negative 
earnings surprise 
Regression Managers move earnings toward analysts‘ forecast 
when pre-managed earnings are below market 
expectations. 
Brown (2001) I/B/E/S, 
Compustat 
U.S. 176,519 All Quarterly actual 
earnings and 
analysts forecast. 
1984-
1999 
To avoid negative 
earnings surprise 
Cross-
sectional 
distribution 
Median surprise for profits exceeds that for losses 
in every year. 
Charoenwong, 
et al., (2008) 
Pacific-Basin 
Capital Market, 
Bureau Van  
Dijk‘s Osiris 
Singapore 
and 
Thailand 
915 Singapore stock 
Exchange and The 
Stock Exchange of 
Thailand listed 
company 
Quarterly actual 
earnings  
 
1975-
2003 
To avoid negative 
earnings surprise 
T-statistic test There is significant evidence of earnings 
management to report or positive profits. 
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Table 2-5 Summary of Empirical Studies on Management Guidance  
Study Sample Source Sample 
Country 
Sample 
Size 
Firm  
Type 
Type of Data Time 
Period 
Why Managers Guide 
Earnings? 
Econometric 
Measures 
used 
The Result of Empirical Analysis 
Stickel 
(1989) 
Zacks 
Investment 
Research 
U.S. 3,544 Firms forecasted by 
management 
Managerial 
earnings forecasts, 
analysts forecasts 
1982-1985 To adjust investor‘s 
expectations about firm 
performance 
Regression Analysts avoid revising for two weeks 
before management guidance and frequently 
revise immediately after the guidance. 
Lev and 
Penman 
(1990) 
Wall Street 
Journal 
U.S. 3,420 Firms forecasted by 
management 
Managerial 
earnings forecasts   
1968-1975 To distinguish their 
firms from other firms 
Regression Managerial information implies that firms‘ 
values are larger than the average valuation 
assumed by the market and the firms‘ values 
will be revised upward 
Skinner 
(1994) 
Nasdaq NMS, 
CRSP 
 
U.S. 93 Firms forecasted by 
management in 
NASDAQ listed firms 
Random earnings-
related voluntary 
disclosures 
1981-1990 To preempt legal risk Maximum-
likelihood 
estimates 
Managers voluntarily disclose earnings 
information to avoid legal ability or 
reputation effects. 
Kasnik et al., 
(1995) 
Compustat, 
I/B/E/S 
U.S. 3,373 Firms forecasted by the 
523 sample firms 
Managerial 
earnings forecasts  
and sales 
1986-1993 To preempt legal risk Regression Firms in high-litigation industries have a 
higher probability of warning before large 
negative earnings surprises.  
Richardson  
et al., (1999) 
I/B/E/S U.S. 179,471 Firms forecasted by 
management 
Managerial 
earnings forecasts, 
analysts forecasts 
1983-1997 To adjust investor‘s 
expectations about firm 
performance 
Regression Management guides the analyst toward a 
final forecast to avoid an earnings 
disappointment. 
Soffer et al., 
(2000) 
First Call, 
Compustat, 
CRSP 
U.S. 541 Firms forecasted by 
management 
Managerial 
earnings forecasts, 
analysts forecasts 
09.1992-
12.1996 
To adjust investor‘s 
expectations about firm 
performance 
Regression Managers strategically select 
preannouncement amounts to circumvent 
negative earnings announcement surprise. 
Johnson  
et al., (2001) 
Nasdaq NMS, 
CRSP 
 
U.S. 547 Computer hardware, 
computer software,  
pharmaceutical industry 
Managerial 
earnings forecasts  
and sales 
1994-1996 To preempt legal risk Regression High litigation risk firms issue significantly 
more forecasts containing specific 
quantitative and qualitative information. 
Cotter et al., 
(2006) 
First Call‘s 
Guidelines 
U.S. 8,198 Firms forecasted by 
management 
Managerial 
earnings forecasts, 
analysts forecasts 
1995-2001 To adjust investor‘s 
expectations about firm 
performance 
Regression Analysts react quickly to management 
guidance to meet or beat earning targets 
when managers preannounce. 
Rogers et al., 
(2008) 
First Call, 
CRSP, I/B/E/S, 
Option Metrics 
U.S. 23,474 Firms forecasted by 
management 
Managerial 
earnings forecast 
and sales 
1996-2006 To preempt legal risk Regression Managers preannounce bad news when 
current earning news is adverse for legal or 
reputational reasons. 
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Table 2-6 Summary of Empirical Studies on Analysts’ Information Environment  
Study Sample Source Sample 
Country 
Sample 
Size 
Firm Type Type of Data Time 
Period 
Econometric 
Measures used 
The Result of Empirical Analysis 
Barron, et al., 
(2002) 
CRSP, I/B/E/S, 
Compustat 
U.S. 990 All Annual forecasts 1986-1997 Regression The consensus among security analysts decreases 
after quarterly earnings announcement, which means 
that earnings announcements lead analysts to acquire 
private information. 
Ivković et al., 
(2004) 
CRSP, I/B/E/S, 
Compustat 
U.S. 544,972 All Quarterly 
Forecasts 
01 1990-
03.2002 
Regression Analysts revising forecasts have access to more 
precise information immediately prior to earnings 
announcements relative to the other analysts, while 
there is no evidence of superior information 
immediately after the earnings announcement. 
Hui et al., 
(2007) 
CRSP, I/B/E/S, 
Compustat 
U.S. 5956 All Annual forecasts 1986-2004 Regression Earnings announcements trigger analysts to acquire 
private information about upcoming annual earnings. 
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Table 2-7 Summary of Empirical Studies on Analysts’ Herding Behaviour  
Study Sample 
Country 
Sample 
Source 
Sample 
Size 
Company 
Type 
Frequency and 
Type of Data 
Time 
Period 
Herding 
Measures 
used 
Result of Empirical Analysis Result for 
Herding 
Olsen (1996) U.S. I/B/E/S and 
CRSP 
4,160 All Quarterly 
forecasts 
1985-
1987 
Olsen Herding behaviour gradually increases as forecast bias 
increases.  
Herding 
Cote et al., (1997) U.S. National 
Association 
of Investors 
(NAIC) 
275 
 
Sample Annual forecast 
and four year 
financial 
summary 
- Cote and 
Sanders (CS) 
Analysts with a highly valued reputation and analysts 
evaluating consensus forecast credibility are likely to 
engage in herding behaviour while forecast ability is 
inversely related to the level of the herding behaviour. 
Herding 
De Bondt et al.,  
(1999) 
U.K. I/B/E/S and 
CRSP 
441,000 All Quarterly and 
yearly forecast 
1986-
1997 
De Bondt and  
Forbes (DF) 
Herding behaviour occurs weakly, but nevertheless 
significantly in the U.K. securities market. 
Herding 
Kim et al., (2003) U.S. I/B/E/S and 
Standard 
&Poor‘s 
Compustat  
15,024 
 
All Annual 
forecasts 
1980-
1998 
Kim and 
Pantzalis 
(KP) 
Herding behavior increases with the degree of both 
geographical and industrial diversification. 
Geographically or industrially diversified firms are more 
herding than domestic or industrially focused firms. 
Herding 
Bernhardt et al., 
(2004) 
U.S. I/B/E/S and 
CRSP 
387,756 
 
All Quarterly 
forecasts 
1989-
2001 
Bernhardt, 
Campello and 
Kutsoati  
59.2% of the analysts‘ forecasts show anti-herding 
behaviour. 
Anti-herding  
Ahn et al., (2006) Korea FN-Guide 3,951 
 
All Annual 
forecasts 
2001-
2003 
Ahn‘s Herding behaviour occurs from 2001 to 2003 in Korean 
securities market. 
Herding 
Krishnan et al.,  
(2006) 
U.S. I/B/E/S 1,293,48
7 
All Quarterly actual 
earnings and 
analysts 
forecast 
1990-
2004 
Fama and 
MacBeth 
(FM) 
75% of the analysts‘ forecasts show herding behaviour Herding  
 
Naujoks et al.,  
(2007) 
Germany I/B/E/S 77,279 
 
All Annual 
forecasts 
1994-
2005 
BCK An average S-statistic of 0.583 is either above or below 
the consensus forecast and actual earnings. 
Anti-herding  
Mensah, et al.,  
(2008) 
U.S. I/B/E/S 126,605 
 
All Quarterly 
forecasts 
1998-
2004 
DHI, BCK Regulation FD is not associated with increase in herding 
behaviour. (Anti-herding : Pre-FD: 63.3, Post-FD: 65.5) 
Anti-herding 
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Table 2-8 Summary of Empirical Studies on Informed Trading 
Study Sample Source Sample 
Country 
Sample 
Size 
Firm  
Type 
Type of Data Time 
Period 
Econometric 
Measures 
used 
The Result of Empirical Analysis 
Cready 
(1988) 
Compustat U.S. 2,327 listed firms in the NYSE Earnings 
announcement 
01.1981-
08.1982 
Mean 
difference test 
High-wealth investors are associated with speedier 
responses to information releases than firms characterized 
by low-wealth investors. 
Lee et al., 
(1992) 
Institute for the 
Study of 
Security 
Markets 
U.S. 1,463 listed firms in the NYSE, 
the AMEX, or the 
NASDAQ 
first 
announcement 
after earnings 
announcement  
1988 Mean 
difference test 
Volume reaction in small and large trades to different types 
of earnings news. 
Kim et al., 
(1997) 
Dow Jones 
News Wire 
U.S. 115 Firms reported on the 
Dow Jones News Wire 
analyst's 
announcements of 
initial  buy 
recommendation,  
1991 Mean 
difference test 
It takes five minutes of trading for NYSE/AMEX stocks and 
15 minutes for NASDAQ stocks to reflect the private 
information contained in these analyst recommendations, 
when informational asymmetry is high. 
Bhattacharya 
(2001) 
Institute for the 
Study of  
Security 
Markets 
U.S. 1,972 listed firms in the NYSE, 
the AMEX, or the 
NASDAQ 
quarterly earnings 
announcements 
1988-1992 Regression Small traders' abnormal trading increases in the seasonal 
random-walk forecast errors. In contrast, large traders' 
abnormal trading response is not positively associated with 
seasonal random-walk forecast errors 
Schneibel Jr 
et al., (2005) 
Thomson 
Financial 
Ownership 
Database. 
CRSP 
U.S. 34,030 all Quarterly earnings 
announcement 
2000-2003 Regression Firm size and institutional ownership are determinants of 
pre-announcement and event-period private 
information acquisition 
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Table 2-9 Summary of U.S. Studies on the Impact of Regulation FD  
Study Sample 
Source 
Sample 
Size 
Firm 
Type 
Frequency and 
Type of Data 
Time 
Period 
Research field Econometric 
Measures 
used 
The Result of Empirical Analysis Impact of 
Regulation 
FD 
Mohanram  
et al., (2002) 
I/B/E/S 11,528 
 
All Quarterly 
forecasts 
10.1999- 
09.2000 and 
01 2001-  
12.2001 
Forecast 
performance 
 
Regression Forecast accuracy has decreased. Positive 
Shane et al.,  
(2002) 
I/B/E/S 33,642 
 
All Quarterly 
forecasts 
24/10/1984-
24/09/2001 
Forecast 
performance, 
Return volatility 
Regression Forecast accuracy has decreased.  
Market reaction to earnings announcement has 
significantly reduced. 
Positive 
Heflin et al., 
(2003) 
First Call, 
CRSP, or 
Compustat 
10,148 All Quarterly 
forecasts 
10.1999-
01.2000 and 
10.2000-
01.2001 
Forecast 
performance 
and Return 
volatility 
  
Regression Forecast errors and forecast dispersion have not 
changed. Return volatility has decreased. Volume 
of firms‘ voluntary, forward-looking, earnings-
related disclosures has increased 
Positive 
Irani et al., 
(2003) 
First Call 11,941 All Annual 
forecasts 
1995-2001 Forecast 
performance 
Regression Analyst following has decreased and forecast 
dispersion has increased. 
Negative 
Chen et al., 
(2006) 
I/B/E/S 19,596 All Quarterly 
forecasts 
09.1993-
06.2002 
Forecast 
performance 
Regression Difference in forecast accuracy for the more 
favourable recommendation groups before and 
after Regulation FD is not significant. 
Positive 
Agrawal et al., 
(2006) 
I/B/E/S 179,729 All  Quarterly 
forecasts 
03.1995- 
01 2004 
Forecast 
performance 
Regression Forecast accuracy has decreased and forecast 
dispersion has increased. 
Positive 
Findlay et al., 
(2006) 
I/B/E/S 321,672 All Annual  and 
quarterly  
forecasts 
1982-2001 Forecast 
performance 
 
Regression Forecast accuracy has decreased. Positive 
 56 
Kwag et al., 
(2007)  
I/B/E/S, 
Compustat, 
CRSP 
1,099 All Annual 
forecasts 
1999-2000 Forecast 
performance 
 
Regression Forecast accuracy has decreased.  
Wang (2007) I/B/E/S, 
Compustat, 
CRSP 
20,218 All forecasts 1996-1999 
and 
2001-2003 
Private earnings 
guidance 
Regression Firms classified as pre-FD private disclosers 
replace private disclosure with nondisclosure. The 
firms suffer from significant deterioration in their 
information. In contrast, pre-FD private disclosers 
that replace private earnings guidance with public 
disclosure experience no significant deterioration. 
Positive 
Feldman et al., 
(2007) 
Comtext 3,495 Firms listed 
in NYSE, 
AMEX or 
NASDAQ. 
earnings 
guidance 
announcements 
10.2000-
07.2002 
Earnings 
guidance 
Text-mining Market reactions are significant when firms issue a 
qualitative guidance without specifying a 
forecasted earnings  
Positive 
Chiyachantana 
et al., (2004) 
CRSP 
DJNS 
6.992 Firms listed 
in NYSE 
Quarterly 
earnings 
announcement 
11.1999-
08.2000 
Informed 
trading 
Mean 
difference test 
Retail trading activity increases after earnings 
announcements in the post-FD period but there is a 
significant decline in institutional trading around 
earnings announcements in the pre-FD period 
Positive 
Cornett et al., 
(2007) 
I/B/E/S, 
SDC, CRSP 
9,600 All Analysts‘ 
forecasts 
change 
10.1998-
11.2002 
Informed 
trading 
Regression Markets react more significantly to 
recommendation downgrades by affiliated analysts 
than unaffiliated analysts prior to the adoption of 
Regulation FD 
Positive 
Ahmed et al., 
(2007) 
CRSP 2,559 All Quarterly 
earnings 
announcement 
1999-2001 Informed 
trading 
Regression Regulation FD has reduced differences in 
information quality between investors prior to 
earnings announcements consistent with the intent 
of the regulation 
Positive 
Gadarowski  
et al., (2008) 
FCHD 
CRSP 
4,359 All Voluntary 
management 
disclosure 
10.1998- 
12.1999 and 
10.2000-
12.2001 
Informed 
trading 
Regression After the adoption of Regulation FD, pre-
announcement abnormal return as a percentage of 
total return has decreased by 26.1% (21.4%) for 
large firms with good (bad) news. 
 
Bailey et al., 
(2003) 
First Call, 
CRSP 
13,401 All Quarterly 
forecasts 
10.1999-
01.2001 
 
Forecast 
performance,  
Return volatility 
Regression Return volatility has not significantly changed. 
Trading volume has significantly increased. 
Quantity of information has significantly increased. 
Volume trading reaction has increased.  
Positive 
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Ferreira et al., 
(2006) 
Yahoo! 
Finance, 
CRSP 
 
1,272 167 S&P 
500 Index 
Stocks 
Analysts 
upgrade or 
downgrade data 
08.1999-
12.2001 and 
01.2001-
12.2001 
Return volatility Regression Market response to analysts‘ recommendation is 
the same in the post-FD as in the pre-FD. 
Non 
Negative 
Eleswarapu  
et al., (2002) 
I/B/E/S, Dow 
Jones News 
Retrieval 
Service  
1,153 NYSE 
listed 
common 
stock  
Quarterly 
Earnings 
conference call 
11.2000-
03.2001 
Bid-ask Spread 
and Return 
volatility 
Regression Bid-ask spreads have decreased and return 
volatility has increased.  
 
Positive 
Sunder (2002) I/B/E/S, 
CCBN 
1,530 All Quarterly 
Earnings 
conference call 
03.1999-
06.2001 
Bid-ask spread Regression Difference in bid-ask spread for open and restricted 
firms are no longer in post-FD period. 
Non 
Negative  
Straser (2002) NYSE TAQ 
and CRSP 
488 130 S&P 
500 Index 
Stocks 
Randomly 
elected,  
Intra-day 
quoted and 
trade data 
18.07.2000-
31.01.2001 
Bid-ask spread Regression Informed trading has decreased. 
Bid-ask spreads have increased.  
Neutral 
Lee et al., 
(2004) 
Bestcall.com, 
NYSE‘s trade 
and Quotes 
database 
7,600 All Quarterly 
Earnings 
conference call  
02.1999- 
02 2001. 
Bid-ask Spread Regression Both return volatility and bid-ask spreads have 
insignificantly increased. 
 
Jorion et al., 
(2004) 
Mergent 
Fixed 
Investment 
Securities 
Database 
2,204 U.S. 
taxable 
corporate 
bond  
Rating changes 11.2000-
12.2002 
Rating agency Regression Market response to upgrades has become 
significant, which means Regulation FD rating 
gives agencies unexpected advantage.  
Not 
Available 
Janakiraman  
et al., (2007) 
I/B/E/S 590,465 All  Quarterly 
forecasts 
1992-2002 Forecast-
horizon 
Regression Difference in first-forecast horizon across leaders 
and followers has decreased considerably. 
Positive 
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Table 2-10 Summary of Korean Studies on the Impact of Regulation FD 
Study Sample Source Sample 
Size 
Firm 
Type 
Frequency and 
Type of Data 
Time 
Period 
Research 
field 
Econometric 
Measures 
used 
The Result of Empirical Analysis 
Lee et al., (2003) FNGuide, KIS-
SMAT 
1,822 KOSPI listed 
companies 
Analysts upgrade or 
downgrade data 
06.2001-
03.2002 and 
11.2002-
03.2003 
Stock returns 
and Trading 
volume 
Event study There is clear evidence of information leakage 
before recommendation announcement in the pre-
FD period, but not in post-FD period.  
Kim et al., 
(2005) 
FSS, Korea 
Exchange,  
FNGuide 
1,500 KOSPI listed 
companies 
FD and earnings 
forecasts  
11.2002-
03.2003 
Stock returns  Event study Abnormal stock returns to earnings forecast 
performance has increased after Regulation FD.  
Oh et al., (2005) FNGuide 10,728 Manufacturing 
Companies  
Annual forecasts 01.2001-
12.2004 
Forecast 
performance 
 
Regression Optimistic forecasts of analysts have decreased. 
Forecast accuracy and dispersion have decreased. 
Firms with more earnings variance, and more 
foreign investor shares have a tendancy to release 
more fair disclosure. 
Jang et al., 
(2007) 
FSS, Korea 
Exchange,  
FNGuide, KIS 
148 KOSPI listed 
companies 
FD and earnings  
forecasts by three 
big brokers 
2000-2004 Stock returns 
and Trading 
volume  
Event study Abnormal stock returns to good news and bad news 
has increased.  
Trading volume to bad news in pre-announcement 
has decreased. 
Lee et al.,  
(2005) 
FNGuide, KSRI 600 KOSPI listed 
companies  
 
Annual forecasts 01.2001-
03.2005 
Forecast 
performance 
 
Regression Forecasts frequency of analysts covering large-size 
has increased but that of analysts covering small-
size has decreased. 
Forecast accuracy has not changed. 
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CHAPTER 3 
FORECAST PERFORMANCE AND EARNINGS 
MANAGEMENT 
3.1. Introduction  
Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD)33 requires firms to disseminate information in public 
forums such as public filings and press statements rather than in private 
communications, effectively preventing selective disclosure to a privileged few (i.e., 
security analysts and institutional investors). The Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) claims that Regulation FD curbs the prevalent practice of selective disclosure. In 
the words of the former SEC‘s Chairman, Arthur Levitt,  
 
Issuers should not selectively disclose information to certain influential 
analysts, in order to curry favour with them and reap a tangible benefit, such 
as a positive press spin and you should counsel your clients that during the 
window of time in which only some analysts have been told material 
information the news has not yet been publicly disseminated. No one who 
knows that information should be trading.34  
 
Despite the SEC‘s intent to impose these requirements on the disclosure practices of 
companies, there has been considerable controversy about the effect of Regulation FD 
(Jenkins, 2000; Opdyke et al., 2000). Critics suggested that the quantity of information 
would reduce drastically due to firms‘ non-disclosure, the so-called ―chilling effect‖, 
which would result in cutting off communication between companies and market 
                                                 
33 Regulation FD states: When firms disclose non-public company information to favoured stakeholders 
such as financial analysts or institutional investors, they shall make it available to the public 
simultaneously (for intentional disclosure) or promptly (for non-intentional disclosures). The Securities 
Exchange Commission (SEC, U.S.) ratified Regulation Fair Disclosure on 23
rd
 October 2000 and the 
Financial Supervisory Committee (FSC, Korea) enacted it on 1
st
 November 2002 following the U.S. 
regulation.  
34 http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch202.txt.  
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participants. One source, the Association for Investment Management and Research 
(AIMR, now the CFA institute) survey (2001), showed that 55% of the responding 
analysts and portfolio managers suggested that the quality and quantity of substantive 
information had declined as a result of the new regulation. For example, earnings 
guidance, forward looking information about costs, pricing, internal operation and sales 
volume had been less available to analysts.35 Similarly, the survey of analysts by the 
Securities Industry Association (SIA) (2001) suggested that 72% of the responding 
analysts believed that information communication had deteriorated since the adoption of 
Regulation FD, whereas 28% believed that the quality had remained the same. This 
result could be a consequence of companies choosing not to release information at all.  
 
On the other hand, the survey of the National Investor Relation Institute (NIRI) 
indicated that 77% of respondents provided earnings guidance to analysts and 98% of 
them said that analysts wanted earnings guidance. Among surveyed U.S. CFOs, 64.2% 
supported Regulation FD, while 20.8% opposed it. The survey argued that the most 
noticeable change brought by Regulation FD has been the way in which companies 
choose to communicate with Wall Street. For example, the percentage of CFOs that had 
private conversations with analysts dropped from 57.0% to 37.2% with the introduction 
of Regulation FD (CFO FORUM, 2001).  
 
The results of the Korean survey on Regulation FD significantly differ from the SIA‘s 
survey. After 7 months‘ application of Regulation FD, the Korea Exchange (KRX) 
reports that it is unable to find any deterioration in the information environment after 
                                                 
35 http://www.cfainstitute.org/aboutus/press/release/01releases/01RegFD.html 
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Regulation FD. 36  The survey shows that rumours on firms had decreased 42% 
compared to the previous year, 2001. Over two thirds (69.2%) of the respondents 
expressed positive views on Regulation FD whilst 11.5% expressed negative views on 
the regulation.37 In other words, the main difference appears to be a change in the 
information environment.  
 
Many academic researchers suggest that Regulation FD influences change in the 
information communication process between firms and analysts. The consensus from 
these researchers is that Regulation FD forces firms to provide equal access to company 
information and decreases the level of information asymmetry. Three research questions 
are examined in this study: (1) the effect of Regulation FD on forecast accuracy (2) the 
effect of Regulation FD on forecast dispersion (3) the effect of Regulation FD on 
earnings management.  
 
First, we study forecast errors and forecast dispersion among analysts to measure the 
impact of Regulation FD on the information environment of firms and analysts. 
Although numerous previous studies have investigated forecast attributes, it is still not 
clear why forecast attributes may be influenced by the content of information and 
analysts‘ degree of consensus. This paper examines the relation of forecast attributes 
and changes in the content of information after the adoption of Regulation FD.38 We 
posit that Regulation FD influences the content of information in analysts‘ forecasts and 
thus forecast attributes will change.  
                                                 
36 The survey was released on 5
th
 June 2003. 
37 19.3% of the respondents said that the information environment has not changed. 
38 Previous studies have used forecast errors and forecast dispersion as proxies for analyst forecast 
attributes (Barron et al., 1998; Sunder, 2002; Yang, 2004).  
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Some extant studies use a sample of earnings conference calls to investigate the 
determinants and effects of the decision to broadly disclose information (Sunder, 2002; 
Bowen et al., 2002; Bushee et al., 2003). For example, Bushee et al., (2003) hypothesize 
that the decision to host an open conference call depends on the managers‘ incentive to 
provide all investors and stakeholders with immediate access to information. They 
examine whether Regulation FD influences firms‘ disclosure policies. For the study, 
they consider firms included in the Bestcalls.com list as ―open-call‖ firms, while they 
consider firms on the First Call corporations list to be ―closed-call‖ firms.39 They find 
that firms providing open calls have a greater number of shareholders, lower 
institutional ownership, lower analyst following and a higher average share turnover 
than closed call firms. The results are consistent with firms opening conference calls to 
meet common shareholders‘ demand for information.  
 
In order to study the difference in analysts‘ forecast ability after the adoption of 
Regulation FD, following Adut et al., (2007) and Chen et al., (2006),40 we classify our 
sample into good news and bad news. By comparing the absolute forecast errors (AFE) 
and forecast dispersion (DISP) for the good news group and the bad news group in 
accordance with earnings persistence and analysts‘ recommendations levels, we 
examine the change in the information environment in the post-FD period. For the study, 
                                                 
39 On the other hand, Sunder (2002) classifies firms as either, (1) ―open‖ firms, which always held 
conference calls accessible to all investors; or (2) ―restricted‖ firms, which held conference calls for only 
analysts and institutional investors in the pre-FD period. 
40 Adut et al., (2007) put forward three reasons why forecast variance is different regarding good news 
and bad news. First, good news comes out early, but bad news comes out late. Second, analysts have a 
motivation to make buy recommendations and therefore may have more incentive to put forecasting 
resources into analysing good news rather than bad news. Third, if so, forecasts under a bad news 
environment may suffer from inadequate attention and would be less precise, leading to higher forecast 
variance during bad news.  
 63 
by focusing on analysts‘ recommendations and persistence of earnings, we examine the 
effect of Regulation FD on forecast accuracy. The first method is based on the level of 
analysts‘ recommendations. Analysts tend to work closely with management in the 
development of their earnings forecast because managers are one of the most significant 
information sources for analysts (Lang et al., 1996). Analysts, therefore, may issue 
optimistically biased recommendations to maintain business ties with the companies.41  
 
Consistent with this view, Chen et al., (2006) provide empirical evidence that analysts 
who upgrade recommendations gain a greater increase in their relative forecast accuracy 
compared with analysts who downgrade their recommendations. Analysts, therefore, 
might issue favourable recommendations as a reward for information provision if 
managers provide favoured analysts with material information. In the same way, it is 
possible that analysts who issue buy-side recommendations experience an increase in 
forecast accuracy, relative to analysts who issue sell-side recommendations. We expect 
that there would be some changes in forecast accuracy and forecast dispersion among 
the recommendations levels following the adoption of Regulation FD.  
 
The second method is based on earnings persistence. Managers that realize large 
persistence of earnings increases have an incentive to increase disclosure prior to the 
earnings announcement (Verrecchia, 1983, Jung et al., 1988). This result is consistent 
with Miller (2002), who suggests that firms with a relatively permanent increase have a 
further incentive to provide information within the earnings announcement that 
confirms the high quality of the earnings increase. Consequently, prior to Regulation FD, 
                                                 
41 For details see Siconolfi (1995).   
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analysts‘ forecasts were likely to be more accurate when earnings increased than when 
earnings declined.  
 
Controlling for other factors that affect forecast attributes, we examine the incremental 
effect of Regulation FD on both ―earnings increase firms‖ and ―earnings decrease 
firms‖. We define INCREASE (DECREASE) as when a firm reports profit (loss) and an 
increase (decrease) in earnings from last year‘s earnings. Based on a sample of 2,311 
firms and 161,643 firm-year observations on analysts‘ forecasts before and after 
Regulation FD, we find a significant decrease in forecast errors and forecast dispersion 
in the post-FD period relative to the pre-FD period. For sell-side recommendations, 
improvement in forecast accuracy and forecast dispersion is more evident than for buy-
side recommendations. We also find that improvement in forecast accuracy and forecast 
dispersion for DECREASE is more significant than for INCREASE.  
 
Third, we examine the effect of Regulation FD by accounting for the relationship 
between analysts‘ forecasts accuracy and earnings management. Previous literature 
provides evidence that earnings are managed for the following reasons: meeting 
analysts‘ forecasts (Payne et al., 2000; Brown, 2001), avoidance of reporting losses 
(Burgstahler et al., 1997; DeGeorge et al., 1999; Matsumoto, 2002) and gaining positive 
stock returns (Bartov et al., 2002; Lopez et al., 2002; Kasznik et al., 2002). Managers 
are likely to manage earnings upward because the market rewards (penalizes) firms 
meeting (missing) analysts‘ forecasts. Management‘s largest incentive to manage 
earnings occurs when earnings would not meet earnings forecasts (Brown, 2001). Thus, 
if Regulation FD leads to a change in the analysts‘ forecasting ability, the change should 
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also influence earnings management. In order to examine how changes in analyst‘s 
forecast performance in the post-FD period influence earnings management, we 
measure the level of earnings management after the adoption of Regulation FD. Healy 
(1985) suggests that there are two general approaches to measure earnings management: 
accruals accounting policy (timing of expenses and revenue recognition) and accounting 
procedure changes (e.g., FIFO or LIFO). He concludes that first method is preferred 
since the accruals accounting choice is cheaper and easier to manage than accounting 
procedure change. Therefore, we focus on the management of discretionary accruals as 
a means of gaining better performance. Specifically, the discretionary accruals are 
computed using the modified Jones model (Subramanyam, 1996; Masumoto, 2002; 
Bartov et al., 2002). However, we provide no evidence that changes in forecast accuracy 
have significantly influenced firm‘s accounting policy.  
 
This study makes a contribution to the literature on the effect of Regulation FD in 
several ways. First, this study contributes to the current debate over the effectiveness of 
Regulation FD. Our results provide positive evidence of a decrease in information 
asymmetry from private communications after the adoption of Regulation FD. Second, 
it provides novel evidence of the effect of Regulation FD on analysts‘ forecast attributes. 
Prior researchers mainly focused on conference calls or change in recommendations 
levels while we use good news and bad news such as earnings increase firms and buy-
side recommendations as information surroundings. Third, we contribute to the existing 
literature by providing additional insights on whether improved forecast accuracy 
influences earnings management in response to forecast accuracy. Finally, this study 
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provides evidence based on a much larger and more comprehensive sample than any 
other prior study on the effect of Regulation FD.  
 
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 introduces and develops the hypotheses. 
Section 3.3 discusses research design. Section 3.4 describes the sample selection 
procedure. Section 3.5 presents the major empirical results on the effect of Regulation 
FD. The final section provides a brief summary and presents conclusions. 
 
3.2. Hypotheses Development 
3.2.1. The Impact of Regulation FD on Forecast Accuracy 
Prior research shows two opposing explanations for the impact of Regulation FD on 
forecast errors. First, analysts may exhibit poorer forecast accuracy because Regulation 
FD curtails previously available analysts‘ private access to firms (Mohanram et al., 
2002; Agrawal et al., 2006; Findlay et al., 2006). Second, forecast errors may not 
change or decrease because Regulation FD may encourage firms to release more public 
information (Heflin, 2003; Oh, 2005). Therefore, the impact of Regulation FD on 
forecast errors is essentially an empirical question. Analysts play an essential role in the 
securities market by collecting and evaluating information released by firms.  
 
Prior to Regulation FD, many firms disclosed important non-public information to 
securities analysts or selected institutional investors, before making disclosure of the 
same information to the public. This common practice allowed analysts and institutional 
investors to act on information before the information was released in public. As SEC 
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stated, those who were privy to the information beforehand could make a profit or avoid 
a loss at the expense of those kept in the dark (SEC Release 2000).42  
 
The above behaviour is, however, prohibited by Regulation FD. Analysts who had 
enjoyed favourable relationship with firms prior to Regulation FD may lose their 
existing superiority as the regulation curtails analysts‘ private channels to firms. If the 
Regulation encourages broad public disclosure and provides vast new information to 
analysts, the regulation helps forecast accuracy. We, therefore, expect some differences 
in forecast accuracy during the post-FD period. We investigate whether change in 
forecast accuracy is influenced by publicly disclosed earnings information in the post-
FD period. 
 
 
H1: Analysts‟ forecast accuracy in post-FD period is different from their 
forecast accuracy in the pre-FD period.  
 
 
Siconolfi (1995) reports that some analysts are excluded from meetings as a result of 
their sell recommendations. Similarly, Kelly et al., (2003) report that managers tends to 
refuse to reply to the questions of analysts who downgraded the firm‘s recommendation 
level during conference calls. Chen et al., (2006) find that analysts issuing more 
favourable recommendations experience a relatively greater forecast accuracy compared 
with analysts with less favourable recommendations. The consensus of the above results 
indicates that analysts who issue negative recommendations would have higher forecast 
errors because they may rely less on management-provided information. However, 
                                                 
42 See Securities and Exchange Commission. 2000. Final Rule: Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading. 
Release No. 33-7881, 34-43154. 
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Regulation FD makes firms increase the amount of information disclosed publicly. We 
expect that analysts issuing unfavourable recommendations would have more improved 
forecast accuracy from the available public information after the adoption of Regulation 
FD. We, therefore test the following hypothesis: 
 
H2: The effect of Regulation FD on forecast accuracy is stronger for analysts 
issuing unfavourable recommendations. 
 
 
To examine the effect of Regulation FD, some researchers use change in an analyst 
recommendation (e.g., upgrade or downgrade) as a proxy for analysts‘ forecast 
surroundings (e.g., favourable or unfavourable recommendations to firms that analysts 
cover). Chen et al., (2006) examine forecast accuracy before and after recommendation 
release under the assumption that management-provided information will increase 
forecast accuracy. Chen et al., (2006) find that a relatively greater increase in forecast 
accuracy for upgrade recommendations groups exists in the pre-FD period, but not in 
the post-FD period. Ferreira et al., (2006) examine the effect of Regulation FD on the 
information content of analysts‘ recommendation changes. Based on announcements of 
analyst upgrades and downgrades with a random sample of S&P 500 Index stocks, they 
find that trading volume declines after Regulation FD, but that there is no significant 
difference during the post-FD period. They conclude that investors‘ responses to 
analysts‘ recommendations have remained the same since Regulation FD. 
 
On the other hand, Cornett et al., (2007) use analysts‘ recommendation levels to study 
the effect of Regulation FD. Cornett et al., (2007) examine whether affiliated analysts 
provide optimistically biased recommendations from selective information provided to 
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them by firms. They find that Regulation FD curbs the selective disclosure of 
information that affiliated analysts are given by the firm. For the second analysis, we 
take the analysts‘ recommendation levels as the analysts‘ forecasts surroundings. 
 
Earnings performance is one of the important variables influencing managers‘ choice on 
disclosure policy. Adut et al., (2007) define good news and bad news in accordance 
with the firms‘ information environment, and most news is related to earnings 
performance. 43  Actually, they find that earnings increase firms provide more 
information relative to earnings decrease firms. In addition, prior research provides 
evidence that managers with lower earnings may choose not to release the information 
or to hide current poor performance. Miller (2002) and Lang et al. (1996) find that firm 
disclosure is greater during a period of increasing earnings. Li (2007) finds that the 
annual reports of firms with increasing earnings are easier to read and more persistent 
than annual reports of firms with decreasing earnings. This is consistent with 
Bloomfield (2002), who suggests that managers make it harder for investors to uncover 
information that the managers do not want to affect their firms‘ stock prices. Firms 
could use vague expressions and formats in their disclosures to hide adverse information 
even if they are reluctantly releasing disclosure of lower earnings.  
 
The next hypothesis is based on the premise that, without Regulation FD, earnings 
decrease firms tend to release less public information. However, Regulation FD 
                                                 
43 Adut et al., (2007) define good news and bad news as follows; (1) When a firm meets or beats 30-day 
analysts‘ consensus forecast (good news) versus when it misses (bad news) (2) When a firm reports an 
increase in earnings from last year‘s earnings (good news) versus when it reports a decrease (bad news) 
(3) When a firm reports profit (good news) versus when it reports a loss (bad news) (4) When the firm 
experiences positive stock price return during the year (good news) versus when it experiences negative 
stock price return (bad news).  
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encourages firms to supply available disclosure in public. Similar to the previous 
hypothesis, therefore, we expect that change in the accuracy of analysts‘ forecasts that 
cover earnings decrease firms should increase in the post-FD period due to the impact 
of public information. We examine the following hypothesis: 
 
H3: The effect of Regulation FD on forecast accuracy is stronger for analysts 
covering earnings decrease firms relative to those covering earnings 
increase firms. 
 
 
3.2.2. The Impact of Regulation FD on Forecast Dispersion 
Prior research also shows empirical evidence that forecast dispersion is influenced by 
the disparity of disclosure practice (Welker, 1995; Lang et al., 1996; Barron et al., 1998; 
Healy et al., 2001; Adut, 2003). Welker (1995) suggests that firms with a high level of 
disclosure policy have lower information asymmetry. Lang et al., (1996) find that firms 
with more informative disclosures have a large number of analysts, less dispersion 
among analyst forecasts, and less volatility in forecast revisions. Barron et al., (1998) 
present that dispersion in analysts‘ forecasts reflects uncertainty about firms‘ future 
economic performance. Healy et al., (2001) conclude that firms with sustained 
improvements in disclosure experience lower information asymmetry. Adut (2003) 
provides evidence that high forecast dispersion indicates that there is little consensus 
among analysts with respect to the future earnings performance.  
 
However, opinions are divided among researchers on the effect of Regulation FD on 
forecast dispersion. Some researchers find evidence that Regulation FD leads to an 
increase in forecast dispersion due to the lack of available private information after the 
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Regulation (Mohanram et al., 2002; Bailey et al., 2003; Irani et al., 2003; Agrawal et al., 
2006). On the other hand, Heflin et al., (2003) do not find any change in forecast 
dispersion after the adoption of Regulation FD. Oh et al., (2005) find evidence of a 
decrease in forecast dispersion after the adoption of Regulation FD.  
 
After the adoption of Regulation FD, firms may significantly increase the quantity and 
quality of material information disclosed through public release. As is the regulator‘s 
intention, if firms release material information to the public rather than privately, 
analysts may lose their exclusive access to management. However, Regulation FD helps 
analysts‘ forecasts if analysts can replace private information acquired directly from 
firms with information obtained publicly. Thus, we expect to see a reduction in 
information asymmetry among investors after Regulation FD. These expectations 
provide the basis for the next hypothesis.  
 
H4: Analysts‟ forecast dispersion in post-FD period is different from their 
forecast dispersion in the pre-FD period.  
 
 
Firms with higher information asymmetry have significantly different forecast 
dispersion than firms with lower information asymmetry. Some researchers examine 
differences in information asymmetry between the two groups after the adoption of 
Regulation FD (Sunder, 2002; Bushee et al., 2002; Yang, 2004). Sunder (2002) focuses 
on the impact of Regulation FD on analysts‘ forecasts‘ properties for closed conference 
calls (i.e. calls that restrict access to invited analysts and institutional investors) and 
open conference calls (i.e. calls that allow unlimited access). Sunder (2002) finds that 
information asymmetry for closed conference call firms are higher than open conference 
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call firms. The results are similar to Yang (2004) and Bushee et al., (2002), who suggest 
that forecast dispersion for non-conference-call firms are significantly larger than those 
for both closed-firms and open-call firms.  
 
Forecast dispersion is higher for firms with higher information uncertainty compared to 
firms with lower information uncertainty because increases in public information can 
improve analysts‘ forecasting performance. If selective disclosure results in higher 
information asymmetry, we expect that firms with higher information asymmetry would 
have a more significant decrease relative to firms with lower information asymmetry. 
Following Chen et al. (2006)44 and Adut et al., (2007), we classify our sample into two 
different environmental groups using two criteria: (1) sell-side (sell or strong sell) 
recommendations and buy-side (buy or strong buy) recommendations (2) earnings 
increase firms and earnings decrease firms. We expect the difference between the two 
groups to have significantly disappeared after the adoption of Regulation FD. We 
hypothesize that the change in analysts‘ forecast dispersion for the firms with higher 
information uncertainty should be significantly more than that for firms with lower 
information uncertainty.  
 
H5: The effect of Regulation FD on forecast dispersion is stronger for 
analysts covering earnings decrease firms relative to earnings increase 
firms.
  
H6: The effect of Regulation FD on forecast dispersion is stronger for sell-
side recommendations relative to buy-side recommendations.
   
                                                 
44 Chen et al., (2006) classify the favourable recommendations in two ways. The first method is based on 
the change in an analyst‘s recommendations. The second method is based on the analyst‘s 
recommendations relative to the consensus recommendation.  
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3.2.3. The Impact of Regulation FD on Earnings Management 
Regardless of the commonality levied by regulatory accounting standards, in part, firms 
have incentives to adopt different degrees of earnings management in their accounting 
policies. Prior literature provides evidence that firms have several incentives for 
earnings management. For example, Kasnik et al., (2002) finds that earnings are 
managed upward when earnings have a possibility to fall below management earnings 
forecasts. Burgstahler et al., (1997) report that firms manage earnings in order to avoid 
earnings decreases and losses. On the other hand, Payne et al., (2002) and Brown (2001) 
show evidence that managers are motivated to manage earnings in order to meet 
analysts‘ forecasts.45  
 
Based on the above studies on earnings management, managers make the choice of the 
degree of earnings management in financial reporting within a rational decision-making 
standpoint. The studies suggest that earnings management may be related to levels of 
several thresholds (i.e., management forecasts, earnings and analysts‘ forecasts). Thus, 
we expect that changes the analysts‘ information environment may influence earnings 
management after the adoption of Regulation FD. 
 
Kwag et al., (2007) suggest that the propensity of firms with higher analyst forecast 
accuracy to manage earnings is higher compared to those with lower forecast accuracy. 
The ability of firms to meet the more inaccurate forecasts may be reduced if analysts‘ 
                                                 
45 Several earnings benchmarks used in the avoidance of negative earnings surprise have been proposed 
in the extant literature: (1) previous quarter‘s earnings (2) last year‘s earnings (3) analyst‘s earnings 
forecast (DeGeorge et al., 1999; Granham et al., 2005; Barua et al., 2006). 
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forecasts are less accurate. Therefore, we expect that firms‘ propensity to manage 
earnings to meet analysts‘ forecasts increases if analysts‘ forecast accuracy improves 
after the adoption of Regulation FD. Managers tend to have an incentive to manage 
earnings for better performance or stock returns. If analysts‘ forecasting ability 
improves after the adoption of Regulation FD, there is an increasing propensity for 
firms to meet analysts‘ forecasts by managing earnings after the adoption of the 
regulation. We examine the seventh hypothesis.  
 
H7: Earnings management increases with the adoption of Regulation FD.  
 
3.3. Sample Selection  
Our sample includes Korean analysts‘ forecasts and Korean publicly-listed 
nonfinancial firms. We construct a merged sample covering analysts‘ forecast data and 
earnings management from 2000 to 2007. We merge firm-year observations on 
analysts‘ forecasts and data on earnings management after the year 2000, collected 
from FNguide and the FSS database. FNguide, established in 2000, is the sole Korean 
company that provides market participants with analysts‘ forecasts data such as 
consensus analyst forecasts and recommendations levels that are acquired from the 
individual analysts‘ reports of forty Korean securities companies and six economic 
research institutes. FNguide selects a best analyst and best research securities company 
every year in conjunction with the Chosun-ilbo, one of the biggest daily newspapers in 
Korea. The annual financial information and audit committee information are retrieved 
from FSS. Analysts‘ forecasts observations are obtained from FNguide.  
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The forecasts and recommendations included in our sample meet the following 
criteria: 
 
- Analysts‘ forecasts or recommendations with recorded EPS 
- Price, trading volume and return data available on FNguide 
- Year-end dates of December 31 
- Earnings forecasts with at least two analysts 
 
The variables on earnings forecast performance and earnings management are 
winsorized in the top and bottom 3 percents of of forecast variable. Korea enacted the 
quarterly financial statement in 1999 and introduced the quarterly cash flow statement 
and the quarterly analysts‘ forecast in 2003. Therefore, it would not be positive to 
explain the difference between the Pre-FD period and post-FD period with quarterly 
observations. In addition, we have to eliminate the data for year 2002 included in both 
periods, because Regulation FD was enacted in November. 2002. For this reason, we 
use yearly instead of quarterly observations from 2000 to 2007 (excluding 2002).46 
Our sample requires at least two forecasts in order to calculate the analysts‘ forecast 
attributes.  
 
Table 3.2 and Table 3.4 summarize the sample selection. Our two final samples consist 
of 161,343 observations and 2,311 observations: (1)24,969 (571) pre-FD period and 
136,374 (1,740) post-FD period (2) 2,310 with Sell-Side Recommendations, 58,702 
with Hold Recommendations and 100,331 Buy-Side Recommendations (3) 85,038 with 
Earnings Increase Firms, 12,094 with Earnings Decrease Firms and 64,211 with All 
Other Firms. The number of observations varies by the determinants being 
                                                 
46 Nevertheless, this study is using the most comprehensive sample of Korean analysts‘ forecasts. 
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investigated. Forecast attributes by earnings persistence has the fewest number of 
observations: 97,132 observations.  
 
[Insert Table 3.2 and Table 3.4 bout here] 
 
We analyse forecasts made over two time intervals: the pre-FD period and the post-FD 
period. The pre-FD period is from 2000 to 2001 (2 years). The post-FD period is from 
2003 to 2007 (5 years). We use analyst reports provided by 40 Korean securities 
companies, and 6 economic research institutes in order to analyse forecasting 
performance.  
 
3.4. Research Design 
3.4.1. Forecast Accuracy and Forecast Dispersion 
3.4.1.1. Measurement of Analysts’ Forecast Performance 
Recent studies have found that Regulation FD has changed the information transfer 
process in the market. Our hypotheses, H1-H6, predict significant differences in 
analysts‘ forecasts from the pre-FD period to the post-FD period. To evaluate how well 
the individual analysts forecast actual earnings after the adoption of Regulation FD, we 
use forecast errors as a proxy for the analyst‘s forecast accuracy (Eames et al., 2002; 
Lopez et al., 2001). For each observation, we calculate the forecast errors (FE) and 
absolute forecast errors (AFE) as the difference between realized earnings and an 
analyst‘s forecast. FE and AFE used in this study are defined as: 
 
 77 
 
FE j,t = (AEPSj,t – FEPSj,t)/Pj,t-1 
AFE j,t = |AEPSj,t – FEPSj,t|/Pj,t-1 
(3.1)  
(3.2) 
where:  
AEPSj,t 
FEPSj,t 
Pj,t-1 
= 
= 
= 
realized annual earnings per share for firm j in year t;  
analyst forecast for EPSj,t;; 
ending price of previous year. 
 
The quantity and quality of firms‘ financial information should affect forecast 
dispersion. Forecast dispersion is defined as standard deviation of analysts‘ forecasts, 
scaled by the ending price of the previous year. We use a forecast dispersion measure 
that has been commonly used in the previous literature (Adut, 2003: Irani et al., 2003; 
Barron et al., 2002). 
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where:  
itJ  = analysts following firm i at time t ( 2itJ  ); 
ijtY  = all price-deflated consensus forecasts; 
ijtY  = analyst j‘s forecast for firm i. 
 
 
3.4.1.2. Changes in Analysts’ Forecast Performance 
We expect that changes in forecast accuracy and forecast dispersion are caused by 
changes in the information flow of firms. To examine the change in the information 
environment, some researchers use conference calls as a proxy for information 
uncertainty (open conference call, closed conference call). We use two proxies for 
measuring information uncertainty: (1) analysts‘ recommendations level (2) earnings 
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performance. It is desirable that two research settings representing both analysts‘ and 
firms‘ information environments are included in the research settings. First, we examine 
the change in forecast attributes by analysts‘ recommendation levels. Second, extending 
Findlay et al., (2006) and Chen et al., (2006)‘s research, we examine the change in 
forecast accuracy and forecast dispersion in accordance with the persistence of earnings 
performance. Following Miller (2002), we define firms that continue to report two years 
of positive (negative) and increase (decline) in earnings from last year‘s earnings as 
―INCREASE (DECREASE)‖.  
 
We examine the above implications using univariate and multivariate methods. We will 
compare the mean of AFE (FE) and DISP among BUY (buy and strong buy 
recommendations), HOLD and SELL (sell and strong sell recommendations). We expect 
that the mean of AFE and DISP for SELL will be larger than those for HOLD and BUY. 
By using t-test and z-test, we also expect that AFE and DISP are significantly different 
between BUY, HOLD and SELL in the pre-FD period while the difference between the 
three groups decreases in the post-FD period. Next, we compare the mean of AFE and 
DISP between INCREASE and DECREASE. Similarly, we expect that the mean of AFE 
and DISP for DECREASE will be larger than those for INCREASE. Then, by using t-test 
and z-test, AFE and DISP are expected to be significantly different between INCREASE 
and DECREASE in the pre-FD period while the difference between the two groups 
decreases in the post-FD period.  
 
Next, using a multiple regression, we expect that the change in forecast attributes would 
be different in the post-FD period. We use various determinants that relate to analysts‘ 
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forecasts mentioned in the previous research; analysts following, firm size, forecast 
horizon, forecast age, earnings surprise, forecast revision, high-tech industry, leverage 
and volatility of daily stock price (Atiase, 1985; Freeman, 1987; Stickel, 1992; Sinha et 
al., 1997; Brown et al., 1987, Bhushan 1989, Jacob et al., 1999; Lang et al., 1996; 
Mikhail et al., 1997; Barron et al., 1998: Mensah et al., 2004; Oh et al., 2005).  
 
Among these determinants, analyst following (ANALY) and firm size (SIZE) are used 
for the richness of a firms‘ information environment. Lang et al., (1996) find evidence 
that ANALY and SIZE are associated with the informativeness of a firm‘s disclosure 
policy. Volatility of daily stock returns (VOLA) is used for the uncertainty of a firm‘s 
information environment. Bhusan (1989) suggests that firms with a lower information 
uncertainty have smaller forecast errors and forecast dispersion. Forecast horizon 
(HORI) is also an important determinant of forecast dispersion. Jacob et al., (1999) 
provide evidence that the greater HORI, the less accurate forecast. We test the above 
implications with univariate and multivariate methods. We include four control 
variables in our model and estimate the following regression equations.  
 
AFE = α + β1FD + β2ANALY + β3HORI + β4SIZE + β5VOLA + ε                 (3.4) 
AFE = α + β1SELL+ β2HOLD + β3ANALY + β4HORI + β5SIZE + β6VOLA + ε (3.5) 
AFE = α + β1DECREASE + β2ANALY + β3HORI + β4SIZE + β5VOLA + ε      (3.6) 
 
 
DISP= α + β1FD + β2ANALY + β3HORI + β4SIZE + β5VOLA + ε                 (3.7) 
DISP= α + β1SELL+ β2HOLD + β3ANALY + β4HORI + β5SIZE + β6VOLA + ε (3.8) 
DISP= α + β1DECREASE + β2ANALY + β3HORI + β4SIZE + β5VOLA + ε      (3.9) 
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All variables are defined in Table 3.1. β1s, coefficients on FD in Equations (3.4) and 
(3.7) represent the incremental effect in AFE and DISP from the pre-FD period to the 
post-FD period. Negative β1 is expected in Equations (3.4) and (3.7), which indicates an 
decrease in AFE and DISP after the adoption of Regulation FD. β1 and β2, SELL and 
HOLD, in Equations (3.5) and (3.8) represent the incremental effect of AFE and DISP 
for hold and buy-side recommendations compared to sell-side recommendations. β1 and 
β2, the coefficients on SELL and HOLD, are expected to be siginificantly positive in the 
pre-FD period because managers tend to provide more (less) available information to 
analysts who issue more (less) favourable recommendations,while β1 and β2 in the post-
FD period are expected to be smaller compared to the pre-FD period. Similarly, β1, the 
coefficient on DECREASE, in Equations (3.6) and (3.9) represents the incremental 
effect of AFE and DISP for income decrease firms (DECREASE) compared to income 
increase firms (DECREASE). β1 in the post-FD period is expected to be lower than that 
of pre-FD period.  
 
However, Equations (3.4) to Equations (3.9) cannot explain the significant difference in 
the change of AFE and DISP after the adoption of Regulation FD. The changes in AFE 
and DISP capture the effect of Regulation FD on forecast attributes. Namely, the change 
in analysts‘ forecast attributes may be smaller when the change in both AFE and DISP 
is measured as the difference between the pre-FD and post-FD period. We conduct 
Chow‘s breakpoint test (1960) to examine whether there is a structural change in AFE 
and DISP from the pre-FD period to the post-FD period. Chow (1960) test is generally 
accepted as the most powerful test among the analytical methods. The Chow test is 
applied in the analysis, since our exact break-point date is 1st November 2002. The 
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regression model below consisting of constant and error terms to explain this dependent 
variable is assumed;  
 
Yt = β + εt        t= 1, ...  T                    (3.10)  
 
If a certain date (T1) is the point to test the structural change, Equation (3.10) is divided 
into two equations. There are two regression models below.  
Y1t = γ + ε1t        t= 1, ... T1                              (3.11) 
Y2t = θ + ε2t    t= T1+1, ... T                    (3.12)  
 
Therefore, the null hypothesis is  
 
H0 : γ = θ                         (3.13) 
 
We show the F-Statistics with probabilities for the hypotheses of parameter stability 
over different periods. To isolate the effect of Regulation FD, we also compare the 
changes in AFE and DISP between two groups ((1) SELL and BUY (2) INCREASE and 
DECREASE) around Regulation FD. We identify the variables causing the structural 
change by examining whether each parameter in the regression model has been 
significantly changed in the post-FD period. 
 
 82 
3.4.2. Earnings Management 
3.4.2.1. Measurement of Earnings Management  
Following previous research (Healy, 1985; DeAngelo, 1986; Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 
1991; DeFond et al., 1994; Dechow et al., 1995; Kothari et al., 2005), we use 
discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings management. Among the discretionary 
accruals measures, our study uses the modified Jones model to measure the level of 
earnings management. The modified Jones model was developed by Dechow et al., 
(1995).47 Following the modified Jones model (1995), we regress total accruals on a 
constant, change in sales, and gross property, plant and equipment (PPE). 
Mathematically, this study estimates the parameters α1, α2, and α3 in Equation (3.14). 
 
, , 1 , ,
1 2 3 ,
, 1 , 1 , 1 , 1
1j t j t j t j t
j t
j t j t j t j t
TA REV AR PPE
e
A A A A
  

   
 
   
          
(3.14)  
where: 
TAj,t 
 
Aj,t-1 
△REVj,t  
△ARj,t  
 
PPEj,t 
= 
 
= 
= 
= 
 
= 
total accruals (earnings minus operating cash flow) for firm j in 
previous year t; 
total assets at end of period for firm j in previous year t; 
revenues for firm j in year t, less revenues in year t-1; 
accounts receivable for firm j, less accounts receivable for 
year t-1. 
gross property plant and equipment for firm j in year t. 
 
Total accruals (TAj,t) are the difference between net income and cash from operations 
and the   operator represents a one-year change in a variable. Total accruals (TAj,t) are 
decomposed into discretionary accruals (DAj,t) and non-discretionary accruals 
                                                 
47 Dechow et al., (1995) suggest that the modified Jones model (1995) provides the most powerful test 
of earnings management, although the model was criticized in the earnings management literature. 
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(NDAj,t).48 Using the model to separately estimate abnormal accruals by industry and 
year for all firms from 2000 to 2007, we measure the absolute value of the error term, eit, 
as our measure of abnormal accruals. The estimated coefficients are used to calculate 
nondiscretionary accruals according to the following equation:  
 
 , , , ,
1 2 3
, 1 , 1 , 1 , 1
1
  
   
 
  
j t j t j t j t
j t j t j t j t
NDA REV AR PPE
A A A A
        
(3.15) 
 
After the parameters are estimated by regression analysis, they are applied to the firm‘s 
reported values. This is an estimated value of normal industry accruals. Firms j in the 
same industry have the same coefficients α1, α2, and α3 for a given year t. The difference 
between the firm‘s industry normal accruals and the firm‘s reported accruals represents 
abnormal accruals, a proxy for discretionary accruals. Following Dechow et al., (1995), 
we remove components of accruals that are ―nondiscretionary‖. Discretionary accruals 
are calculated by subtracting non-discretionary accruals from the total accruals as 
follows; 
 
 
, , ,
, 1 , 1 , 1  
 
j t j t j t
j t j t j t
DA TA NDA
A A A
                     
(3.16) 
 
Since earnings management involves both positive and negative values of discretionary 
accruals, we report the absolute value of discretionary accruals (ADA).  
 
                                                 
48 Discretionary accruals is used as a proxy for earnings management (Becker et al., 1998; DeFond et al., 
1998; Francis et al., 1999). 
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3.4.2.2. Regulation FD and Earnings Management 
We use absolute forecast errors (AFE) as a proxy for analysts‘ forecast ability. To verify 
the validity of H1, and to understand the association between forecast accuracy and 
earnings management, we estimate the following regression equation. 
 
ADA=α + β1FD + β2AFE + β3FD*AFE + β4BM + β5EARN + β6AGR + ε (3.17)  
 
All variables are defined in Table 3.1. We control for (1) book to market (BM) (2) 
realized earnings (EARN) (3) asset growth ratio (AGR). Based on the prior research, 
positive signs are expected for EARN and AGR and negative signs are expected for BM. 
The coefficients of interest in the Equation (3.17) are β1 (FD), β2 (AFE) and β3 
(FD*AFE). Due to an increase in analysts‘ forecast ability after the adoption of 
Regulation FD, we expect that managers‘ propensity to manage earnings also increases. 
Thus, we expect the coefficients of β1 (FD) and β3 (FD*AFE) to be significantly positive.  
 
3.5. Empirical Results 
3.5.1. Forecast Accuracy and Forecast Dispersion 
3.5.1.1. Univariate Results 
We employ both univariate and multivariate analyses to test our hypotheses. First, for 
the univariate analyses, Table 3.3 represents the major descriptive statistics on both pre-
period and post-period variables used in analysts‘ forecast attributes.  
 
[Insert Table 3.3 about here] 
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Table 3.3 reveals that the means of forecast errors (FE) in the pre-FD and post-FD 
period are 0.056 and 0.021 respectively, implying analysts‘ optimism in the Korean 
market. The result is consistent with Abarbanell (1991) and Capstaff et al., (2001), who 
report that analyst forecast bias is, on average, optimistic in U.S. and nine European 
countries49.  
 
However, analysts‘ optimism has decreased in the post-FD period. The difference in the 
mean of absolute forecast errors (AFE) in the pre-FD and post-FD period declines from 
0.079 to 0.044. In addition, the difference in the mean of forecast dispersion (DISP) 
declines from 0.055 to 0.030 after the adoption of Regulation FD. These preliminary 
results generally support H1 and H4. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that 
Regulation FD has increased the average quality of information.  
 
Table 3.4 summarizes the sample distribution of events by the three groups: (1) forecast 
year (2) recommendations levels and (3) earnings performance. Table 3.5 presents the 
significant difference in the means of forecast attributes. Table 3.4 shows evidence that 
AFE and DISP have gradually decreased annually after the adoption of Regulation FD. 
Next, we compare the AFE and DISP of two sets of groups (SELL vs BUY and 
INCREASE vs DECREASE). Both the AFE and DISP of all the recommendations levels 
in the pre-FD period are higher than those in the post-FD period. Only a small fraction 
of observations fall in the SELL (sell or strong sell recommendations) portion in both 
our samples (1.5%), and the majority of recommendations are BUY (buy or strong buy 
recommendations, 61.8%), followed by HOLD (hold recommendations, 36.7%).  
                                                 
49 Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland and United Kingdom.  
 86 
 
[Insert Table 3.4 and Table 3.5 about here] 
 
We note that our sample consists of a greater proportion of BUY. This phenomenon is 
generally found, for example in U.S. research. Lin et al., (1998) indicate that 61.2% is 
buy strong buy recommendations, 33.0% is hold recommendations, and 5.8% is sell-
side recommendations.  
 
Previous literature and financial press suggest that analysts are reluctant to issue 
unfavourable recommendations. For example, according to the Korean financial 
publication, Naeilshinmoon (2009), an analyst revealed that ―fund managers who 
invested in firms opposing the recommendations of analysts will issue sell 
recommendations because they are concerned about the declines of the stock price.‖ 
Other analysts confessed ―Specially, it is difficult for analysts in small securities 
company to issue candid recommendation reports‖.50 This is consistent with prior 
research, which suggests that analysts‘ recommendations are related to the business of 
the investment bank that employs the analyst51 and that analysts follow other analysts‘ 
forecasts for a ―sharing-the-blame effect‖.52  
 
Similarly, both AFE and DISP for INCREASE are smaller than those for DECREASE. 
For the univariate analysis, we find evidence that the AFE and DISP of lower 
information uncertainty groups (DECREASE and SELL) tend to be larger than that of 
                                                 
50 See Kim (2009) Naeilshinmoon (Korean Daily Newspaper)  
51 For details see Browning (1995), Konrad (1989), Raghavan (1997) and Siconolfi (1995)  
52 For details see Scharfstein et al., (1990)  
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higher information uncertainty firms (INCREASE and BUY). Also, both AFE and DISP 
for SELL and INCREASE are greater than those for BUY and DECREASE both in pre-
FD period and post-FD period.  
 
In addition, the difference in the means of AFE and DISP between the two groups 
declines after the adoption of the Regulation. Specifically, Table 3.5 shows the 
significant difference in the means of AFE and DISP using t-test in both the pre-FD and 
post-FD periods. Table 3.5 presents the comparisons in means, which are significantly 
different at the 1% level between the two groups, respectively, in the pre-FD and post-
FD periods.  
 
However, z-test shows that DISP for DECREASE is not significantly different in both 
periods. Prior to Regulation FD, it is possible that favourable recommendations are 
associated with access to managers, resulting in increased forecasting ability. 
Regardless of the recommendations level, however, the AFE and DISP of each group 
tend to be equalised after the adoption of Regulation FD. Overall, except for higher FE 
for INCREASE in the post-FD period, Table 3.5 shows that the means of AFE and DISP 
for INCREASE are lower than DECREASE in both sets of tests. This result is consistent 
with Miller (2002), which suggests that firms may withhold disclosure during a decline 
in earnings performance.53 
 
                                                 
53 Prior research shows that various variables generate differential motivation to announce good news 
versus bad news to all investors. For instance, a litigation risk can encourage firms to quickly release 
bad news (Kasznik et al., 1995; Skinner, 1994, 1997). 
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Table 3.7 presents the correlation coefficients between forecast attributes and their 
determinants. In general, the correlation coefficients have signs consistent with those 
expected for the equation coefficients and all are significant among forecast attributes 
and their determinants except for DISP and HORI (forecast horizon). DISP is the 
highest related to AFE among other variables, which is consistent with Mensah et al., 
(2004).  
 
[Insert Table 3.7 about here] 
 
3.5.1.2. Regression Results 
Table 3.8 and Table 3.9 present the regression results of AFE and DISP in the pre-FD 
and post-FD periods. In Equation (3-4) and Equation (3-7), the coefficients of interest 
are the FD dummy variables. The binary coefficients, β1, capture the difference in AFE 
and DISP between the pre-FD and the post-FD period. As expected, the coefficients (β1) 
of FD variables in Model 1 of Table 3.9 and Table 3.10 are significantly negative, which 
is consistent with our hypothesis (H1 and H4) that Regulation FD influences the 
information environment around firms and analysts. A negative coefficient indicates 
that AFE and DISP in the post-FD period were smaller than in the pre-FD period. 
 
[Insert Table 3.8 and Table 3.9 about here] 
 
The coefficients of SELL (β1) and HOLD (β2) in Equation (3-5) and Equation (3-8) of 
Table 3.8 and Table 3.9 are significantly positive in both the pre-FD and post-FD period. 
The results suggest that AFE and DISP for SELL are higher than those for BUY and 
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HOLD. Similarly, β1, the coefficients AFE and DISP of DECREASE, in Equation (3-6) 
and Equation (3-9) in Table 3.8 and Table 3.9 are higher than that of INCREASE both in 
the pre-FD and post-FD period. The results indicate that AFE and DISP of higher 
information uncertainty firms are higher than those of lower uncertainty firms after 
controlling for variables documented by prior studies associated with forecast attributes.  
 
In both sets of tests, the coefficients on ANALY and SIZE are positive and highly 
significant, capturing the fact that forecasts for firms with more analysts following and 
bigger size tend to be more accurate. However, the coefficients on DISP and HORI are 
negative and highly significant, indicating that analysts‘ disagreements and older 
forecasts tend to be less accurate. Unfortunately, the above results cannot explain our 
hypotheses, H2, H3, H5 and H6, which supports that the differences may have appeared 
between the two groups after the adoption of Regulation FD.  
 
3.5.1.3. Chow’s Test Results 
Table 3.10 presents the significant difference in means of the change in AFE and DISP 
using Chow tests. Table 3.10 reports the results of Chow‘s test. Table 3.10 shows that 
the results reject the hypotheses that binary β1 are the same at the 1% level. The results 
from the Chow-test show that the comparisons in means are significantly different at the 
1% level between lower and higher information uncertainty. 
 
[Insert Table 3.10 about here] 
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The results of Chow‘s breakpoint test indicate that the hypotheses on AFE and DISP of 
parameter stability over pre-FD and post-FD period are rejected on both DECREASE 
and SELL at 1 percent of significance level. The post-FD structural change in AFE and 
DISP is, therefore, verified for both DECREASE and SELL. The result is consistent with 
our expectation that Regulation FD has a strong impact on high information uncertainty 
firms.  
 
These results are consistent with prior research, which suggests that the significant 
increase in forecast accuracy for favourable (upgrade) recommendations relative to that 
for unfavourable (downgrade) recommendations in the pre-FD period, does not persist 
in the post-FD period (Chen et al., 2006). We ascribe the result to the improvement of 
the forecast ability in SELL and DECREASE. The results support hypotheses H2, H3, H5, 
and H6. Regulation FD may have contributed to the information quality.  
 
3.5.2. Earnings Management 
We examine the level of DA and ADA before and after Regulation FD. Table 3.6 
presents the difference in the level of DA and ADA in both the pre-FD and post-FD 
period. The mean of DA in the pre-FD is not closer to zero relative to the post-FD 
period. ADA decreases from the pre-FD period to the post-FD period. Using t-test and z-
test, we find evidence that the level of earnings management has significantly decreased 
after the adoption of Regulation FD. The results are not consistent with our hypothesis 
H7.  
 
[Insert Table 3.6 about here] 
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Table 3.11 reports the regression results on the effect of Regulation FD on the earnings 
management in accordance with forecast accuracy. β1 is interpreted as the mean change 
in earnings management from the pre-FD period to the post-FD period. Binary β1s in 
Model 1 and Model 2, are significantly negative at the level of 1%. This result indicates 
that earnings management has decreased after the adoption of Regulation FD.  
 
[Insert Table 3.11 about here] 
 
The most interesting two coefficients, β2 and β3 on AFE and AFE*FD in Model 1 and 
Model 2 are not significant factors that influence earnings management. Controlling for 
book to market (BM), earnings performance (EARN) and asset growth rate (AGR), we 
find no evidence that changes in analysts‘ forecast accuracy in the post-FD period 
exhibits an impact on earnings management.  
 
On the basis of the findings of prior research, we cautiously ascribe the results, 
presented in Table 3.11, on the decrease in earnings management (β1s) to the new rules 
introduced in Korea. Korea adopted a regulation on the functioning of the audit 
committee in 200054 and internal accounting control system in 2005. Prior research has 
shown that audit committee and internal controls are associated with reduction in 
earning management. Xie et al., (2003) and Bédard et al., (2004), who suggest that the 
audit committee is the important factor in constraining the propensity of managers to 
                                                 
54 Audit committee has developed among Korean listed firms since 2000. However, audit committee did 
not significantly influence the earnings management during the early stage of the regulation. Jeon et al., 
(2004) suggest that there is no significant difference in earnings management between firms with audit 
committee and firms without audit committee from 2000 to 2001. 
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engage in earnings management. Cho et al., (2008) suggest that the Korean firms with 
audit committee are related to higher financial reporting quality.55 Similarly, Doyle et 
al., (2007) find that weak internal controls are associated with relatively low quality 
accruals. Kim (2008) suggests that Korean firms with internal control are related to 
higher earnings quality. Above research presents a fairly cohesive picture of how audit 
committee and internal controls affect earnings quality. 
 
In conclusion, our results are not consistent with our expectations that improved 
forecast accuracy may influence earnings management.  
 
3.6. Summary and Conclusions 
In this chapter, this study examines the effect of Regulation FD on forecast performance 
and earnings management. First our paper investigates whether Regulation FD 
influences forecast errors (AFE) and forecast dispersion (DISP) for the lower 
information uncertainty groups (INCREASE, BUY) as compared to the higher 
information uncertainty groups (DECREASE, SELL) after the adoption of the 
Regulation. The empirical results provide evidence that AFE and DISP have decreased 
after the adoption of Regulation FD.  
 
Also, there is a significant difference between forecast attributes for the higher 
information uncertainty groups and lower information uncertainty groups in the post-FD 
period. The results support the hypothesis that Regulation FD succeeds in elimating 
                                                 
55 They use a sample consisting of Korean firms listed in the Korean Exchange (KRX) from 2000 to 
2004. 
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selective disclosure. Actually, the release from the Korea Exchange (KRX) supports 
these results.56 The release shows that Fair Disclosure (FD) and Voluntary Disclosure 
(VD) have significantly increased in the post-FD period, which means that Regulation 
FD encourages firms to disclose useful information to market. The results are consistent 
with Heflin et al. (2003), who find an increase in the number of earnings related 
voluntary disclosures in the post-FD period.  
 
There are two methods to improve forecast accuracy; access to managers (private 
information) or increase in useful information to the market (public information). 
Supposing that managers will not provide private information to analysts who issue 
favourable recommendations any longer, the increase in forecast ability can be 
explained by the increase in useful public information available to the analysts. In other 
words, even if analysts lose their private access to managers, the firms may significantly 
enhance the quality and quantity of released information. Analysts could therefore 
replace information gathered directly from the managers with information obtained 
from available public information and other sources. Therefore, it is possible that 
analysts increase in their forecasting ability without a private channel to management, if 
companies release available public information to all market participants.  
 
                                                 
56 Managers may choose either fair disclosure or voluntary disclosure if they want to release material 
information in public. Therefore, fair disclosure and voluntary disclosure may be complementary to each 
other. This table shows the number of fair disclosures and voluntary disclosures released after year 2000. 
The difference between fair disclosure and voluntary disclosure is whether the information is delivered to 
a certain few favoured subjects in advance or not. Voluntary disclosure is literally not compulsory 
disclosure, but fair disclosure is compulsory disclosure because firms should disclose the information 
after they release the material information to the favoured few. The number of disclosure including 
disclosure and voluntary disclosure has increased after the adoption of Regulation FD: 88 cases in 2000, 
239 cases in 2001, 1920 cases in 2002, 9,024 cases in 2003, 8,405 cases in 2004, 6,299 cases in 2005, 
6,363 cases in 2006, 6,817 cases in 2007.  
 94 
Second, we explore the effect of change in analyst forecast on earnings management. 
On the assumption that improved forecast accuracy encourages managers to increase 
earnings management, we investigate the cross-sectional effect of forecast accuracy on 
the firms‘ accounting policy on earnings management after the adoption of Regulation 
FD. We show evidence that absolute discretionary accruals, proxy of earnings 
management, has gradually decreased over the time. However, contrary to our 
expectations, after controlling for variables that are known to be associated with 
earnings management in the previous research, our analysis presents evidence that 
forecast accuracy does not influence firms‘ earnings policy after the adoption of 
Regulation FD.  
 
In conclusion, our research suggests that a ―chilling‖ effect does not occur after the 
adoption of Regulation FD, regardless of the critics‘ apprehension. On the contrary, 
Regulation FD contributes to increases in the quality and quantity of information from 
firms. We find evidence that forecast performance does not influence firms‘ accounting 
policy choices.  
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ANNEX 2 
Table 3.1 Definition of Variables 
 
This table outlines the definitions of variables used in our hypothesis testing. 
AFE   
 
DISP 
 
FD 
 
SELL 
 
HOLD         
 
BUY            
 
DECREASE       
 
INCREASE 
 
ANALY          
HORI          
 
SIZE           
VOLA 
 
ADA 
BM 
EARN 
AGR 
= 
 
= 
 
= 
 
= 
 
= 
 
=
 
=
 
= 
 
= 
=
 
=
= 
 
= 
= 
= 
= 
Analysts‘ absolute forecast errors at the earnings announcement deflated by beginning 
stock price; 
the standard deviation of all analysts‘ forecasts made at the end of the year from the 
consensus of analysts‘ forecasts deflated by stock price at the end of the previous year;  
dummy variable that equals 1 for firms take in the post-FD (year 2003-2007) period 
and 0 otherwise; 
dummy variable for sell or strong sell recommendation in the analysts‘ 
recommendations and 0 otherwise;  
dummy variable for hold recommendation in the analysts‘ recommendations and 0 
otherwise;  
dummy variable for buy or strong buy recommendation in the analysts‘ 
recommendations and 0 otherwise;  
dummy variable that equals 1 if the observation continues to report two year of 
negative and decrease in earnings from the last year‘ earnings;  
dummy variable that equals 1 if the observation continues to report two year of positive 
and increase in earnings from the last year‘ earnings;  
the number of analysts providing earnings forecasts;  
the number of the day between the end of the following fiscal year and the date of the 
analysts‘ forecast; 
the natural log of the total asset at the end of the last year of forecast; 
standard deviation of past one year‘s stock returns prior to the release of the analysts‘ 
recommendations; 
absolute value of the discretionary current accrual; 
book value of equity divided by the market value of equity;  
realized earnings to total asset; 
ratio of asset growth. 
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Table 3.2 Sample Selection  
 
Sample A is based on the firm-year observations while Sample B is based on the forecast-year 
observations. Sample A and Sample B consist of 161,343 and 2,311 observations from 2000 to 2007 
(excluding 2002).  
 
 2000 2001 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total 
Sample A  5,014 19,955 21,772 21,424 41,270 33,543 18,365 161,343 
Sample B 300 271 264 303 374 385 414 2,311 
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Table 3.3 Descriptive Statistics for Variables 
 
 
 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for 161,343 analyst-year observations (Panel A) and 2,311 
firm-year observations (Panel B) from 2000 to 2007 (excluding year 2002). The pre-FD period is from 
2000 to 2001 and the post-FD period is from 2003 to 2007. Variables are forecast errors (FE), absolute 
forecast errors (AFE), forecast dispersion (DISP), analyst following (ANALY), forecast horizon (HORI), 
firms size (SIZE) and standard deviation of daily stock returns (VOLA), discretionary accruals (DA), 
absolute discretionary accruals (ADA), book to market (BM), earnings size (EARN), and asset growth rate 
(AGR).  
 
 
< Panel A: 161,343 analyst-year observations > 
Variables 
Pre-FD period (n=24,969) Post-FD period (n=136,374) 
Mean 
25th  
Percentile 
Median 
75th  
Percentile 
Mean 
25th  
Percentile 
Median 
75th  
Percentile 
FE 0.056 -0.004 0.019 0.076 0.021 -0.005 0.009 0.038 
AFE 0.079 0.011 0.034 0.089 0.044 0.073 0.021 0.052 
DISP 0.055 0.019 0.034 0.062 0.030 0.011 0.019 0.035 
ANALY 23 15 23 33 24 14 24 33 
HORI 206 107 198 299 214 115 216 313 
SIZE 3,058 1,031 3,033 13,256 7,511 1,651 7,477 35,554 
VOLA 0.71 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.47 0.37 0.45 0.55 
 
 
< Panel B: 2,311 firm-year observations >  
Variables 
Pre-FD period (n=571) Post-FD period (n=1,740) 
Mean 
25th  
Percentile 
Median 
75th  
Percentile 
Mean 
25th  
Percentile 
Median 
75th  
Percentile 
DA -0.071 -0.126 -0.062 0.005 0.022 -0.047 0.015 0.092 
ADA 0.108 0.042 0.087 0.141 0.084 0.031 0.067 0.122 
AFE 0.079 0.012 0.034 0.090 0.044 0.075 0.022 0.054 
DISP 0.056 0.019 0.034 0.063 0.030 0.012 0.019 0.036 
BM 2.15 0.88 1.64 2.85 1.24 0.54 0.92 1.57 
EARN 0.063 0.021 0.045 0.088 0.088 0.04 0.072 0.118 
ASSETGR 0.315 0.00 0.108 0.309 0.196 0.025 0.106 0.239 
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Table 3.4 Comparison of Forecast Errors and Forecast Dispersion (1) 
 
This table summarizes the absolute forecast error (AFE) and forecast dispersion (DISP) by analysts 
between 2000 and 2007 (excluding year 2002). The pre-FD period is from 2000 to 2001 and the post-FD 
period is from 2003 to 2007. Panel A shows the absolute forecast errors (AFE) and forecast dispersion 
(DISP) by year while Panel B presents AFE and DISP by forecast recommendations level and Panel C 
provides AFE and DISP by the earnings performance.  
 
 
<Panel A> Absolute Forecast Errors (AFE) and Forecast Dispersion (DISP) by Year 
 
Pre-FD Post-FD 
Obs % AFE DISP Obs % AFE DISP 
2000 5,014 0.031 0.073  0.071          
2001 19,955 0.124 0.081  0.051          
2003         21,772 0.135 0.052  0.040  
2004         21,424 0.133 0.051  0.036  
2005         41,270 0.256 0.042  0.028  
2006         33,543 0.208 0.042  0.026  
2007         18,365 0.114 0.032  0.021  
(n=161,343) 24,969 0.155 0.079  0.055  136,374 0.845 0.055  0.030  
 
<Panel B> Absolute Forecast Errors (AFE) and Forecast Dispersion (DISP) by Forecast Recommendations Level 
 Pre-FD Post-FD 
Obs AFE DISP Obs AFE DISP 
SELL 
(n=2,310) 
Mean 1,617 0.146  0.076  693 0.062  0.043  
Median 1,617 0.081  0.041  693 0.027  0.031  
HOLD 
(n=58,702) 
Mean 11,417 0.091  0.062  47,285 0.050  0.034  
Median 11,417 0.039  0.039  47,285 0.024  0.022  
BUY 
(n=100,331) 
Mean 11,935 0.058  0.046  88,396 0.040  0.027  
Median 11,935 0.027  0.030  88,396 0.020  0.018  
Total  
(n=161,343) 
Mean 24,969 0.079  0.055  136,374 0.055  0.030  
Median 24,969 0.034  0.034  136,374 0.021  0.019  
 
 
<Panel C> Absolute Forecast Errors (AFE) and Forecast Dispersion (DISP) by Earnings Performance 
 
Pre-FD Post-FD 
Obs AFE DISP Obs AFE DISP 
INCREASE 
(n=85,038) 
Mean 12,235 0.041  0.041  72,803 0.030  0.024  
Median 12,235 0.021  0.025  72,803 0.014  0.015  
DECREASE 
(n=12,094) 
Mean 3,991 0.236  0.086  8,103 0.165  0.071  
Median 3,991 0.164  0.058  8,103 0.129  0.056  
ALL-OTHERS 
(n=64,211) 
Mean 8,743 0.061  0.061  55,468 0.045  0.030  
Median 8,743 0.036  0.039  55,468 0.029  0.022  
Total 
(n=161,343) 
Mean 24,969 0.079  0.055  136,374 0.055  0.030  
Median 24,969 0.034  0.034  136,374 0.021  0.019  
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Table 3.5 Comparison of Forecast Errors and Forecast Dispersion (2) 
 
 
This table presents the results of t-tests and z-tests for the difference in absolute forecast error (AFE) and 
forecast dispersion (DISP) in the pre-FD versus post-FD period. The pre-FD period is from 2000 to 2001 
and the post-FD period is from 2003 to 2007. Z-test (Wilcoxon signed test) is used to measure whether 
the medians are statistically different from each other while t-test is used to measure whether the means 
between the pre-FD and post-FD periods are statistically different from each other. P-values for both tests 
are reported. * Significant at the 10% level or better; ** Significant at the 5% level or better; *** 
Significant at the 1% level or better. 
 
 
< Panel A: By FD Period > 
 
Pre-FD 
(n=24,969) 
Difference (Pre-FD=Post-FD) Post-FD 
(n=136,374) t-test z-test 
AFE 0.079 65.11*** 45.80*** 0.055 
DISP 0.055 83.14*** 90.81*** 0.030 
 
 
< Panel B: By Recommendation Level > 
Variables 
SELL-SIDE RECOMMENDATIONS BUY-SIDE RECOMMENDATIONS 
Pre-FD 
(n=1,617) 
Difference  
(Pre-FD=Post-FD) 
Post-FD 
(n=693) 
Pre-FD 
(n=11,935) 
Difference 
(Pre-FD=Post-FD) 
Post-FD 
(n=88,396) 
t-test z-test t-test z-test 
AFE 0.146 11.88*** 12.89*** 0.062 0.058 27.80*** 20.51*** 0.040 
DISP 0.076 8.36*** 8.76*** 0.043 0.046 48.92*** 62.42*** 0.027 
 
 
< Panel C: By Earnings Performance > 
Variables 
INCREASE DECREASE 
Pre-FD 
(n=12,235) 
Difference  
(Pre-FD=Post-FD) 
Post-FD 
(n=72,803) 
Pre-FD 
(n=3,991) 
Difference  
(Pre-FD=Post-FD) 
Post-FD 
(n=8,103) 
t-test z-test t-test z-test 
AFE 0.041 22.88*** 28.13*** 0.024 0.236 21.88*** 16.03*** 0.165 
DISP 0.041 40.62*** 65.80*** 0.030 0.086 11.49*** 1.26 0.071 
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Table 3.6 Comparison of Absolute Discretionary Accruals  
 
 
This table presents the results of t-tests and z-tests for the difference in discretionary accruals (DA) and 
absolute discretionary accruals (ADA) in the pre-FD versus post-FD period. The pre-FD period is from 
2000 to 2001 and the post-FD period is from 2003 to 2007. Z-test (Wilcoxon signed test) is used to 
measure whether the medians are  statistically different from each other while t-test is used to measure 
whether the means between the pre-FD and post-FD periods are statistically different from each other. P-
values for both tests are reported. * Significant at the 10% level or better; ** Significant at the 5% level or 
better; *** Significant at the 1% level or better. 
 
 
 
Pre-FD  
(n=571) 
Difference of DA 
(Pre-FD=Post-FD) Post-FD 
(n=1,740) 
Pre-FD  
(n=571) 
Difference of ADA 
(Pre-FD=Post-FD) Post-FD 
(n=1,740) 
t-test z-test t-test z-test 
Mean -0.071 
-17.39*** -15.98*** 
0.022 0.108 
6.47*** 4.54*** 
0.084 
(Median) (-0.062) (0.015) (0.087) (0.067) 
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Table 3.7 Correlation between Forecast Attributes and Other Variables 
 
 
This table shows the matrix of Pearson correlation coefficients among the possible explanatory variables 
to the events of forecasting earnings. The pre-FD period is from 2000 to 2001 and the post-FD period is 
from 2003 to 2007. The explanatory variables are forecast errors (FE), absolute forecast errors (AFE), 
forecast dispersion (DISP), analyst following (ANALY), forecast horizon (HORI), firms size (SIZE) and 
standard deviation of daily stock price (VOLA). The numbers below are t-stats of the null hypothesis 
where the correlation coefficient is zero.  
 
< Panel A: Pre-FD Period > 
Variables FE AFE DISP ANALY HORI SIZE VOLA 
FE 1 
      
      
AFE 
0.8078 
1 
     
<.001      
DISP 
0.2971 0.4073 
1 
    
<.001 <.001     
ANALY 
-0.1800 -0.2425 -0.2191 
1 
   
<.001 <.001 <.001    
HORI 
0.1164 0.1831 -0.0375 0.0276 
1 
  
<.001 <.001 0.3926 <.001   
SIZE 
-0.0500 -0.0651 -0.0388 0.2998 -0.0025 
1 
 
<.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 0.6888  
VOLA 
0.1623 0.1668 0.0564 -0.0212 0.0320 -0.2078 
1 
<.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
< Panel B: Post-FD Period > 
Variables FE AFE DISP ANALY HORI SIZE VOLA 
FE 1 
      
      
AFE 
0.4901 
1 
     
<.001      
DISP 
0.1725 0.4800 
1 
    
<.001 <.001     
ANALY 
-0.1996 -0.1874 -0.0963 
1 
   
<.001 <.001 <.001    
HORI 
 0.1148 0.2640 0.0217 -0.0212 
1 
  
<.001 <.001 <.001 <.001   
SIZE 
-0.0764 -0.0896 -0.0840 0.4051 -0.0142 
1 
 
<.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 0.6888  
VOLA 
0.0934 0.1805 0.2012 -0.0757 -0.0094 -0.3204 
1 
<.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
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Table 3.8 Regression of the Changes in Forecast Errors  
 
 
This table reports the results of regressions to examine the variation in analyst‘s forecast accuracy for 
161,343 observations from 2000 to 2007 (excluding year 2002). The pre-FD period is from 2000 to 2001 
and the post-FD period is from 2003 to 2007. The dependent variable is absolute forecast errors (AFE). 
The explanatory variables are post-FD period (FD), analyst following (ANALY), forecast horizon (HORI), 
firms size (SIZE) and standard deviation of daily stock price (VOLA). * Significant at the 10% level or 
better; ** Significant at the 5% level or better; *** Significant at the 1% level or better. 
 
 
 
(MODEL 1) AFE = α + β1FD + β2ANALY + β3HORI + β4SIZE + β5VOLA + ε  
(MODEL 2) AFE = α + β1SELL + β2HOLD + β3ANALY + β4HORI + β5SIZE + β6VOLA + ε  
(MODEL 3) AFE = α + β1DECREASE + β2ANALY + β3HORI + β4SIZE + β5VOLA + ε  
Model 1 Coef. t P>|t|    
INTERCEPT α    0.0234  *** 12.43 0.000     
FD β1    -0.0152  *** -22.99 0.000     
ANALY β2 -0.0010  *** -52.61 0.000     
HORI β3    0.0002  *** 95.03 0.000     
SIZE β4 -0.0032  *** -8.95 0.000     
VOLA β5    0.0839  *** 54.14 0.000     
  Number of obs = 161,343 
Adj R-squared = 0.1375 
 
Model 2 
< Pre-FD > < Post-FD > 
Coef. t P>|t| Coef. t P>|t| 
INTERCEPT α -0.0386  *** -4.90 0.000 0.0157  *** 10.13 0.000 
SELL β1 0.1019  *** 21.86 0.000 0.0170  *** 6.81 0.000 
HOLD β2 0.0158  *** 8.58 0.000 0.0055  *** 15.05 0.000 
ANALY β3 -0.0032  *** -32.41 0.000 -0.0007  *** -38.91 0.000 
HORI β4 0.0002  *** 26.25 0.000 0.0001  *** 100.36 0.000 
SIZE β5 0.0117  *** 7.25 0.000 -0.0059  *** -17.80 0.000 
VOLA β6 0.1503  *** 21.50 0.000 0.0706  *** 49.03 0.000 
 
 
Number of obs = 24,969 
Adj R-squared = 0.1619 
Number of obs = 136,374 
Adj R-squared = 0.1357 
Model 3 
< Pre-FD > < Post-FD > 
Coef. t P>|t| Coef. t P>|t| 
INTERCEPT α    0.0752  *** 7.74 0.000 -0.0132  *** -6.70 0.000 
DECREASE β1    0.2494  *** 84.06 0.000    0.1253  *** 164.64 0.000 
ANALY β2 -0.0020  *** -17.81 0.000 -0.0003  *** -12.17 0.000 
HORI β3    0.0002  *** 21.01 0.000    0.0001  *** 72.54 0.000 
SIZE β4    0.0029   1.49 0.136 -0.0023  *** -5.25 0.000 
VOLA β5 -0.0382  *** -4.44 0.000    0.0626  *** 34.38 0.000 
  Number of obs = 16,226 
Adj R-squared = 0.4749 
Number of obs = 80.906 
Adj R-squared = 0.3424 
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 Table 3.9 Regression of the Changes in Forecast Dispersion  
 
 
This table reports the results of regressions to examine the variation in analyst‘s forecast dispersion for 
161,343 observations from 2000 to 2007 (excluding year 2002). Pre-FD period is from 2000 to 2001 and 
post-FD period is from 2003 to 2007. Dependent variable is forecast dispersion (DISP). The explanatory 
variables are post-FD period (FD), analyst following (ANALY), forecast horizon (HORI), firms size 
(SIZE) and standard deviation of daily stock price (VOLA). * Significant at the 10% level or better; ** 
Significant at the 5% level or better; *** Significant at the 1% level or better. 
 
(MODEL 1) DISP = α + β1FD + β2ANALY + β3HORI + β4SIZE + β5VOLA + ε  
(MODEL 2) DISP = α + β1SELL + β2HOLD + β3ANALY + β4HORI + β5SIZE + β6VOLA + ε  
(MODEL 3) DISP = α + β1DECREASE + β2ANALY + β3HORI + β4SIZE + β5VOLA + ε 
Model 1 Coef. t P>|t|    
INTERCEPT α    0.0501  *** 46.16 0.000     
FD β1 -0.0144  *** -37.74 0.000     
ANALY β2 -0.0002  *** -18.79 0.000     
HORI β3    0.0000  *** 3.67 0.000     
SIZE β4 -0.0053  *** -25.81 0.000     
VOLA β5    0.0391  *** 43.83 0.000     
  Number of obs = 161,343 
Adj R-squared = 0.0815 
 
Model 2 
< Pre-FD > < Post-FD > 
Coef. t P>|t| Coef. t P>|t| 
INTERCEPT α 0.0698  *** 15.63 0.000 0.0311  *** 34.52 0.000 
SELL β1 0.0384  *** 14.48 0.000 0.0156  *** 10.80 0.000 
HOLD β2 0.0084  *** 8.06 0.000 0.0059  *** 27.97 0.000 
ANALY β3 -0.0015  *** -27.48 0.000 -0.0000  ** -2.32 0.020 
HORI β4 -0.0000  ** -1.98 0.047 0.0000  *** 7.44 0.000 
SIZE β5 0.0013   1.38 0.168 -0.0062  *** -31.72 0.000 
VOLA β6 0.0224  *** 5.65 0.000 0.0400  *** 47.86 0.000 
 
 
Number of obs = 24,969 
Adj R-squared = 0.0898 
Number of obs = 136,374 
Adj R-squared = 0.0624 
Model 3 
< Pre-FD > < Post-FD > 
Coef. t P>|t| Coef. t P>|t| 
INTERCEPT α    0.0706  *** 13.73 0.000    0.0258  *** 20.25 0.000 
DECREASE β1    0.0627  *** 39.92 0.000    0.0430  *** 87.05 0.000 
ANALY β2 -0.0013  *** -22.11 0.000    0.0002  *** 10.26 0.000 
HORI β3    0.0000   0.25 0.800    0.0000  *** 7.29 0.000 
SIZE β4    0.0032  *** 3.09 0.002 -0.0063  *** -22.31 0.000 
VOLA β5 -0.0112  ** -2.46 0.014    0.0364  *** 30.79 0.000 
  Number of obs = 16,226 
Adj R-squared = 0.2119 
Number of obs = 80.906 
Adj R-squared = 0.1333 
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Table 3.10 Chow’s Breakpoint Test on Regression of Forecast Errors and Forecast 
Dispersion 
 
 
This table shows the results of the Chow test on regression of forecast errors and forecast dispersion. * 
Significant at the 10% level or better; ** Significant at the 5% level or better; *** Significant at the 1% 
level or better. 
 
 Forecast Errors (AFE) Forecast Dispersion (DISP) 
F-Statisitics Probability F-Statisitics Probability 
DECREASE 1423.14*** 0.000  921.83*** 0.000 
SELL  742.99*** 0.000 1317.43*** 0.000 
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Table 3.11 Regression of Regulation FD and Earnings Management 
 
 
This table reports the results of regressions to examine the variation in analyst‘s forecast accuracy for 
161,343 observations from 2000 to 2007 (excluding year 2002). The pre-FD period is from 2000 to 2001 
and the post-FD period is from 2003 to 2007. The dependent variable is defined as the absolute 
discretionary accruals (ADA) for earnings management. The explanatory variables are post-FD period 
(FD), absolute forecast errors (AFE), book to market (BM), earnings size (EARN), and asset growth rate 
(AGR). * Significant at the 10% level or better; ** Significant at the 5% level or better; *** Significant at 
the 1% level or better. 
 
 
(Model 1) ADA=α + β1FD + β2AFE + β3FD*AFE+ ε 
(Model 2) ADA=α + β1FD + β2AFE + β3FD*AFE + β4BM + β5EARN + β6AGR + ε 
 (Model 1) (Model 2) 
Coef. t P>|t| Coef. t P>|t| 
INTERCEPT α 0.1101 *** 30.03 0.000 α  0.1040  *** 20.18 0.000 
FD β1 -0.0248 *** -5.85 0.000 β1 -0.0267  *** -6.10 0.000 
AFE β2 -0.0293  -1.32 0.186 β2 -0.0171   -0.78 0.438 
FD*AFE β3 -0.0036  -0.12 0.908 β3 -0.0076   -0.25 0.805 
BM      β4 -0.0024  * -1.93 0.053 
EARN      β5 0.0869  *** 3.38 0.001 
AGR      β6 0.0149  *** 5.08 0.000 
 
Number of obs = 2,311 
Adj R-squared = 0.0182 
Number of obs = 2,311 
Adj R-squared = 0.0420 
* Significant at the 10% level or better 
 ** Significant at the 5% level or better 
*** Significant at the 1% level or better 
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CHAPTER 4 
PRIVATE EARNINGS GUIDANCE AND FORECASTS  
4.1. Introduction  
Firms have strong incentives to guide earnings in order to meet or beat market 
expectations.57 Previous literature documents that managers are more likely to guide 
market expectations following positive earnings surprises (i.e. actual earnings exceeding 
analysts‘ consensus forecast). Management has two ways to avoid negative earnings 
surprises. First, they can manage earnings upwards to exceed expectations (i.e. increase 
earnings by managing accruals or postponing expenses to next year).58 Second, they 
can manage market expectation downward in order to reduce level of optimistic 
forecasts. Anecdotal evidence suggests that managers guide earnings expectations when 
market earnings forecasts differ from theirs: 
 
After a typically grim presentation by CEO Bill Gates and sales chief Steve 
Ballmer at an analysts‟ meeting two years ago, Goldman Sachs analyst Rick 
Sherlund ran into the pair outside and said, „Congratulations. You guys 
scared the hell out of people.‟ Their response? „They gave each other a high 
five,‟ Sherlund recalls (Fox, 1997). 
 
 
 
Graham et al., (2005)‘s survey results supports the above anecdotal evidence. They find 
evidence that 85.5% of the 577 managers surveyed guide analysts. They suggest that 
80.7% of the managers guide analysts to circumvent negative earnings surprises, which 
may reduce stock price, by managing analysts‘ expectations. They report that managers 
                                                 
57 Approximately 50 percent of firms meet or beat analysts‘ forecasts during the years 1984-1992 while 
this ratio dramatically increased in the years after 1992 to approximately 65 percent (Lopez et al., 2002).  
58 See Chapter 2. 
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want to preannounce earnings early to (1) avoid potential lawsuits (2) promote a 
reputation of transparent reporting.59 Focusing on forecast at a given point in time prior 
to the earnings announcement, Richardson et al., (2005) examine earnings guidance 
before earnings announcements. Consistent with the findings of the above studies, they 
find that management guides the analyst toward a final forecast that is just beatable in 
order to avoid an earnings disappointment. The consensus of the research indicates that 
firms are likely to guide earnings forecasts when the expectations gap is large (Ajinkya 
et al., 1984; King et al., 1990).  
 
Prior to Regulation FD, many firms worked closely with analysts in the development of 
their earnings forecasts. However, not all analysts acquired material information from 
managers. Consequently, a few favoured analysts were more accurate than the unguided 
analysts (Lim, 2001; Hutton, 2005). Regulation FD was supposed to change the way 
firms release material information to market participants. If the regulation leads to 
change in information environment surrounding market participants, the change should 
also influence earnings management and earnings guidance, which are closely related to 
analysts‘ forecasts. We shall, therefore, study the effect of Regulation FD on earnings 
guidance.  
 
Before Regulation FD, analysts often emailed their detailed numerical forecasts to 
managers, who then provided detailed responses. Thus, both sides enjoyed the benefits. 
Managers can guide analysts‘ forecasts while they can meet or beat analysts‘ forecasts 
                                                 
59 Soffer et al., (2000) examine cross-sectional differences in how much of the news is disclosed at the 
preannouncement date versus the earnings announcement date and find that managers voluntarily 
preannounce bad news to avoid negative earnings announcement surprises. They suggest that the 
possibility of earnings guidance increases the optimism of analysts‘ prior consensus earnings forecasts. 
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(Hutton, 2005). However, Regulation FD prohibits this practice. Our interest is whether 
Regulation FD influences firms‘ practice of earnings guidance. Only a few papers 
discuss how Regulation FD affects earnings guidance from management. For example, 
using text mining, Feldman et al., (2003) identify over 3,400 earnings guidance 
disclosures from October 2000 to July 2002. They find that private earnings guidance 
has decreased in the post-FD period.  
 
First, we examine the change in private earnings guidance after the adoption of 
Regulation FD. Following Matsumoto (2002) and Wang (2007), we calculate private 
earnings guidance in analysts‘ forecasts. Using 2,311 firm-year observations for 
earnings guidance and analysts‘ consensus forecasts, we measure private earnings 
guidance by subtracting ‗factors that contribute to the variability of total earnings 
guidance‘ (i.e. earnings volatility, incidence of losses and fair disclosure) from total 
earnings guidance. We analyze the association of Regulation FD and private earnings 
guidance over the period 2000 to 2007.  
 
Second, we examine the Korean market‘s price reaction to firms‘ meeting, beating or 
missing analysts‘ forecasts. Previous research focuses on the market‘s reaction to 
reported earnings that meet or beat analysts‘ expectations (Lopez et al., 2002; Brown et 
al., 2005).60 For example, Lopez et al., (2002) examine whether the market penalizes 
firms more for falling short of expectations than it rewards them for exceeding 
expectations. They find that firms that meet or beat analysts‘ forecasts enjoy higher 
stock returns than firms that fail to meet these expectations. Brown et al., (2005) report 
                                                 
60 To date, market reaction to firms‘ strategies has never been studied in Korea.  
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that managers focus more on avoiding negative earnings surprises rather than on 
avoiding losses or earnings decreases. The results indicate that markets provide stronger 
rewards (penalties) for meeting or beating (missing) current analysts‘ forecasts than any 
other earnings thresholds.  
 
Third, we examine the extent to which the content of private information in analysts‘ 
forecasts has changed after the adoption of Regulation FD. We then examine how 
changes in private information affect the analysts‘ forecasting ability. Barron, Kim, Lim 
and Stevens (1998, hereafter BKLS) show evidence that information content affects 
forecast dispersion and forecasts errors in the mean value of these forecasts. They find 
that lack of BKLS consensus (1-ρ), proxy for information asymmetry, reflects the ratio 
of private information to total information in analysts‘ forecasts. Their findings suggest 
that an increase in the precision of public (private) information implies the impact of 
increased public (private) disclosures by firms (Mohanram et al., 2006).  
 
Using BKLS (1998), Adut (2003) examines the effect of Regulation FD on private 
information. He finds that low dispersion firms have more public information. We 
extend Adut (2003) by examining the extent to which the content of the information 
influences analysts‘ forecasts. Similarly, following BKLS (1998), we measure the ratio 
of private information in analysts‘ forecasts. Using a large sample of analysts‘ forecasts 
(161,343 observations), we examine whether Regulation FD contributes to a decrease in 
private information in earnings forecasts. We hypothesize that a change in private 
information will influence analysts‘ forecasts. We find that the ratio of private 
information in analysts‘ forecasts significantly decreases. We show evidence that 
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analysts‘ forecasting ability has significantly improved even though private information 
decreases after the adoption of Regulation FD.  
 
This study contributes to the literature on the effect of Regulation FD in several ways. 
First, our study investigates how changes in private information affect analysts‘ 
forecasting ability after the adoption of Regulation FD. Most prior literature focuses on 
the effect of Regulation FD on the analysts‘ forecasts‘ attributes. Our study 
differentiates itself by measuring the ratio of private information in analysts‘ forecasts. 
Second, we extend previous research by exploring private earnings guidance. Third, this 
study contributes to the research by examining the economic consequences of meeting 
or beating analysts‘ forecasts in the Korean market.  
 
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 explains and develops the hypotheses. 
Section 4.3 describes the sample selection procedure. Section 4.4 discusses research 
design. Section 4.5 presents the main empirical results on the effect of Regulation FD. 
The final section provides a brief summary and presents conclusions. 
 
4.2. Hypotheses Development 
4.2.1. Regulation FD and Private Earnings Guidance 
Numerous studies provide evidence that analysts tend to make optimistic forecasts at the 
start of the fiscal year but then tend to be pessimistic as earnings announcement 
approaches. For example, Richardson et al., (1999) find that analysts issue 
systematically optimistic forecasts early in the year and then talk down their forecasts to 
a level that managers can beat. Bernhardt et al., (2002) also find that earnings forecasts 
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tend to grow pessimistic over the forecast horizon. These results are in line with 
O‘Brien (1988) and Abarbanell (1991). Arthur Levitt, Chairman of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) reported in a speech that managers cannot be solely 
blamed for the above practices. Levitt commented that many corporate managers, 
auditors, and analysts all participate in a game of nods and winks. 
 
This is the pattern earnings management creates: companies try to meet or 
beat Wall Street earnings projections in order to increase the value of stock 
options. Their ability to do this depends on achieving the earnings 
expectations of analysts. And analysts seek constant guidance from companies 
to frame those expectations. Auditors, who want to retain their clients, are 
under pressure not to stand in the way (The “Number Game”, 28 Sep 1998). 
 
 
Prior to Regulation FD, if analysts‘ expectations were too high, managers could 
normally hold a conference call to adjust analysts‘ expectations. Consequently, some 
analysts could obtain informational advantage over others through their private access 
to management. Previous research documents that managers tended to reward (or 
punish) analysts with more favourable (unfavourable) recommendations (Francis et al., 
1993; Mayew, 2007; Chen et al., 2006). All the above studies find evidence that 
managers discriminate among analysts by granting more management access to more 
favourable analysts. 
 
However, Regulation FD restricts private earnings guidance or discrimination among 
analysts, which leads to information asymmetry. This motivates us to examine private 
earnings guidance after the adoption of Regulation FD. An underpinning of Regulation 
FD is that dissemination of available public information complements managers‘ private 
earnings guidance. It is possible that more managers issue public earnings guidance 
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instead of engaging in private communications with favoured analysts in the post-FD 
period. If analysts can obtain less private information from management, they are likely 
to depend on the available public information. Thus, we expect that private earnings 
guidance from the management decreases after the adoption of Regulation FD. Our first 
hypothesis is stated as follows: 
 
H1: Private earnings guidance decreases after the adoption of Regulation FD. 
 
Managers‘ decisions to manage analysts‘ forecasts through earnings guidance depends 
on whether managers have incentives to have their expectations of future earnings 
before releasing earnings information to all market participants. Managers perceive a 
benefit from guiding earnings forecasts in order to avoid negative earnings surprises. On 
the other hand, if managers fail to meet or beat analysts‘ forecasts, then the market is 
likely to react strongly to such surprises. Earnings performance is one of the most 
critical variables influencing firms‘ disclosure policies.  
 
Previous research suggests that firms with higher earnings provide the information 
relative to firms with lower earnings (Matsumoto, 2002; Miller, 2002; Adut et al., 2007). 
For example, Matsumoto (2002) finds that managers of earnings increase (decrease) 
firms are more (less) likely to be associated with earnings guidance to avoid negative 
earnings surprises. The finding indicates that managers of firms with higher earnings are 
more likely to face higher pressure to satisfy stakeholders. Therefore, we conjecture that 
firms with higher earnings have more incentives to provide earnings guidance relative to 
firms with lower earnings.  
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Prior to Regulation FD, especially, managers with high earnings performance could 
disclose their assessment of future earnings to selected groups of analysts. However, 
Regulation FD may diminish managers‘ ability to avoid such surprises since the 
regulation forbids private dissemination of earnings guidance to selected analysts. We 
expect that changes in the information environment will lead to a decrease in private 
earnings guidance for earnings increase firms in the post-FD period. We examine the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H2: Private earnings guidance for earnings increase firms has significantly 
changed after the adoption of Regulation FD. 
 
4.2.2. Market Price Reaction  
Prior research finds evidence that the market rewards (penalizes) firms for meeting or 
beating (missing) analysts‘ earnings forecasts (Lakonishok et al., 1992; Burgstahler et 
al., 2001; Skinner et al., 2002; Lopez et al., 2002). For example, firms tend to lose their 
market value after reporting earnings that miss analysts‘ forecasts (so-called earnings 
torpedoes). Lopez et al., (2002) report lower mean cumulative three-day abnormal 
returns for firms that miss analysts‘ expectations than for firms that beat analysts‘ 
expectations. Skinner et al., (2002) find that investors tend not to forgive firms that miss 
earnings expectations. Fox (1997) also highlights the importance of the meeting of the 
analysts‘ earnings expectations.  
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In January, for the 41st time in the 42 quarters since it went public, Microsoft 
reported earnings that met or beat Wall Street estimates... This is what chief 
executives and chief financial officers dream of: quarter after quarter after 
blessed quarter of not disappointing Wall Street. Sure, they dream about other 
things…. But the simplest, most visible, most merciless measure of corporate 
success in the 1990s has become this one: Did you make your earnings last 
quarter? (Fox, 1997)  
 
 
This is consistent with DeGeorge et al. (1999) and Bartov et al., (2002), who suggest 
that markets also reward firms who report profits instead of losses. We examine the 
Korean market reaction to firms‘ meeting or beating to analysts‘ forecasts. Consistent 
with previous empirical literature, we expect that markets respond strongly to meeting 
or beating analysts‘ forecasts. Our third hypothesis is stated as follows: 
 
H3: Korean market price reaction is stronger for meeting or beating analysts‟ 
forecasts than missing analysts‟ forecasts, ceteris paribus.  
 
 
4.2.3. Private Information in Analysts’ Forecasts 
SEC suggests that Regulation FD may result in an increase in the level of publicly 
available information to the capital market and an elimination of the flow of private 
information.61 Regulation FD makes the market efficient by increasing the amount of 
available information to the public and limiting the amount of private information 
available exclusively to some favoured investors such as broker dealers, institutional 
investors and analysts. It is obvious that the aim of the regulation is to curtail analysts‘ 
private channels to management that they had formerly enjoyed and to disseminate 
material information to the public.  
                                                 
61 See the ‗SEC Plans New Disclosure Rules To Speed Corporate Filings‘, Dow Jones News Wire, 5 th 
Mar. 2002.  
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Therefore, if firms stop using selective disclosure and release a high quality of public 
information, information asymmetry would be reduced. After the adoption of 
Regulation FD, we expect that firms would decrease the flow of private information 
provided to favoured analysts and increase the scope of information provided to the 
public. Based on the expectation, our fourth hypothesis posits that the ratio of private 
information in analysts‘ forecasts decreases after the adoption of Regulation FD.  
 
H4: The ratio of private information in analysts‟ forecasts decreases after the 
adoption of Regulation FD. 
 
To further our investigation, we examine whether change in the content of information 
in analysts‘ forecasts influences analysts‘ forecasting ability. If there has been a change 
in analyst forecast ability, there would be two fundamental sources of information: high 
quality information through public channels; and private information from managers.  
 
In Chapter 3, we conclude that Regulation FD may lead to the improvement of analysts‘ 
forecasting ability although public information in analysts‘ forecasts increases. After 
Regulation FD took effect, analysts should seriously depend on the public information 
since managers should preclude the analysts from private information. Namely, analysts 
should turn to public channels in order to acquire alternative less direct sources of 
private information. Therefore, we should see lower information asymmetry if 
Regulation FD makes firms provide public information of higher quality to all analysts. 
This will be the last focus of this paper. We hypothesize that analysts‘ forecasting 
ability will not change even if private information has decreased after the adoption of 
Regulation FD. 
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H5: Analysts‟ forecast accuracy has not changed even if private information 
has decreased after the adoption of Regulation FD. 
 
H6: Analysts‟ forecast dispersion has not changed even if private information 
has decreased after the adoption of Regulation FD. 
 
4.3. Sample Selection  
In order to study the effect of Regulation FD on private earnings guidance and private 
information in earnings forecasting, we use two samples from FSS and FNguide. 
Individual analysts‘ forecasts of annual earnings per share (EPS) are obtained from the 
FNguide and financial information was retrieved from FSS. In this study, unlike the 
previous chapter, we use firm-observations (2,311) additionally.  
 
We use forecast-year observations to examine the change in private information in 
analysts‘ forecasts and firm-year observations to calculate the private information in 
firms‘ earnings guidance. Firm-year observations are based on the forecast-year 
observations. Therefore, firm-year observations included in our sample meet the 
following criteria adopted in choosing forecast-year observations: 
 
- Firms are covered by at least two individual analysts‘ forecasts with EPS 
- Firms with stock price and trading volume data available on FNguide 
- Firms ending dates of December 31 
- Firms do not belong to financial institutions 
 
Finally, elimination of four outliers resulted in a final sample of 2,311 firm-year 
observations. We sort our data into two groups: 571 (24,969) pre-FD period and 1,740 
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(136,374) post-FD period. The pre-FD period covers two years (2000-2001) and post-
FD period covers five years (2003-2007). Using the firm year observations in 
accordance with analysts‘ forecasts, we then calculate the changes in private earnings 
guidance in analysts‘ forecasts after the adoption of Regulation FD. In this sample, 
observations include private information in analysts‘ forecasts (PI), private earnings 
guidance (PEG), analysts following (ANALY), firm size (SIZE), forecast horizon 
(HORI), volatility of stock returns (VOLA) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). 
Table 4.3 represents the major descriptive statistics on both pre-period and post-period 
variables used in analysts‘ forecast attributes. 
 
[Insert Table 4.3 about here] 
 
4.4. Research Design 
4.4.1. Effect of Regulation FD on Private Earnings Guidance 
4.4.1.1. Measurement of Private Earnings Guidance  
Matsumoto (2002) develops a measure of forecast guidance using analysts‘ forecasts, 
earnings per share (EPS) and cumulative stock returns. In order to reflect the market 
risk, we extend the Matsumoto (2002)‘ model to control for the market portfolio returns. 
The Matsumoto (2002) model consists of four stages. We first calculate expected yearly 
change in analysts‘ forecasts based on yearly earnings change (△EPS) and cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR) in Equation (4.8). 
 
, , , , 1
, 1, , 2 , , , ,
, , 1 , , 2
i j t i j t
j t j t jt i j t i j t
i j t i j t
EPS EPS
CAR
P P
   

 
 
   
          
(4.1)  
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where: 
, ,i j tEPS   
 
, , 1i j tP 
, ,i j tCAR  
= 
 
= 
= 
earnings per share for firm i in year t less earnings per share for 
the same firm in prior year; 
price per share for firm i at the end of year t-1; 
cumulative stock returns on stock j for year t less cumulative 
returns on the market portfolio for year t. 
 
In Equation (4.2), we use the parameter estimates (α, β1 and β2) from the prior year to 
calculate the expected change in earnings per share. 
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(4.2) 
 
In order to calculate expected analyst‘ forecast in Equation (4.3), we add prior year‘s 
EPS (
, , 1)i j tEPS   to expected change in EPS , ,( ( ))i j tE EPS .  
 
, , , , 1 , ,[ ] [ ( )i j t i j t i j tE F EPS E EPS                      (4.3) 
where: 
, ,[ ]i j tE F  
, , 1i j tEPS   
, ,( )i j tE EPS  
= 
= 
= 
Expected analyst‘ forecast; 
Prior year‘s earnings per share; 
Expected change in analyst‘ forecast 
 
In order to measure the magnitude of earnings guidance, we deduct the expected 
analyst‘ forecast from the consensus forecast for the year. 
 
, , , , , ,( )i j t i j t i j tUF F E F                              (4.14) 
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where: 
, ,i j tUF  
, ,i j tF  
= 
= 
unexpected analysts forecasts; 
actual analysts‘ forecasts 
 
Wang (2007) defines the unexplained portion of UF  as private earnings guidance. 
Controlling for earnings volatility, incidence of losses and number of fair disclosure of 
earnings related information, Wang (2007) measures private earnings guidance in 
analysts‘ forecasts. Following Wang (2007), we select variables that contribute to the 
variability of UF (volatility of daily stock returns (VOLA), earnings decrease 
(DECRESE) and number of fair disclosure (NFD)). We consider the unexplained 
portion of unexpected analysts‘ forecasts (absolute value of the sum of the firms-specific 
intercept and error term) as a proxy for private earnings guidance (PEG).  
 
0 1 , , 2 , , 3 , , , ,, , i j t i j t i j t i j ti j t
UF VOLA DECREASE NFD              (4.5) 
where: 
VOLA
 
DECREASE 
 
 
NFD 
= 
= 
 
 
= 
standard deviation of daily stock returns 
dummy variable that equals 1 if the observation continues to 
report two year of negative and decrease in earnings from the 
last year‘ earnings 
number of fair disclosure released in year t 
 
4.4.1.2. Regulation FD and Private Earnings Guidance 
Our first hypothesis (H1) predicts that the amount of private earnings guidance (PEG) in 
analysts‘ forecasts decreases after the adoption of Regulation FD. In order to examine 
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the effect of Regulation FD on private earnings guidance, we estimate the following 
equation.  
 
PEG = α + β1FD + β2ANALY + β3BM + β4SIZE + β5VOLA+ ε      (4.6)  
 
All variables defined in Table 4.1. We identify and control for factors other than 
Regulation FD that may cause differences in PEG between pre-FD period and post-FD 
period. Matsumoto (2002) and Hutton (2005) suggest that management‘s decision to 
guide analysts‘ earnings is associated with book-to-market value, value-relevance of 
earnings, firm size, market value and earnings volatility. Hutton (2005) suggests that 
analyst following or earnings performance is one of the strongest determinants of 
managerial earnings guidance.  
 
Our objective is to provide evidence on how Regulation FD influences manager‘s 
disclosure policy by observing change in PEG. Accordingly, we include four control 
variables capturing any change in PEG: analysts following (ANALY), book value to 
market value (BM), firm size (SIZE) and volatility of daily stock returns (VOLA).  
 
The most interesting coefficient in the Equation (4.6) is β1 (FD). A significant and 
negative coefficient β1 indicates that private earnings guidance decreases in the post-FD 
period. The variable β1 in this specification is interpreted as the mean change in private 
earnings guidance from the pre-FD period to the post-FD period, while controlling for 
four above variables. To further test for a decline in private earnings guidance after the 
adoption of Regulation FD, we additionally estimate the following equation.  
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PEG = α + β1INCREASE + β2ANALY + β3BM + β4SIZE + β5VOLA + ε   (4.7)  
 
We partition our sample period into two sub-periods: pre-FD period (2000-2001) and 
post-FD period (2003-2007). In Equation (4.7), we compare observed signs of β1, on 
INCREASE of pre-FD period with that of post-FD period. We expect that β1, on 
INCREASE is significantly positive in the pre-FD period while β1 in the post-FD is not 
significant.  
 
4.4.2. Market Price Reaction to Missing, Meeting and Beating 
As stated in the previous chapter, we compute cumulative abnormal returns (CARj,t) by 
subtracting the cumulative market portfolio returns as expressed in following equation. 
The initial market reaction is measured for trading day [day-1, day+1] when day 0 is the 
earnings announcement release date, and longer term ([day-3, day+3] and [day-5, 
day+5]) stock returns are measured. In order to test the market‘s reaction to firms 
strategies on analysts‘ forecasts, we compare the cumulative stock returns (CARj,t) to 
firms meeting, beating or missing the analysts‘ forecasts. We use the KOSPI composite 
index (similar to the U.S. Dow Jones Index) or the KOSDAQ composite index (similar 
to the U.S. NASDAQ composite index) as a proxy for market portfolio returns (Rm,t). 
 
, , , j t j t m tCAR R R                                 
 (4.8)
 
where: 
Rj,t 
 
Rm,t 
 
= 
= 
returns on stock j for day t. 
returns on the market portfolio (KOSPI INDEX or KOSDAQ INDEX) 
for day t. 
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Regression analysis is also used to test whether the Korean stock market recognises the 
firms‘ meeting or beating the analysts‘ forecasts. The independent variables, analysts 
following (ANALY), firm size (SIZE), leverage (LEVER) and standard deviation of daily 
stock price (VOLA) serve as controls for market price reaction. Prior research has found 
these variables to be important of the market reaction to reported earnings that 
meet/beat or missing analysts‘ forecasts (Lopez et al., 2002). Dummy variables (β1 and 
β2) are included for meeting or beating analysts‘ forecasts. The dummy variables 
capture the hypotheses that the Korean market will distinguish the meeting or beating 
from missing the analysts‘ forecasts. The following model is used to test this market 
reaction to firms‘ strategies subsequent to analysts‘ forecasts.  
 
CAR= α + β1MEET+β2BEAT+β3ANALY+β4SIZE+β5LEVER+β6VOLA+ε   (4.9) 
 
All variables are defined in Table 5.1. Meeting/Beating analysts‘ forecasts are defined 
as a zero or positive earnings surprise, which is the difference between the realised 
earnings and the consensus forecast. One of the most important coefficients in this 
regression model is β1 (MEET) or β2 (BEAT) variables. Significant positive β1 (MEET) 
and β2 (BEAT) are consistent with our hypothesis that Korean stock markets respond 
strongly to firms that meet or beat analysts‘ forecasts.  
 
4.4.3. Measurement of Private Information in Analysts’ Forecasts 
We found that analysts‘ forecasting ability has improved after the adoption of 
Regulation FD in the previous chapter. We attributed the results to the increase in 
available public information in analysts‘ forecasts. Thus, measuring the private 
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information in analysts‘ forecasts is a critical issue to the assessment of Regulation FD. 
For the study, we measure the private information used in analysts‘ forecasts.  
 
In order to capture analysts‘ information environments, some recent empirical studies 
use the BKLS model: price reaction (Ivkovic et al., 2004; Hui et al., 2007), earning 
surprises (Barron et al., 2007), analysts‘ forecasts (Barron et al., 2002; Adut, 2003) and 
firm disclosure (Lang et al., 2003; Mohanram et al., 2006). BKLS presents a model how 
analysts‘ forecasts are related to their information environment.62 The BKLS model 
presents two properties of analysts‘ forecasts: analysts‘ forecasts dispersion (D) and the 
mean forecasts error (SE), as a measure of the accuracy of analysts‘ public and private 
information.  
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62 Mohanram et al., (2006) suggest that the information sources are aggregated into idiosyncratic 
information, which referring to information specific to an individual analyst and common information, 
referring to the information available to all analysts. 
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where: 
SE 
N 
,i tF  
Ai,t 
Fi,j,t 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
expected squared error in the mean forecast, ( ,i tF - Ai,t)
2 
number of the individual forecasts;
 
mean forecast for firm i, year t;
 
actual earnings for firm i, year t;
 
analyst j‘s forecast of earnings for firm i, year t. 
 
Equations (4.11) and (4.12) show the definition of BKLS consensus (ρ) and information 
asymmetry (1-ρ). Information asymmetry (1-ρ) means the portion of private information 
to the total information and BKLS consensus (ρ) means the portion of analysts‘ 
information that is common. Equations (4.10) and (4.11) imply that dispersion among 
individual analysts‘ forecasts (D) is relatively small (large) and mean forecasts error 
(SE) is large (small) when individual forecasts include more public (private) 
information. Dispersion (D) is the multiple of uncertainty (V) and information 
asymmetry (1-ρ) while, consensus (ρ) is measured as 1-D/V.  
 
In order to provide evidence on the first, second and third hypotheses, we examine 
whether changes in the content of information influence forecast accuracy and forecast 
dispersion. Based on the BKLS model (1998), we measure a proxy for the content of 
information of individual analysts.63 If Regulation FD has enhanced the information 
environment then the ratio of private information should be lower in the post-Regulation 
FD period. This reasoning provides the basis for my hypothesis. Our fourth hypothesis 
predicts that the private information (PI) contained in analysts‘ forecasts decreases 
following the regulation.  
 
                                                 
63 Adut (2003) and Mohanram et al., (2006) use information asymmetry (1-ρ) as a proxy for private 
information and consensus (ρ) as a proxy for public information.  
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To test the overall impact of Regulation FD on private information (PI) in analysts‘ 
earnings forecasts, the ratio of private information is compared to their respective 
empirical distributions before and after the FD-period. Next, the coefficients tested in 
the regression model will provide evidence regarding the relation of forecast attributes 
and the ratio of private information. We expect that binary β2, coefficients of PI in 
Equation (4.14) and Equation (4.15) are to be significant and negative, which suggests 
that forecast attributes are negatively associated with private information (PI) in the pre-
FD period. We also expect that binary β3, coefficients of PI*FD in Equation (4.14) and 
Equation (4.15) are to be significant and positive, which suggests that reduction in 
private information (PI) may lead to a decrease in forecast errors and forecast dispersion. 
To test the effect of Regulation FD on private information related to forecast attributes, 
we estimate the following regression models.  
 
AFE = α+β1FD+β2PI+β3PI*FD+β4ANALY+β5HORI+β6SIZE+β7VOLA+ ε (4.14)  
DISP = α+β1FD+β2PI+β3PI*FD+β4ANALY+β5HORI+β6SIZE+β7VOLA+ ε (4.15) 
 
 
All variables are defined in Table 5.1. The control variables in Equation (4.15) and 
(4.21) are used in the previous chapter: analysts following (ANALY), forecast horizon 
(HORI), firms size (SIZE) and volatility of daily stock returns (VOLA). Prior research 
suggests that these four variables are important determinants in analysts‘ forecast 
performance (Brown et al., 1987; Jacob et al., 1999; Mensah et al., 2004; Seyhyun, 
1986; Lakonishok et al., 2001).  
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4.5. Empirical Results 
4.5.1. Effect of Regulation FD on Private Earnings Guidance 
Equation (4.6) is used to examine whether Regulation FD influences private earnings 
guidance in analysts‘ forecasts. We examine whether use of private access to 
management has the same trend as firms‘ propensities to guide analysts‘ earnings 
forecasts downward after the adoption of Regulation. We expect to find a significant 
decrease in private earnings guidance in analysts‘ forecasts. Table 4.5 reports the 
difference in the level of the unexplained portion in unexpected earnings forecasts 
(PEG) during both periods. In order to test whether the difference in PEG between pre-
FD and post-FD period is statistically significant, we use the t-test and z-test. Consistent 
with my predictions and Wang (2007)64, there is a significant drop in the unexplained 
portion in unexpected earnings forecasts (PEG), which is our proxy for private earning 
guidance. 
 
[Insert Table 4.5 about here] 
 
Table 4.8 shows the results of the regressions used to test our hypothesis H1 and H2. 
Model 1 in Table 4.8 captures the estimated results of Equation (4.7) on changes of 
private earnings guidance (PEG) from the pre-FD to the post-FD period. This result in 
Table 4.8 corroborates Table 4.5 and our hypothesis H1 that Regulation FD improves 
the information flow between analysts and management. The result is consistent with 
Feldman et al., (2003) and Wang (2007). Feldman et al., (2003) suggest that more 
                                                 
64 Wang (2007) suggests that firms relying more on private earnings guidance replace private earnings 
guidance with non-disclosure instead of public earnings guidance after the adoption of Regulation FD; 
these firms suffer significant deterioration in the information environment. 
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managers now issue their guidance to the public instead of disclosure to a selected 
group of analysts, in conformity with Regulation FD. Wang (2007) finds the evidence 
that firms that replace private earnings guidance with public earning guidance prevent 
significant deterioration in their information environment after the adoption of 
Regulation FD. 
 
[Insert Table 4.8 about here] 
 
Controlling for the variables that influence analysts‘ forecasts, coefficient β2, on FD, is 
negative as predicted and statistically significant at the 1% level (β2 = -0.0089), 
supporting our hypothesis of decreased private earnings guidance in the post-FD period.  
We interpret this to mean that private earnings guidance has become less prevalent in the 
post-FD period, a result consistent with the results that inform the univariate analysis. 
The tests also indicate that coefficient β4 (book value to market value) is significantly 
positive while coefficient, β5 (volatility of daily stock returns) is significantly negative at 
the 1% level (β5 = -0.0000).  
 
The results indicate that firms with higher book value than market value are likely to 
disclose earnings information to favoured analysts and firms with higher information 
uncertainty are less likely to guide earnings through private channels. However, β3 
(analysts following) and β5 (firm size) are not associated with private earnings guidance. 
The findings are inconsistent with Atiase (1985) and Bhushan (1988), who suggest that 
firm size and analysts following are likely to be positively related to greater private 
information acquisition.  
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Model 2 in Table 4.8 presents the level of private earnings guidance for earnings 
increase firms in the pre-FD and post-FD periods. The binary coefficients, β1, indicate 
the difference in private earnings guidance for earnings increase firms between the pre-
FD and the post-FD period. Coefficient (β1) in the pre-FD period, is significantly 
positive, but in the post-FD period in not significant, which is consistent with our 
second hypothesis (H2). The results suggest that private earnings guidance for earnings 
increase firms has diminished after the adoption of Regulation FD. The results have the 
implication that more managers issue their guidance to the public instead of using 
disclosure to a selective group of analysts after the adoption of Regulation FD.  
 
In summary, the results reported in Table 4.8 show evidence of changes in the 
information environment between managers and analysts. Overall, the results are 
consistent with the notion that regulation seems to improve the importance of public 
information for analysts‘ forecasts. 
 
4.5.2. Market Price Reaction  
Table 4.6 presents the difference in the Korean market reaction to firms missing, 
meeting and beating analysts‘ forecasts. Using t-test and z-test we find evidence that 
there is a significant difference between reactions to meeting/beating and missing 
analysts‘ forecasts. Our univariate results support our hypothesis H3 that stronger 
market reaction to firms beating rather than missing can be a rationale in the ongoing 
game between managers and analysts. 
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[Insert Table 4.6 about here] 
 
Table 4.9 establishes a link between cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) and the firms‘ 
missing, meeting or beating analysts‘ forecasts. Table 4.9 shows the evidence of 
difference in MEET/BEAT and MISS. The results indicate that the Korean market reacts 
strongly to firms beating analysts‘ forecasts for cumulative abnormal returns CAR [D-3, 
D+3] and CAR [D-5, D+5] around earnings announcements as compared to firms 
missing analysts‘ forecasts. 65  These results are robust to controlling for other 
determinants of stock returns around earnings announcement.  
 
[Insert Table 4.9 about here] 
 
These findings confirm prior finding and our hypothesis H3. The results are consistent 
with Lopez et al., (2002) and Skinner et al., (2002), who report that the cumulative stock 
return (CAR) for firms announcing earnings that miss analysts‘ forecasts, after 
controlling for other determinants, is lower than that for firms beating forecasts.  
 
However, we find no significant return differences between firms missing and meeting 
analysts‘ forecasts over the three short windows around earnings announcements. Our 
results support the notion that the market rewards firms for beating analysts‘ forecasts 
while it penalizes firms which fail to exceed the forecasts.  
                                                 
65 To further our investigation, we measure the markets reaction to analysts missing, meeting and 
beating analysts‘ forecasts following earnings announcement. The additional market reaction is measured 
for three windows ([day+0, day+1], [day+0, day+3], [day+0, day+5]). The results are similar to the above 
results. The Korean market reacts strongly to firms beating analysts‘ forecasts for CAR [D+0, D+3] and 
CAR [D+0, D+5] compared to firms missing analysts‘ forecasts. On the other hand, there is no significant 
difference in meeting/beating and missing analysts‘ forecasts for CAR [D+0, D+1]. 
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4.5.3. Effect of Regulation FD on Private Information in Forecasts 
In our study, we examine whether Regulation FD influences the ratio of private 
information and whether there is a significant correlation between private information 
and analysts‘ forecast attributes (i.e., absolute forecast errors (AFE) and forecast 
dispersion (DISP)). We hypothesize that Regulation FD leads to a decrease in the ratio 
of private information in analysts‘ forecasts. In order to evaluate the impact of 
Regulation FD on the analysts‘ information environment, we first examine the ratio of 
private information (PI). This analysis is presented in Table 4.3 and Table 4.7. 
 
[Insert Table 4.3 and Table 4.7 about here] 
 
These results on the preliminary basis support hypothesis H4. Univariate analysis shows 
that the PI has significantly decreased from the pre-FD to the post-FD period. The 
average PI in the pre-FD period is 0.5265 and the average in the post-period is 0.4938. 
Both t-tests and z-tests (Wilcoxon rank sum tests) show that PI in the post-FD is 
significantly different from PI in the post-FD at the level of 1%. The results of the 
univariate analysis indicate that the information environment in analysts‘ forecasts has 
significantly changed after the FD took effect, which is consistent with our original 
hypothesis.  
 
Next, Table 4.4 reports the correlation between the dependent variables (forecast 
accuracy and forecast dispersion) and the test variable (private information), as well as 
control variables (analysts following, forecast horizon, firms size and volatility of daily 
 131 
stock returns). Forecast errors (AFE) and forecast dispersion (DISP) are significantly 
negatively correlated with private information (PI) during the both periods. The 
correlation coefficient (-0.35) between AFE and PI has increased, compared to the pre-
FD period (-0.43). These findings are consistent with our expectations that the positive 
relation between private information and forecast accuracy has decreased due to the 
improvement of information flow from firms to analysts without selective disclosure in 
the post-FD period.  
 
[Insert Table 4.4 about here] 
 
Next, we find a significant negative association between private information (PI) and 
two control variables (forecast horizon, (HORI) and volatility of stock returns (VOLA)). 
Finally, the other two variables (analysts following (ANALY), firm size (SIZE)) are 
significantly positively correlated with private information (PI). The results of the 
multiple regressions are presented in Table 4.10. Table 4.10 contain the results from the 
two regression specifications (i.e., Equation (4.14) and Equation (4.15)). 
 
[Insert Table 4.10 about here] 
 
Binary coefficients (β1) in Model 1 and Model 2 of Table 4.10 mean change in the AFE 
and DISP from the pre-FD period to the post-FD period. The results indicate that AFE 
and DISP have significantly decreased in the post-FD period. The results are consistent 
with our univariate analysis and previous hypotheses in Chapter 3. One of the most 
interesting coeffecients in this specification is β2 or β3. The binary coefficients estimates 
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on the β2, PI variables in Model 1 and Model 2 of Table 4.10 are -0.1739 and -0.0166 
respectively, and are significant at the 1% level. The results suggest that a one 
percentage point increase in the private information ratio is associated with an 17.39 
(Model 1) and 1.66 (Model 2) basis point decrease in forecast errors (AFE) and forecast 
dispersion (DISP) in the pre-FD period. These negative and significant coefficients 
indicate that private information (PI) is negatively associated with both forecasts 
attributes (AFE and DISP) in the pre-FD period.  
 
The binary coefficient estimates on β3, PI*FD variables are 0.1047, and 0.0145 
respectively, and are significant at the 1% level. A movement from 17.39 (AFE) and 
1.66 (DISP) to 10.47 and 1.45 would be associated with a 5.92 (AFE) and 0.21 (DISP) 
basis point decrease in the forecast errors and forecast dispersion. The results indicate 
that analysts‘ forecasting ability has improved although private information has 
decreased in the pre-FD period. Therefore, H1, H2, and H3 are accepted. Analysts placed 
more weight on public disclosures for forecasting as Regulation FD restricted private 
communications with managers. The results seem to indicate that Regulation FD may 
influence the amount of private information by disseminating the information to market 
participants publicly.  
 
4.6. Summary and Conclusions 
We provide an empirical study of the effect of Regulation FD on the change in private 
information in analysts‘ forecasts and private earnings guidance. Knowing Regulation 
FD‘s aim of levelling the playing field, we expect a decrease in information asymmetry. 
First, we examine the relation between Regulation FD and private earnings guidance. 
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Following Matsumoto (2002) and Wang (2005), we compare the degree of private 
earnings guidance in the pre-FD and post-FD period. Our results show a significant 
decrease in private earnings guidance after the adoption of Regulation FD. These results 
are consistent with Feldman et al., (2003) and Wang (2007), who suggest that more 
managers issue public guidance instead of selective disclosure to favoured analysts in 
the post-FD period. We document that Regulation FD makes firms replace private 
earnings guidance with public guidance. Even if analysts depend on public disclosure, 
there is no significant deterioration in their earnings forecasts.  
 
Second, we provide empirical evidence on the differential market response to firms that 
beat market expectations versus firms that do not exceed the expectations. We find the 
evidence that the Korean stock market generally recognizes firms beating analysts‘ 
forecasts. Controlling for four variables (analysts following, firm size, leverage and 
volatility of daily stock returns), we find that the market strongly responses to beating 
analysts‘ forecasts for CAR [D-3, D+3] and CAR [D-5, D+5].  
 
Third, relying on analytical models of BKLS, we hypothesize that private information in 
analysts‘ forecasts significantly decreases in the post-FD period. For the study, we 
compare the ratio of private information in analysts‘ forecasts before and after 
Regulation FD. The differences in availability of private information between the two 
periods suggest that Regulation FD leads to an improvement in the information 
environment for analysts‘ forecasting. We also find that analysts‘ forecasting ability has 
improved in the post-FD period despite the decrease in private information. Consistent 
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with the previous chapter, we show that Regulation FD contributes to firms 
disseminating available information in public.  
 
In conclusion, we support the notion that private information acquired from private 
channels can be replaced by public information from firms and analysts‘ research efforts 
after the adoption of Regulation FD.  
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ANNEX 3 
Table 4.1 Definition of Variables 
 
This table outlines the definitions of variables used in our hypothesis testing 
PEG 
FD 
 
ANALY 
BM 
SIZE 
VOLA 
INCREASE 
 
CAR 
 
LEVER 
AFE   
 
DISP 
 
PI 
HORI          
  
= 
= 
 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
 
= 
 
= 
= 
 
= 
 
= 
=
 
Private earnings guidance  
dummy variable that equals 1 for firms take in the post-FD (year 2003-2007) period 
and 0 otherwise; 
the number of analysts providing earnings forecasts;  
book value to market value; 
the natural log of the total asset at the end of the last year of forecast; 
standard deviation of daily stock returns for year prior to earnings announcement;  
dummy variable that equals 1 if the observation continues to report two year of positive 
and increase in earnings from the last year‘ earnings;  
cumulative abnormal returns over three windows surrounding release day of earnings 
announcement; 
leverage ratio 
analyst forecast error at the earnings announcement deflated by stock price at the end 
of the previous year;  
the standard deviation of all analyst forecasts made at the end of the year from the 
consensus of analysts‘ forecasts deflated by stock price at the end of the previous year;  
the ratio of private information in analysts‘ forecasting; 
the number of days between the end of the following fiscal year and the date of the 
analysts‘ forecast 
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Table 4.2 Sample Selection 
 
 
Sample A is based on the firm-year observations while Sample B is based on the forecast-year 
observations. Sample A and Sample B consist of 161,343 and 2,311 observations from 2000 to 2007 
(excluding 2002).  
 
 2000 2001 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total 
Sample A  5,014 19,955 21,772 21,424 41,270 33,543 18,365 161,343 
Sample B 300 271 264 303 374 385 414 2,311 
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Table 4.3 Descriptive Statistics for Variables 
 
 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for 161,343 forecast-year observations from 2000 to 2007 
(excluding 2002). The pre-FD period is from 2000 to 2001 and the post-FD period is from 2003 to 2007. 
Variables are private information in analysts‘ forecasts (PI), forecast errors (AFE), forecast dispersion 
(DISP), analyst following (ANALY), forecast horizon (HORI), firm size (SIZE), broker size (SECU) and 
standard deviation of daily stock returns (VOLA). 
 
Variables 
Pre-FD period (n=24,969) Post-FD period (n=136,374) 
Mean 
25th  
Percentile 
Median 
75th  
Percentile 
Mean 
25th  
Percentile 
Median 
75th  
Percentile 
PI 0.527 0.254 0.459 0.807 0.494 0.238 0.429 0.770 
AFE 0.079 0.011 0.034 0.089 0.044 0.073 0.021 0.052 
DISP 0.055 0.019 0.034 0.062 0.030 0.011 0.019 0.035 
ANALY 23 15 23 33 24 14 24 33 
HORI 206 107 198 299 214 115 216 313 
SIZE 3,058 1,031 3,033 13,256 7,511 1,651 7,477 35,554 
VOLA 0.71 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.47 0.37 0.45 0.55 
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Table 4.4 Correlation between Private Information and Analysts’ Forecasts  
 
 
 
This table shows the matrix of Pearson correlation coefficients among the possible explanatory variables 
to the events of forecasting earnings. The pre-FD period is from 2000 to 2001 and the post-FD period is 
from 2003 to 2007. These explanatory variables are ratio of private information (PI), forecast dispersion 
(DISP), absolute forecast errors (AFE), analyst following (ANALY), forecast horizon (HORI), firm size 
(SIZE) and standard deviation of daily stock returns (VOLA). The numbers below are t-stats of the null 
hypothesis where the correlation coefficient is zero.  
 
 
< Panel A: Pre-FD Period > 
Variables PI DISP AFE ANALY HORI SIZE VOLA 
PI 1 
      
      
DISP 
-0.0120 
1 
     
0.0588      
AFE 
-0.4311 0.4073 
1 
    
<.001 <.001     
ANALY 
0.1817 -0.2191 -0.2425 
1 
   
<.001 <.001 <.001    
HORI 
-0.0651 -0.0375 0.1831 0.0276 
1 
  
<.001 <.001 <.001 <.001   
SIZE 
0.2030 -0.0388 -0.0651 0.2988 -0.0025 
1 
 
<.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 0.6888  
VOLA 
-0.1949 0.0564 0.1668 0.0320 0.0320 -0.2078 
1 
<.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
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< Panel B: Post-FD Period > 
Variables PI DISP AFE ANALY HORI SIZE VOLA 
PI 1 
      
      
DISP 
-0.0522 
1 
     
<.001      
AFE 
-0.3517 0.4800 
1 
    
<.001 <.001     
ANALY 
0.2023 -0.0963 -0.1874 
1 
   
<.001 <.001 <.001    
HORI 
-0.0536 0.0217 0.2640 -0.0212 
1 
  
<.001 <.001 <.001 <.001   
SIZE 
0.1076 -0.0840 -0.0896 0.4051 -0.0142 
1 
 
<.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 0.6888  
VOLA 
-0.0608 0.2012 0.1805 -0.0757 -0.0094 -0.3204 
1 
<.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
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Table 4.5 Comparison of Private Earnings Guidance  
 
 
 
This table presents the results of t-tests and z-tests for the difference in mean and median private earnings 
guidance (PEG) in the pre-FD versus post-FD period. Pre-FD period is from 2000 to 2001 and post-FD 
period is from 2003 to 2007. Z-test (Wilcoxon signed test) is used to measure whether the medians are 
statistically different from each other while t-test is used to measure whether the means between pre-FD 
period and post-FD period are statistically different from each other. P-values for both tests are reported. 
* Significant at the 10% level or better; ** Significant at the 5% level or better; *** Significant at the 1% 
level or better. 
 
 
Pre-FD  
(n=571) 
Difference of PEG 
(Pre-FD=Post-FD) Post-FD 
(n=1,740) 
t-test z-test 
Mean 0.022 
10.07*** 13.54*** 
0.009 
(Median) (0.010) (0.003) 
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Table 4.6 Comparison of Cumulative Abnormal Returns  
 
 
This table presents the difference in stock price effect to missing, meeting and beating analysts‘ forecasts 
around earnings announcement released in the pre-FD (2000-2001) versus post-FD period (2003-2007). 
The event date (D) is defined as the earnings announcement release date. CAR is the cumulative abnormal 
returns for three windows ([day-1, day+1], [day-3, day+3], [day-5, day+5]). Z-test (Wilcoxon signed 
test) is used to measure whether the medians are statistically different from each other while t-test is used 
to measure whether the means are statistically different from each other. P-values for both tests are 
reported. * Significant at the 10% level or better; ** Significant at the 5% level or better; *** Significant 
at the 1% level or better. 
 
< Panel A: All Period > 
 
MISS  
(n=1,342) 
Difference of CAR 
(MISS=MEET) MEET 
(n=526) 
Difference of CAR 
(MEET=BEAT) BEAT 
(n=443) 
t-test z-test t-test z-test 
CAR (D-1, D+1)  -0.003  -0.20 -1.07 -0.002  -0.10 0.36 -0.002  
CAR (D-3, D+3) -0.010  -0.59 -1.70* -0.008  -1.42  -0.41 -0.001  
CAR (D-5, D+5) -0.009  -1.21 -1.63  -0.003  -2.07** -1.30 0.009 
 
< Panel B: Pre-FD Period > 
 
MISS  
(n=321) 
Difference of CAR 
(MISS=MEET) MEET 
(n=124) 
Difference of CAR 
(MEET=BEAT) BEAT 
(n=126) 
t-test z-test t-test z-test 
CAR (D-1, D+1)  -0.004  -0.03 -0.94 -0.004  -0.25 0.44 -0.002  
CAR (D-3, D+3) -0.022  -1.09 -1.80* -0.012  -0.02  0.65 -0.012  
CAR (D-5, D+5) -0.008  -1.01 -1.48  0.003  -0.29 -0.17 0.007  
 
< Panel C: Post-FD Period > 
 
MISS  
(n=1,021) 
Difference of CAR 
(MISS=MEET) MEET 
(n=402) 
Difference of CAR 
(MEET=BEAT) BEAT 
(n=317) 
t-test z-test t-test z-test 
CAR (D-1, D+1)  -0.002  -0.22 -0.65 -0.002   0.02 0.12 -0.002  
CAR (D-3, D+3) -0.006   0.01 -0.83 -0.006  -1.95* -1.08  0.037  
CAR (D-5, D+5) -0.009  -0.79 -1.01 -0.005  -2.31** -1.43 0.009  
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Table 4.7 Comparison for Private Information in Analysts’ Forecasts  
 
 
This table presents the results of t-tests and z-tests for the difference in private information in analysts‘ 
forecasts in the pre-FD versus post-FD period. The pre-FD period is from 2000 to 2001 and the post-FD 
period is from 2003 to 2007. Z-test (Wilcoxon signed test) is used to measure whether the medians are 
statistically different from each other while t-test is used to measure whether the means between the pre-
FD period and the post-FD period are statistically different from each other. P-values for both tests are 
reported. * Significant at the 10% level or better; ** Significant at the 5% level or better; *** Significant 
at the 1% level or better. 
 
 
Pre-FD 
(n=24,969) 
Difference (Pre-FD=Post-FD) Post-FD 
(n=136,374) t-test z-test 
0.5265 15.85*** 13.91*** 0.4938 
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Table 4.8 Regression of Regulation FD and Private Earnings Guidance 
 
 
 
This table reports the results of regressions to examine the variation in private earnings guidance for 
2,311 firm-year observations from 2000 to 2007 (excluding 2002). The pre-FD period is from 2000 to 
2001 and the post-FD period is from 2003 to 2007. The dependent variable (PEG) is defined as the 
private earnings guidance. The explanatory variables are post-FD period (FD), earnings increase firms 
(INCREASE), analysts following (ANALY), book to market (BM), firm size (SIZE) and standard deviation 
of past five year‘s EPS (VOLA). * Significant at the 10% level or better; ** Significant at the 5% level or 
better; *** Significant at the 1% level or better. 
 
 
 
< Model 1 > PEG = α + β1FD + β2ANALY + β3BM + β4SIZE + β5VOLA + ε 
 Coef. t P>|t| 
INTERCEPT α          0.0093  *** 2.55 0.011 
FD β1 -0.0089  *** -6.62 0.000 
ANALY β2          0.0000   0.69 0.489 
BM β3          0.0042  *** 10.31 0.000 
SIZE β4          0.0018   1.36 0.173 
VOLA β5 -0.0000  *** -3.07 0.002 
 
Number of obs = 2,311 
Adj R-squared = 0.1027 
< Model 2 > PEG = α + β1INCREASE + β2VOLA + β3ANALY + β4BM + β5SIZE+ β5VOLA + ε 
 < Pre-FD period> < Post-FD period> 
Coef. t P>|t| Coef. t P>|t| 
INTERCEPT α -0.0097   -0.95 0.345 α 0.0095  *** 3.25 0.001 
INCREASE β1 0.0093  *** 2.75 0.006 β1 -0.0000   -0.06 0.955 
ANALY β2 0.0062   1.62 0.106 β3 -0.0006   -0.56 0.574 
BM β3 0.0063  *** 7.09 0.000 β4 0.0020  *** 5.05 0.000 
SIZE β4 -0.0001  *** -2.66 0.008 β5 - 0.0000  * -1.66 0.098 
VOLA β5 0.0000   0.93 0.354 β2 0.0000   0.38 0.705 
 
Number of obs = 571 
Adj R-squared = 0.1278 
Number of obs = 1,740 
Adj R-squared = 0.0263 
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Table 4.9 Regression of Market Reaction to Meeting and Beating Analysts’ Forecasts 
 
 
This table reports the results of regressions to examine the market response to firm that meet or beat 
analysts‘ forecasts compared to the firms that miss analysts‘ forecasts for 2,311 firm-year observations 
from 2000 to 2007 (excluding 2002). The pre-FD period is from 2000 to 2001 and the post-FD period is 
from 2003 to 2007. The dependent variable (CAR) is defined as the cumulative four windows [CAR (D-
1,D+1)], [CAR (D-3,D+3)], [CAR (D-5,D+5)]. Independent variables are firms‘ meeting and beating to 
analysts‘ forecasts (MEET and BEAT), analysts following (ANALY), firm size (SIZE), leverage (LEVE) 
and standard deviation of daily stock returns (VOLA). * Significant at the 10% level or better; ** 
Significant at the 5% level or better; *** Significant at the 1% level or better. 
 
CAR = α + β1MEET + β2BEAT + β3ANALY + β4SIZE + β5LEVER + β6VOLA + ε 
< Panel A: All Period > 
 CAR (D-1, D+1) CAR (D-3, D+3) CAR (D-5, D+5) 
Coef. t Coef. Coef. t Coef. Coef. t Coef. 
CON α -0.0139  ** -2.40 0.016 -0.0406  *** -4.18 0.000 -0.0200  * -1.71 0.088 
MEET β1 0.0004   0.18 0.857 0.0012   0.30 0.764 0.0061   1.29 0.198 
BEAT β2 0.0006   0.23 0.816 0.0091  ** 2.17 0.030 0.0171  *** 3.4 0.001 
ANALY β3 0.0000  * -1.90 0.058 0.0000   -1.57 0.116 0.0000   -1.16 0.245 
SIZE β4 0.0042  * 1.82 0.069 0.0114  *** 2.96 0.003 0.0035   0.75 0.451 
LEVER β5 0.0007   1.46 0.143 0.0006   0.71 0.476 0.0025  * 2.42 0.016 
VOLA β6 0.0000   -0.44 0.657 0.0000   -0.69 0.490 0.0000   -0.26 0.794 
  
Number of obs = 2,311 
Adj R-squared = 0.0031 
Number of obs = 2,311 
Adj R-squared = 0.0070 
Number of obs = 2,311 
Adj R-squared = 0.0086 
< Panel B: Pre-FD Period > 
 CAR (D-1, D+1) CAR (D-3, D+3) CAR (D-5, D+5) 
Coef. t Coef. Coef. t Coef. Coef. t Coef. 
CON α -0.0187   -1.57 0.116 -0.0694  *** -3.55 0.000 -0.0170   -0.73 0.466 
MEET β1 0.0065   1.08 0.280 0.0098   0.99 0.321 0.0180   1.53 0.127 
BEAT β2 0.0026   0.47 0.639 0.0107   1.15 0.251 0.0157   1.42 0.155 
ANALY β3 -0.0002  *** -4.23 0.000 -0.0002  ** -1.98 0.049 -0.0002  * -1.93 0.054 
SIZE β4 0.0041   0.82 0.414 0.0142  * 1.7 0.089 -0.0006   -0.06 0.950 
LEVER β5 0.0024   1.48 0.140 0.0046  * 1.7 0.090 0.0054  * 1.68 0.094 
VOLA β6 0.0000   1.09 0.278 0.0000   0.76 0.448 0.0000   0.77 0.443 
  
Number of obs = 571 
Adj R-squared = 0.0418 
Number of obs = 571 
Adj R-squared = 0.0232 
Number of obs = 571 
Adj R-squared = 0.0183 
< Panel C: Post-FD Period > 
 CAR (D-1, D+1) CAR (D-3, D+3) CAR (D-5, D+5) 
Coef. t Coef. Coef. t Coef. Coef. t Coef. 
CON α -0.0147  ** -2.21 0.028 -0.0234  ** -2.06 0.039 -0.0252  * -1.83 0.067 
MEET β1 0.0003   0.11 0.914 -0.0004   -0.09 0.927 0.0041   0.79 0.431 
BEAT β2 0.0002   0.09 0.928 0.0096  ** 2.07 0.039 0.0181  *** 3.23 0.001 
ANALY β3 0.0000   -0.77 0.440 0.0000   -0.67 0.500 0.0000   -0.72 0.471 
SIZE β4 0.0050  * 1.91 0.056 0.0064   1.44 0.150 0.0061   1.13 0.257 
LEVER β5 0.0005   0.89 0.376 0.0007   0.75 0.452 0.0018  * 1.69 0.090 
VOLA β6 0.0000   -1.64 0.101 0.0000   -0.67 0.506 0.0000   -1.07 0.283 
  
Number of obs = 1,740 
Adj R-squared = 0.0036 
Number of obs = 1,740 
Adj R-squared = 0.0047 
Number of obs = 1,740 
Adj R-squared = 0.0096 
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Table 4.10 Regression of Private Information in Analysts’ Forecasts 
 
 
This table reports the results of regressions to examine the variation in private information in analysts‘ 
forecasts for 161,343 forecasts-year observations from 2000 to 2007 (excluding 2002). The pre-FD period 
is from 2000 to 2001 and the post-FD period is from 2003 to 2007. The dependent variable is absolute 
forecast errors (AFE) and forecast dispersion (DISP). The explanatory variables are post-FD period (FD), 
private information in analysts‘ forecasts (PI), analyst following (ANALY), forecast horizon (HORI), firms 
size (SIZE) and standard deviation of daily stock returns (VOLA). * Significant at the 10% level or better; 
** Significant at the 5% level or better; *** Significant at the 1% level or better 
 
(MODEL 1) AFE = α + β1FD + β2PI + β3PI*FD + β4ANALY + β5HORI + β6SIZE + β7VOLA + ε  
(MODEL 2) DISP= α + β1FD + β2PI + β3PI*FD + β4ANALY + β5HORI + β6SIZE + β7VOLA + ε 
Model 1 Coef t P>|t| 
INTERCEPT α    0.1035  *** 68.67 0.0000 
FD β1 -0.0789  *** -67.93 0.0000 
PI β2 -0.1739  *** -104.64 0.0000 
PI*FD β3    0.1047  *** 59.13 0.0000 
ANALY β4 -0.0008  *** -57.05 0.0000 
HORI β5    0.0001  *** 97.18 0.0000 
SIZE β6    0.0000  *** 25.22 0.0000 
VOLA β7    0.0863  *** 64.53 0.0000 
 
Number of obs = 161,343 
Adj R-squared = 0.2491 
Model 2 Coef t P>|t| 
INTERCEPT α    0.0374  *** 39.8 0.0000 
FD β1 -0.0223  *** -30.79 0.0000 
PI β2 -0.0166  *** -16.05 0.0000 
PI*FD β3    0.0145  *** 13.15 0.0000 
ANALY β4 -0.0004  *** -43.58 0.0000 
HORI β5    0.0000  *** 3.94 0.0000 
SIZE β6    0.0000  *** 9.39 0.0000 
VOLA β7    0.0512  *** 61.52 0.0000 
 
Number of obs = 161,343 
Adj R-squared = 0.0800 
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CHAPTER 5 
HERDING BEHAVIOUR IN ANALYSTS’ FORECASTS  
5.1. Introduction 
Access to managers is one of the most important determinants of analysts‘ quality 
(Johnson, 2005).66 On the other hand, it puts analysts in a privileged position. In order 
to prohibit private access to managers, the Financial Supervisory Committee (FSC) in 
Korea adopted Regulation FD in November 2002. The regulation is intended to ensure 
equal access to material information by disseminating publicly the information privately 
shared with market participants.  
 
In the previous chapter, consistent with the regulator‘s intention, we showed evidence of 
decrease in private information in analysts‘ forecasts and of an increase in the public 
dissemination of information. In this chapter, we examine the effect of Regulation FD 
on Korean analysts‘ herding behaviour. In the present context, herding is defined as 
‗excessive agreement‘ among analysts expectations‘ (De Bondt et al., 1999), or as ‗a 
group of investors trading in the same direction over a period of time‘ (Olsen, 1996; 
Nofsinger et al., 1999; Oehler et al., 2000) and as ‗deviating from one‘s true posterior 
belief on a subject and moving closer to the prevailing consensus‘ (Gleason et al., 
2003). Herding, therefore, can decrease the information transmitted by individual 
analysts‘ forecasts or lead them to revise their forecasts simply to be closer to the mean 
                                                 
66 Prendergast et al., (1996) suggest that if an analyst‘s ability relates to access to private information, 
high-ability analyst‘s forecast is further away from consensus than the consensus forecast. 
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forecast and not because of new private information (Clement et al., 2005). Obviously, 
herding implies that individual patterns are alike.67  
 
Numerous approaches to testing herding behaviour in analysts‘ forecasts have been 
proposed in prior papers (Trueman, 1994; De Bondt et al., 1999; Kim et al., 1999; 
Clement et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2006; Bernhardt et al., [hereafter ―BCK‖], 2006). 
Trueman (1994) finds evidence that herding forecast is positively associated with 
forecast dispersion.68 Chan et al., (2005) suggest that the informational cascade model 
and the reputational risk model69 predict higher levels of herding behaviour for stock 
with high information uncertainty as there is little reliable information.  
 
However, empirical evidence regarding the effect of the Regulation FD on herding 
behavior in analysts‘ forecasts is limited. For example, Arya et al., (2005) show that 
Regulation FD may cause analysts to mimic the firms‘ announcement or analysts‘ 
consensus forecasts and ignore their own private information. In light of herding 
concerns, they suggest that Regulation FD may act to stifle firm disclosure and lead 
firms to do away with voluntary disclosure. The results are consistent with the 
                                                 
67 See section 2.6 in Chapter 2.  
68 Forecast dispersion is used as a proxy for information uncertainty on the future earnings. 
69 Analysts‘ herding behaviour is based on the three theoretical models (See Chapter 2): the information 
cascade model (Bikhchandani et al., 1992), the reputational risk model (Scharfstein et al., 1990), and the 
investigative herding model (Hirshleifer et al., 1994). According to the information cascade model and 
reputational risk model, analysts are likely to herd toward other analysts, even if their colleagues might 
not obtain reliable information. For example, for firms with high information uncertainty, the two former 
models predict a high level of herding, as analysts do not have the reliable information about the future 
firms. On the other hand, investigative model predicts low level of herding as the firm has little reliable 
information. Thus, our hypotheses may follow two different routes. However, we suspect that herding 
behaviour is associated with low dispersion if analysts are not sure about their information. For the study 
in this chapter, we follow the two former models. 
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regulation‘s critics.70 Arya et al., (2005) assume that the analyst who is privy to a firm‘s 
disclosure is willing to reflect his own information and be independent of the 
recommendation of other analysts when the firm selectively discloses material 
information. However, a consequence of widening the recipients of firm disclosures 
may be heightened herding behavior among recipients because Regulation FD limits 
selective disclosure. Arya et al., (2005) conclude that the Regulation FD could have the 
unintended consequence of increasing herding behaviour among analysts‘ forecasting. 
On the other hand, Mensah et al., (2008) contradict Arya et al., (2005), and report no 
evidence that Regulation FD results in increasing in analysts‘ herding behaviour. To the 
contrary, they find some weak evidence of a slight increase in anti-herding behaviour in 
the post-FD period. The results indicate that Regulation FD has not led to a negative 
influence on the analysts‘ individual forecasting ability.  
 
Our study is motivated by this debate and the inconclusive evidence. Our research 
attempts to reconcile these conflicting results. We examine whether Regulation FD 
influences herding behaviour by comparing behaviour among analysts during the pre-
FD and post-FD periods. We use two methods to proxy (i.e., measure) for herding 
referred to as herding propensity. Using the S-statistic approach by BCK (2006) and 
Boldness approach developed by Clement et al., (2005), we measure herding propensity 
in Korean analysts‘ forecasts. We show no evidence that there is significant increase in 
Korean analysts‘ herding behaviour in the post-FD period, which indicates that 
Regulation FD is not related to any discernible increase in analysts‘ herding behaviour.  
 
                                                 
70 e.g. Association for Investment Management and Research [AIMR, 2000, now the CFA institute] and 
Securities Industry Association [SIA, 2000], which suggest that Regulation FD leads to decrease in 
information provided by firms, the so-called ―chilling effect. See Chapter 3.  
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Second, we extend previous Korean evidence by using much more comprehensive data 
than in Ahn et al., (2006). Using 161,343 forecasts observations from 2000 to 2007, we 
find that that Korean analysts consistently exhibit anti-herding behaviour in all sub-
samples (P = 0.62, S = 0.52), which indicates that on average 62% (or 52%) of analysts‘ 
forecasts are away from the consensus forecast. Our results, therefore, are not consistent 
with Ahn et al., (2006).  
 
Third, following Jegadeesh et al., (2008), we examine whether the Korean securities 
market recognizes analysts‘ herding behaviour. In order to understand the broader 
implications of analysts herding behaviour, it is important that we examine whether 
analysts herd in earnings forecasting but also how the stock market responds to the 
herding forecasts. Jegadeesh et al., (2008) find that stock returns respond more strongly 
when forecast revisions deviate from the consensus forecast than when the revisions 
follow their colleagues‘ opinion. The results indicate that analysts‘ herding behaviour 
does not influence the stock price because the securities market recognizes analysts‘ 
herding behaviour. Our results are consistent with Jegadeesh et al., (2008). We find that 
the Korean stock market responses more strongly to anti-herding forecasts.  
 
Our paper contributes to the research on the herding behaviour in the following ways. 
First, this paper reconciles the conflicting papers on the effect of Regulation FD on the 
herding behavior. Our empirical results offer a convincing interpretation of the mixed 
results on the effect of Regulation. Second, our paper provides evidence on anti-herding 
behaviour in Korean analysts‘ forecasts. Finally, our paper provides further evidence on 
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the Korean stock markets‘ response to herding behaviour among analysts after 
controlling for factors known to impact the market reaction.  
 
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 5.2 introduces and develops the hypotheses. 
Section 5.3 describes the sample selection procedure and provides some descriptive 
statistics. Section 5.4 discusses research design. Section 5.5 presents the main empirical 
results on the effect of Regulation FD. The final section provides a brief summary and 
presents conclusions. 
 
5.2. Hypotheses Development 
5.2.1. Analysts’ Herding Behaviour in Korean Market 
Herding behaviour occurs when analysts ignore their own private information and 
follow their colleagues‘ recommendations. A number of studies are offered to explain 
the herding behaviour among analysts. These studies largely focus on the following 
major questions: (1) Do analysts herd? (Welch, 2000; Hong et al., 2000; Zitzewitz, 
2001; Kim et al., 2003; Clement et al., 2005; Bernhardt et al., 2006) (2) Do markets 
respond more strongly to anti-herding? (Gleason et al., 2003; Clement et al., 2005) (3) 
Why do analysts herd? (Chevalier et al., 1999; Hong et al., 2000; Clement et al., 2005) 
(4) Does anti-herding lead to better forecast accuracy? (Clement et al., 2005; Clarke et 
al., 2006)71  
 
This chapter is related to the first and second questions. In order to study the effect of 
Regulation FD on herding behavior, we begin by examining whether Korean analysts 
                                                 
71 See Chang et al., (2008) for detailed surveys of herding research.  
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herd in earnings forecasting and whether the Korean capital market recognizes analysts‘ 
herding behavior. Most research on analysts‘ herding behavior focuses on U.S. analysts. 
Hong et al., (2000), Kim et al., (2003) and Clement et al., (2005) provide evidence of 
herding in analysts‘ forecasts by examining the clustering of earnings around the 
prevailing consensus. Using a methodology that represents divergence in forecast, 
Zitzewitz (2001) and Bernhardt et al., (2006) report that anti-herding is pervasive in the 
U.S. securities market. Research on analysts‘ herding behaviour in other countries is 
rather limited. For example, using data for U.K. companies between 1986 and 1997, De 
Bondt et al., (1999) find strong evidence of over-optimism, overreaction, and herding in 
analysts‘ forecasts. Using BCK (2006), Naujoks et al., (2009) examine the herding 
behaviour of German analysts between 1994 and 2005. They find that German analysts 
tend to release biased forecasts, which reveal anti-herding behaviour.  
 
Using 3,951 observations between 2001 and 2003, Ahn et al., (2006) find that 71% of 
Korean analysts herd toward their colleague‘s forecasts. In addition, they document that 
analysts employed by smaller brokerage firms and analysts covering companies with a 
higher ratio of institutional investors are likely to herd. They interpret the results, 
suggesting that analysts employed by small brokerage firms are more likely to have an 
incentive to reduce the danger of unemployment or loss of bonus caused by inaccuracy 
of forecasts than analysts employed by large brokerage firms. Consistent with Ahn et al., 
(2006), we first hypothesize that analysts‘ herding behaviour exists in the Korean stock 
market. Our first hypothesis is stated as follows: 
 
H1: Herding behaviour exists among analysts in the Korean stock market. 
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5.2.2. Regulation FD and Analysts’ Herding Behaviour 
Arya et al., (2005) show evidence that analysts‘ herding behaviour tends to increase 
with changes in internal and external factors surrounding their forecasts. Arya et al., 
(2005) also suggest that selective disclosure, prior to the adoption of Regulation FD, 
could have had a preventive effect on herding behaviour. Their results are consistent 
with Zitzewits (2002), who reports that herding may be more present in the post-FD 
period due to the reduction in the disclosure of private information to analysts. The 
consensus of the above research suggests that analysts who get private access to 
managers may more willing to use both their private information and other analysts‘ 
forecasts. Therefore, analysts are likely to follow previous analysts‘ forecasts in the 
post-FD period because the regulation inhibits selective disclosure and leads to the 
chilling effect to stifle firm disclosure.72  
 
On the other hand, Mensah et al., (2008) find that Regulation FD is not related to 
increasing herding behaviour in the post-FD period. On the contrary, they find evidence 
of a slight decrease in anti-herding behaviour after the adoption of Regulation FD. The 
experimental evidence on the effect of Regulation FD on herding behavior among 
analysts, therefore, seems to be mixed. Our study is motivated by the current debate on 
the effect of Regulation FD on herding behaviour. By re-examining the relationship 
between Regulation FD and herding behavior, we reconcile these opposing results. 
                                                 
72 The chilling effect would result in cutting off communication between companies and market 
participants. 
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5.2.3. Market Reaction to Analysts’ Herding Behaviour 
Previous literature examined the association of herding behaviour and investment 
recommendations (Graham, 1999; Jaffe et al., 1999; Desai et al., 2000), herding 
behaviour among fund managers (Lakonishok et al., 1992; Grinblatt et al., 1995; 
Wermers, 1999, Chevalier et al., 1999), and herding behaviour and earnings forecasts 
(Jegadeesh et al., 2008).  
 
There is, however, a paucity of research on the markets‘ response to analysts‘ herding 
behaviour. Jegadeesh et al., (2008) examine whether stock price reactions following 
recommendations are stronger when the new recommendation is away from the 
consensus than when it is closer to it. Jegadeesh et al., (2008) find that stock returns to 
analysts‘ recommendations are unrelated to consensus forecast if they make 
recommendations based on their own information, without herding. These results are 
consistent with Gleason et al., (2003), who suggest that the stock price reaction to 
forecasts that herd toward consensus forecast is weaker than to forecasts that deviate 
from the consensus. Because the market efficiently reflects all available information 
such as consensus recommendations and analysts‘ recommendation revisions, the 
market should react more strongly to anti-herding forecasts than to herding forecasts. 
We, therefore, expect a stronger market reaction when analysts deviate from the 
consensus forecast. Our second hypothesis is stated as follows:  
 
H2: The market reaction will be more pronounced to anti-herding 
recommendations as opposed to herding recommendations. 
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5.3. Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
In order to test for the effect of Regulation FD on the herding behaviour in analysts‘ 
forecasts, we use samples from FNguide and FSS database. FNguide, established in 
2000, collects analysts‘ forecasts information such as forecasted earnings per share 
(EPS), level of investment recommendations, name of analyst and release date of 
recommendations from 46 financial professional institutions.73 Thus, our data consist 
of forecasts released by analysts affiliated to most Korean domestic securities 
companies. Our sample includes observations for herding propensity (P, S), forecast 
dispersion, analysts following, forecast horizon, firms size, volatility of stock returns, 
actual earnings, book value to market value, leverage and cumulative abnormal returns 
(CAR). Consistent with other research (Sinha et al., 1997; Clement et al., 1999), we 
eliminate observations from the sample if (1) there are no earnings per share forecast (2) 
only one analyst covers the firm (3) forecasts reported in year 2002 (4) earnings forecast 
is in the top or bottom 3 percents of the forecast variable.  
 
Table 5.2 shows the number of observations used in this study and their distribution 
over time. Our sample contains 161,343 observations and spans 7 years (from 2002 to 
2007, excluding 2002). The number of observations in each year ranges from 5,014 in 
2000 to 41,270 in 2005. We define the years from 2000 to 2001 as belonging to the pre-
FD period and the years from 2003 to 2007 as the post-FD period. It is ambiguous 
whether analysts‘ yearly earnings forecasts released in 2002 were affected by the new 
regulation because Regulation FD in Korea was enacted in November. 2002. Therefore, 
we exclude analyst forecasts issued in 2002.  
                                                 
73 Forty Korean domestic securities companies and six economic research institutes. 
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[Insert Table 5.2 about here] 
 
The descriptive statistics of the sample are shown in Table 5.3. Table 5.3 presents the 
distribution of main variables used in this study. The mean value of herding propensity 
by Clement et al., (2005) and BCK (2006) is 0.621 (pre-FD; 0.612, post-FD; 0.623) and 
0.518 (pre-FD: 0.522, post-FD: 0.517) respectively. On the other hand, Table 5.3 shows 
a decrease in stock price volatility (VOLA) and number of broker‘s analysts (SECU) in 
the post-FD period relative to the pre-FD period. At the same time, the table shows an 
increase in firm size (SIZE) in the post-FD period. This may seem a significant change 
in Korean market value in the post-FD period. On the other hand, there is no significant 
change in analysts following (ANALY).  
 
[Insert Table 5.3 about here] 
 
5.4. Research Design 
5.4.1. Measurement of Analysts’ Herding Behaviour 
Numerous studies have documented that analysts have a tendency to herd toward their 
colleagues‘ consensus forecast, making recommendations that under-weight their own 
private information. Measures of analysts herding propensity are classified into two 
types: analysts‘ herding ratio in certain firms and analysts‘ herding ratio among analysts. 
The former measures overall analysts‘ herding propensity based on analysts‘ forecast 
dispersion (De Bondt et al., 1999, Kim et al., 2003). The latter method provides an 
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overall analysts‘ herding ratio (Olsen, 1996; Cote et al., 1997; Clement et al., 2005; 
BCK, 2006). We adopt the second method and explore Korean analysts‘ herding 
behaviour in earnings forecasting.  
5.4.1.1. S-Statistic Test  
In this paper, we employ the methodology of BCK (2006) to measure for herding 
propensity in Korean analysts‘ forecasts. This methodology is robust to signal 
correlation, arrival of new information unforecasted shocks to earnings and systematic 
optimism or pessimism. By perceiving all this information, analysts form posterior 
earnings when they issue forecasts if an analyst‘s forecast is unbiased. His forecast 
equals the median posterior earnings, which indicates that conditional probability is 0.5. 
 
Pr (Fτ > Aτ and Fτ > Cτ : Fτ ≠ Aτ)
 
= 0.5                 (5.1) 
Pr (Fτ < Aτ and Fτ < Cτ : Fτ ≠ Aτ)
 
= 0.5                 (5.2) 
where; 
Fτ: analyst‘s forecast; Aτ: actual earnings; Cτ: consensus forecast                  
 
If an analyst chooses to bias their forecast away from his best estimate of earnings in the 
direction of the consensus, the forecast should be considered as a herding forecast.  
 
Pr (Fτ > Aτ and Fτ < Cτ: Fτ≠Aτ)
 
< 0.5                 (5.3) 
Pr (Fτ < Aτ and Fτ > Cτ: Fτ≠Aτ)
 
< 0.5                 (5.4) 
By contrast, if an analyst chooses to bias their forecast away from the consensus, the 
forecast should be considered as an anti-herding forecast.  
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Pr (Fτ > Aτ and Fτ > Cτ: Fτ≠Aτ)
 
> 0.5                 (5.5) 
 Pr (Fτ < Aτ and Fτ < Cτ: Fτ≠Aτ)
 
> 0.5                 (5.6) 
 
BCK (2006) use the test Statistic-S to estimate for herding behaviour in analysts‘ 
forecasts. First condition events, ττ
+ 
means the analyst‘s forecast exceeds the consensus 
forecast (Fτ > Cτ ) and ττ
–
 implies the forecast falls short of the consensus forecast (Fτ < 
Cτ ) when analysts release the recommendations.  
 
ττ
+ 
= 1 if Fτ > Cτ occurred, ττ
+
 = 0 otherwise and    
ττ
– 
= 1 if Fτ < Cτ occurred, ττ
–
 = 0 otherwise              (5.7) 
 
BCK (2006) define the dummy variables, δτ
+ 
and δτ
–
, which are the conditioning 
indicator functions. δ τ
+ 
and δτ
–
 is above or below realised earnings (Aτ) given that it is 
also above or below the extant consensus (Cτ).  
        
    δτ
+ 
= 1 if Fτ > Aτ and Fτ > Cτ occurred, δτ
+ 
= 0 otherwise and 
δτ
– 
= 1 if Fτ < Aτ and Fτ < Cτ occurred, δτ
+ 
= 0 otherwise      (5.8) 
 
We can define the two conditional probabilities in Equation (5.7) and (5.8) as: 
 
and
 
   
 
   
 
 
 
 
,                      (5.9) 
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Statistic-S, which is the degree of herding among analysts, is the average of the two 
conditional probability estimates: the conditional overshooting and the conditional 
undershooting probability. The average of these two conditional probabilities is the 
Statistic S. Therefore, Statistic S can be interpreted as the degree of herding among 
analysts.  
 
S (z−, z+) = 0.5 
   
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
                (5.10) 
 
 






is estimate of the conditional probability of overshooting actual earnings given 
that the forecast exceeds the consensus; while 
 
 






is estimate of the conditional 
probability of falling short of true earnings given that the forecast falls short of the 
consensus. If analysts herd, the probability that their forecasts overshoot earnings in the 
direction away from the consensus is less than one-half (i.e., S < 0.5). Conversely, if 
analysts overstate their private information, S is more than one-half (i.e., S > 0.5).  
 
5.4.1.2. Forecast Boldness Measure  
In order to measure herding behaviour in Korean analysts‘ forecasts, we use the 
Forecast Boldness Measure (P) developed by Clement et al., (2005). Using a simple 
herding model, Clement et al., (2005) examine the relation of herding behaviour and 
analysts‘ characteristics. They show evidence that analysts who (1) are historically 
accurate (2) are employed by large brokerage (3) with more general experience (4) 
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frequently forecast, tend to issue bold (or anti-herding) forecasts.74 As shown in Figure 
5.1, they classify forecasts as herding forecasts and bold (or anti-herding) forecasts. 
 
Figure 5-1 Forecast Boldness Measure (Clement et al., 2005) 
 
Anti-herding forecasts       Herding forecasts       Anti-herding forecasts 
Analyst‟s forecast < F and C  F(C)≤ Analyst‟s forecast ≤C(F)  Analyst‟s forecast > F and C 
                                    
 
Analyst‟s prior           Prior consensus 
forecast (F)              forecast (C) 
 
 
Anti-herding forecasts are above both the analysts‘ own prior forecast and the consensus 
forecast immediately prior to the analyst‘s forecast, or else below both. All other 
forecasts between the analysts‘ own prior forecast and the consensus forecast are 
classified as herding forecasts. Univariate analysis assumes that other variables that 
influence the herding behaviour remain constant over the test periods. In order to 
control for other extraneous variables, the coefficients tested in the regression model 
will provide evidence regarding the effect of Regulation FD on herding behaviour.  
 
We expect that binary β1s, coefficients of FD in Equation (5.11) are to be significantly 
positive or insignificantly negative, which suggests that herding behaviour has not 
significantly increased in the post-FD period. For the study, we use herding propensity 
(P and S) by Clement et al., (2005) and BCK (2006). Following Mensah et al., (2008), 
                                                 
74 Zitzewitz (2001) defines the bold forecast as a chance to release earnings forecasts that is further from 
the consensus than analysts‘ private information suggests. 
 160 
in order to test the effect of Regulation FD on herding behavior in analysts‘ forecasts, 
using P and S, we estimate the following regression models.  
 
HERD (P,S)= α + β1FD+ β2 ANALY + β3HORI + β4SIZE + β5SECU + ε   (5.11) 
 
All variables are defined in Table 5.1. Previous research suggests that analyst 
characteristics could be related to herding behaviour (Graham, 1999; De Bondt et al., 
1999; Chrishnan et al., 2005; Clement et al., 2005; Naujoks et al., 2007; Mensah et al., 
2008). Four variables that earlier studies have been found to be important in explaing 
the herding behaviour. For instance, De Bondt et al., (1999) provide evidence that 
analyst disagreement tend to go up with the number of analysts (ANALY) and with the 
number of months that remain until earnings announcement (HORI). Naujoks et al., 
(2007) report a strong positive relation between firm size (SIZE) and anti-herding 
forecast, indicating that anti-herding behaviour seems to be less prevalent among 
forecasts for smaller firms. Clement et al., (2005) report that broker size (SECU) has the 
same sign with the anti-herding behaviour. This observation could be explained by the 
notion that analysts in large brokerage house tend to deviate from the other analysts‘ 
forecasts.  
 
We control the variables influencing herding behavior described in the previous 
research: analysts following (ANALY), forecast horizon (HORI), firm size (SIZE) and 
broker size (SECU). We expect that an increase in the number of analysts following the 
firms, older forecasts, bigger firm size and broker size are associated with anti-herding 
behavior. One of the most interesting coefficients in the regression models is the β1, FD 
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variable. Significant positive or insignificant negative β1 is consistent with our 
hypothesis that herding behavior has not changed after the introduction of Regulation 
FD.  
 
5.4.2. Markets’ Reaction to Herding Behaviour 
We begin the analysis by comparing changes in market response to herding forecasts 
and anti-herding forecasts. We then examine the market response to herding forecasts 
and anti-herding forecasts around release of recommendations using both univariate 
tests and regression analysis. For the research, as stated in the previous chapter, we 
compute cumulative abnormal returns (CARj,t) by subtracting the cumulative market 
portfolio returns as expressed in the following equation. The initial market reaction is 
measured for trading day [day+0, day+1] when day 0 is the recommendations release 
date, and longer term ([day+0, day+5] and [day+0, day+21]) stock returns are measured. 
In order to test the markets‘ reaction to analysts‘ herding behaviour for buy-
recommendations and sell-recommendations, we compare the cumulative stock returns 
(CARj,t) to herding forecasts and anti-herding forecasts. We examine excess returns 
using a market adjusted returns model 75  which takes into account market wide 
movement. 
 
, , , j t j t m tCAR R R                              
 (5.12)
 
 
                                                 
75 Brown et al., (1980) suggest that market adjusted returns model performs no worse than the market 
and risk adjusted returns model for short event widows and Jegadeesh et al., (2008) use this model.  
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All the variables are defined in Table 5.1. For our test of H2, we classify our 
observations as buy-side recommendations (2,310 observations) and sell-side 
recommendations (100,331 observations). We examine whether the market responds 
differently to analysts‘ herding or anti-herding behaviour in accordance with level of 
recommendations. We expect that stock returns would be higher for anti-herding buy-
side recommendations than herding buy-side recommendations and be inversely lower 
for anti-herding sell-side recommendations than herding sell-side recommendations. We 
run our regressions separately for each sub-sample. We use the following regression 
specification to investigate whether the Korean stock markets recognize the analysts‘ 
herding behaviour.  
 
CAR= α + β1HERD (P,S) + β2ANALY + β3SIZE + β4SECU + β5VOLA +ε    (5.13) 
 
All variables are defined in Table 5.1. The independent variables, analysts following 
(ANALY), firm size (SIZE) broker size (SECU), and standard deviation of daily stock 
price (VOLA) serve as controls for market price reaction. Their inclusion is motivated 
by previous research (Jegadeesh et al., 2008; Barber et al., 2008; Barron et al., 2008; 
Fabiano, 2008). The coefficient binary β1s, on P and S variables, represent the change in 
market price response for anti-herding forecasts compared to those for herding forecasts, 
which we predict to be more positive for buy-side recommendations and negative for 
sell-side recommendations.  
 
In order to clarify the Korean stock market‘s reaction to herding forecasts, following 
Jegadeesh et al., (2008), we use the following two regression models. Jegadeesh et al., 
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(2004) define DEVI (β2, NEWREC - CONLEVEL) as analyst‘s new recommendation 
level less consensus recommendation level. NEWREC is the recommendation level after 
the forecast revision and CONLEVEL indicates the consensus recommendation the day 
before analysts forecast excluding the analysts‘ forecasting. Jegadeesh et al., (2008) 
define a forecast as an anti-herding forecast if the absolute value of deviation from the 
consensus is larger for the new recommendation than for the old recommendation, and a 
herding forecast vice versa.  
 
We use a dummy variable taking the sign of expected abnormal returns conditional on 
buy-side recommendations or sell-side recommendations.76 We expect that market 
reaction is stronger for recommendations that move away from the consensus than for 
those that move toward it. Coefficient β2, therefore, is expected to be significantly 
positive. In addition, we re-estimate the models reported in Equation 5.13 with six 
future cumulative abnormal stock returns (measured over days 1 to 180 after the 
analyst‘s recommendation release) as the dependent variable. We use the following 
regression models as the robust test on the Korean markets‘ reaction to herding 
forecasts. All variables are defined in Table 5.1. 
 
CAR= α + β1BUY + β2DEVI + β3ANALY + β4SIZE + β5SECU + β6VOLA + ε   (5.14) 
CAR= α + β1BUY+β2HERD (P, S)+β3ANALY +β4SIZE +β5SECU +β6VOLA + ε (5.15) 
 
                                                 
76 On the other hand, Jegadeesh et al., (2004) adopt upgrade and downgrade recommendations.  
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5.5. Empirical Results 
5.5.1. Analysts’ Herding Behaviour in Earnings Forecasting 
Our first set of tests examines whether Korean analysts herd toward their colleagues‘ 
forecasts. Table 5.4 and Table 5.5 summarize the results regarding Korean analysts‘ 
herding propensity. The results show evidence of anti-herding behaviour among Korean 
analysts. The first herding propensity (P) by Clement et al., (2005) in Tables 5.4 shows 
mean value of P = 0.612. The second herding propensity (S) by BCK (2006) in Table 
5.5 presents mean value S = 0.518. Table 5.4 and Table 5.5 indicate that 38.8% (48.2%, 
S) of the Korean analysts‘ release earnings forecasts tend to herd. The results do not 
support our hypothesis H1.  
 
[Insert Table 5.4 and Table 5.5 about here] 
 
The results are not also consistent with Ahn et al., (2006), who suggest that over 70% of 
Korean analysts tend to herd their colleagues‘ opinion. They employ Cote et al., (1997) 
and Clement et al., (2005), when they define a forecast as anti-herding forecast. 
However, their study is different from our study in several aspects. Ahn et al., (2006) 
only cover the last revision forecasts closing to the end of the fiscal year after the 
earnings forecasts while we adopt the whole analysts‘ annual earnings forecasts. 
Therefore, we can cover the analysts‘ forecasts without revision or revision forecasts 
issued several times after first earnings forecasts. Second, our study employs a more 
comprehensive sample size and a longer sample period.  
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5.5.2. Comparison of Herding Propensity  
Table 5.4 and Table 5.5 show the overall herding propensity. The reports in both Tables 
show evidence of mixed findings. For instance, two herding propensities for the pre-FD 
period in Table 5.4 and Table 5.5 have mean value of 0.612 (P), 0.522 (S) whereas the 
mean value of herding propensities for the post-FD period are 0.623 (P), 0.517 (S), 
respectively.  
 
A comparison of P in Table 5.4 shows a significant increase from the pre-FD (0.612) to 
the post-FD period (0.623). In order to test the difference of herding propensity between 
the two periods, we conduct a t-test and a Wilcoxon test (z-test). As shown in Table 5.4, 
the results indicate that herding behaviour has decreased after the adoption of 
Regulation FD.  
 
On the other hand, Table 5.5 shows that herding propensity (S) has insignificantly 
decreased in the post-FD period. The mean of the pre-FD period is not significantly 
higher than that of the post-FD period by 0.005 with a Satterthwaite t-value of 1.45. 
Both univariate results suggest that there is insignificant difference in herding 
propensity between the two periods.  
 
In addition, our regression results also contradict Arya et al., (2005), who suggest that 
Regulation FD may lead to herding behaviour due to a lack of available information. 
Table 5.10 reports the regression results of changes in herding behavior after the 
adoption of Regulation FD. The coefficient of β1, on FD variable is negative and 
statistically insignificant. We interpret this result as evidence that herding behavior has 
not significantly changed after the adoption of Regulation FD. Therefore, we contradict 
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the notion that Regulation FD may suppress the firm‘s disclosure and private disclosure 
stave off herding behaviour.77  
 
Table 5.6 and Table 5.7 detail the distribution of forecasted year, forecast horizon, 
forecast order and broker size. The value of P varies from a low of 0.60 in 2006 to a 
high of 0.65 in 2007 while S-Statistics shows a generally balanced herding propensity. 
Our findings suggest a positive relation between the forecast horizon and anti-herding 
propensity. Table 5.6 presents that analysts who issue more than 300 days prior to the 
earnings announcement move from their colleagues‘ forecasts more than 70% of the 
time while those who report within about 100 days prior to the announcement date anti-
herd more than 55% of the time. Table 5.6 and Table 5.7 present that anti-herding 
behaviour is positively associated with release order. P and S of forecasts within 25% in 
forecast order show higher than average herding propensity.  
 
In contrast, P and S of forecasts outside 75% in forecasts order are lower than the 
average. The finding is not consistent with BCK (2006), who suggest that herding 
behavior varies little with release order. Table 5.6 also shows that P varies with broker 
size at the time of forecast in the pre-FD period, but not last in the post-FD period. In 
addition, we find no evidence of relation between S and broker size.  
 
5.5.3. Korean Stock Markets’ Reaction to Herding Behaviour  
Our second hypothesis provides a potential explanation for the market response to the 
analysts‘ herding behaviour. H2 predicts that market reaction will be stronger for anti-
                                                 
77 See chapter 3.  
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herding forecasts. Table 5.8 documents the market reaction to analysts‘ forecasts 
classified by the level of herding forecasts. The results present the cumulative stock 
returns (CAR) for the three event windows ([day+0, day+1], [day+0, day+5], and 
[day+0, day+21]).  
 
[Insert Table 5.8 about here] 
 
Similar to prior studies (Jegadeesh et al., 2008; Gleason et al., 2003), Table 5.8, Panel A 
and Panel B show that market reaction to buy-side recommendations is larger when 
analysts deviate from the consensus relative to herding forecasts. The result supports 
our hypothesis H2. On the other hand, market reactions to sell-side recommendations are 
not significantly different between the two forecast groups. The results indicate that the 
Korean market recognizes buy-side herding behaviour. Table 5.11 and Table 5.12 report 
the results of a pooled regression of stock returns on these explanatory variables.  
 
The pooled time-series cross-section regressions approach often ignores residual cross-
correlation (i.e. assumes no correlation across firms). For example, the average slopes 
from equivalent year-by-year cross section regressions are essentially equivalent to the 
slopes from pooled time series cross section regressions that include annual dummies 
that allow the average values of the variables to change through time. Fama et al., 
(1973) show that standard errors of average regression slopes (from year by year cross 
section regressions) tend to be much larger than standard errors from pooled time series 
cross section regressions.  
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The dependent variable is cumulative stock returns over the 1 days [day+0, day+1], 5 
days [day+0, day+5], and 21 days [day+0, day+21]. The results reported in Table 5.11 
and Table 5.12 confirm the results of univariate analysis and our hypothesis H2. 
However, we find heteroscedasticity in six regressions ([day+0, day+1], [day+0, 
day+5], [day+0, day+21], for sell-side recommendations and buy-side 
recommendations). We use the White (1980) correction for heteroskedasticity to explain 
this problem. Table 5.11 and Table 5.12 report that the market cannot generally 
recognize the differential impact of herding forecasts (P) for sell-side recommendations.  
We ascribe the results to the scarcity of sell-side recommendations.  
 
[Insert Table 5.11 and Table 5.12 about here] 
 
Sell-side recommendations have a valuable meaning relative to buy-side 
recommendations as analysts do not have a tendency to release sell-side 
recommendations. If analysts release unfavourable recommendation to firms, 
unfavourable analysts are pressured to drop coverage. Thus, in order to keep in good 
relations with management, analysts tend to positively bias their view of the firms (Kim, 
2009). Actually, our data shows that sell-side recommendations decrease as the years 
pass.78 Therefore, it is not easy for markets to make a sufficient distinction between 
herding sell recommendation and anti-herding sell recommendations.  
 
                                                 
78 The number of sell-side recommendations in Korean stock markets decreases over time: 326 
observations in 2000, 1,291 observations in 2001, 398 observations in 2002, 175 observations in 2003, 
143 observations in 2004, 207 observations in 2005, 134 observations in 2006 and 34 observations in 
2007. 
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If analysts release sell-side recommendations, the recommendations can cause a strong 
market reaction because the rarity of sell-side recommendations encourages investors to 
sell the stocks. Even if an analyst herds the previous sell-recommendation, investors are 
likely to consider the recommendation as a confirmation of colleagues‘ sell-side 
recommendations. However, as expected, the market fully appreciates the difference of 
buy-side herding recommendations and buy-side anti-herding recommendations. Our 
results suggest that other variables of interest (unexpected earnings, book to market and 
firm size) affect the market reaction.  
 
In addition, following Jegadeesh et al., (2008), we examine the robustness of our results. 
Table 5.9 represents cumulative abnormal returns over various six windows of horizon 
following analysts‘ forecasts. The CARs for six windows ([day+0, day+1], [day+0, 
day+3], [day+0, day+10], [day+0, day+21], [day+0, day+42], and [day, day+126]) on 
the release date for anti-herding forecasts are significantly higher than those for herding 
forecasts at the 1% of significant level. Particularly, the results suggest that the Korean 
market price continues to reflect anti-herding information up to a half year (d+126, 180 
business-days) after recommendations release.  
 
The results of univariate analyses are consistent with our expectations and Jegadeesh et 
al., (2008). Table 5.13 presents the estimates of Equation 5.14 using the Fama-MacBeth 
(1973) approach. We estimate the regression using six different windows. The positive 
coefficients (β2s) indicate that stock market reaction is stronger for moving from the 
consensus forecast. Table 5.13 reports that the slope coefficients (β2s) increase generally 
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over time, which reflect the delay in market reaction to analysts‘ recommendations. The 
results are also similar to the previous results.  
 
[Insert Table 5.13 and Table 5.14 about here] 
 
In addition, controlling for several variables influencing market reaction to analysts‘ 
forecasts, we plot dummy variables, P, S in the regression models instead of DEVI. 
Table 5.14 also reports that all coefficients (β2s) on the herding propensity (S) are 
significantly positive, indicating that the Korean stock market recognises the analysts‘ 
herding forecasts.79 Therefore, market price sufficiently incorporates the information in 
the herding forecasts on the release date.  
 
5.6. Summary and Conclusions 
Regulation FD prohibits the practice of ―selective disclosure,‖ where a firm provides 
crucial information to favoured financial professionals. This regulation restricts private 
communications between a firm and a market participant. Advocated by the SEC 
chairman, Arthur Levitt, the new rule was intended to level the playing field for all 
investors.80  In this chapter, we examine changes in herding behaviour after the 
adoption of Regulation FD. We analyze a large sample of 161,343 observations of 
individual analysts during a seven year period surrounding the adoption of Regulation 
FD in 2002. We calculate herding propensity (P, S) and the effect of Regulation FD on 
herding behaviour.  
                                                 
79 Our empirical results present that the market reaction is also stronger for anti-herding forecasts based 
on herding propensity (P) developed by Clement et al., (2005). For brevity, we omit drawing tables on the 
similar results.  
80 See Chapter 3 and http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch202.txt. 
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We have three main sets of findings. First, we find that Korean analysts do not herd. 
About 61% (by Clement, 2005) or 51% (by BCK, 2006) of Korean analysts tend to 
deviate their forecasts away from their colleagues‘ forecast. The results are not 
consistent with Ahn et al., (2006), who suggest that only 30% of Korean analysts 
deviate their forecast away from their consensus forecast.  
 
Second, we find no evidence that herding behaviour has significantly increased in the 
post-FD period. After controlling for other relevant variables, we find that Regulation 
FD has not led to analysts‘ herding behaviour. The results indicate that Regulation FD 
has not led to a deterioration of information quality and decrease in information released 
from firms. The findings are not consistent with Arya et al., (2005).  
 
Third, we find that the Korean stock market recognizes buy-side herding 
recommendations. Market reaction to buy-side recommendations for anti-herding 
behaviour is stronger for than that of herding behaviour. On the other hand, there is no 
significant difference in market reaction to sell-side recommendations. In the results of 
robust testing, we also find that six CARs ([day+0, day+1], [day+0, day+3], [day+0, 
day+10], [day+0, day+21], [day+0, day+42], [day+0, day+126]) for anti-herding 
forecasts are significantly higher than those for herding forecasts. This finding indicates 
that the Korean market reflects herding information for up to six months after analysts 
forecast.  
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Overall, our results counter the criticism of Regulation FD. We find no evidence that 
Regulation FD makes firms withhold voluntary disclosure of material information and 
results in chilling the flow of information to the market participants. To the contrary, we 
conclude that Regulation FD contributes to the increase in the quality and quantity of 
available public information for analysts‘ forecasts. 
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ANNEX 4 
Table 5.1 Definition of Variables 
 
This table outlines the definitions of variables used in our hypothesis testing 
P 
S 
FD 
 
ANALY          
HORI          
 
SIZE  
SECU          
VOLA 
CAR 
 
Rj,t  
Rm,t  
 
BUY 
 
DEVI 
= 
= 
= 
 
=
=
 
= 
=
= 
= 
 
= 
= 
 
= 
 
= 
herding propensity (Clement et al., 2005) 
herding propensity (S-statistics, BCK, 2006) 
dummy variable that equals 1 for firms take in the post-FD (year 2003-2007) period 
and 0 otherwise; 
the number of analysts providing earnings forecasts;  
the number of days between the end of the following fiscal year and the date of the 
analysts‘ forecast; 
the natural log of the total asset at the end of the last year of forecast; 
the number of broker‘s analysts;  
standard deviation of daily stock returns for year prior to recommendations release;  
cumulative abnormal returns over three (or six) windows surrounding release day of 
analysts‘ forecasts 
stock returns on stock j for day t; 
stock returns on the market portfolio (KOSPI composite index or KOSDAQ composite 
index) for day t. 
dummy variable that equals 1 for buy-side recommendations and 0 for sell-side 
recommendations; 
new recommendation level less consensus recommendation level. 
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Table 5.2 Sample Selection 
 
Our sample consists of 161,343 analyst-year observations from 2000 to 2007 (excluding 2002).  
 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total 
5,014 19,955 - 21,772 21,424 41,270 33,543 18,365 161,343 
 
 
 
 
 Number of Observations 
Initial observations (observations with forecasts on manufacturing firms 
without engaging in merging and acquisitions) 
 214,924 
- Observations without forecasts  -2,401 
- Observations with only 1 analyst  -3,234 
- Observations forecasted in 2002  -18,948 
- Observations with firms not year-end dates of December, etc  -18,700 
- top and bottom 3 percents of of observations  -10,298 
Final sample   161,343 
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Table 5.3 Descriptive Statistics for Variables 
 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for 161,343 analyst-year observations from 2000 to 2007 
(excluding year 2002). Pre-FD period is from 2000 to 2001 and post-FD period is from 2003 to 2007. 
Variables are herding propensity (P, S), analyst following (ANALY), forecast horizon (HORI), firm size 
(SIZE), broker size (SECU) and standard deviation of daily stock price (VOLA). 
 
Variables 
Pre-FD period Post-FD period 
Mean 
25th  
Percentile 
Median 
75th  
Percentile 
Mean 
25th  
Percentile 
Median 
75th  
Percentile 
ANTIHERD(P) 0.612 0 1 1 0.623 0 1 1 
ANTIHERD(S) 0.522 0 1 1 0.517 0 1 1 
ANALY 23 15 23 33 24 14 24 33 
HORI 206 107 198 299 214 115 216 313 
SIZE 3,058 1,031 3,033 13,256 7,511 1,651 7,477 35,554 
SECU 37 22 40 49 32 22 29 42 
VOLA 0.71 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.47 0.37 0.45 0.55 
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Table 5.4 Summary Statistics of Herding Propensity (P) 
 
This table presents the results of t-tests and z-tests for the difference in mean herding propensity in 
analysts‘ forecast in the pre-FD versus post-FD period. The pre-FD period is from 2000 to 2001 and the 
post-FD period is from 2003 to 2007. Z-test (Wilcoxon signed test) is used to measure whether the 
medians are statistically different from each other while t-test is used to measure whether the means 
between pre-FD period and post-FD period are statistically different from each other. P-values for both 
tests are reported. * Significant at the 10% level or better; ** Significant at the 5% level or better; *** 
Significant at the 1% level or better. 
 
Pre-FD Pre-FD 
(2000-2001) 
Difference (Pre-FD=Post-FD) 
Post-FD 
(2003-2007) All 
t-test z-test 
Observations (A) 24,969 - - 136,374 161,343 
Anti-herding  
Forecasts (B) 
15,293 - - 84,917 100,210 
Herding forecasts 9,676 - - 51,457 61,133 
Herding propensity (P) 
(B/A) 
0.612 -4.10*** -4.10*** 0.623 0.621 
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Table 5.5 Summary Statistics of Herding Propensity (S) 
 
 
This table presents the results of Satterthwaite test for the difference in mean herding propensity (S) in 
analysts‘ forecasts in the pre-FD versus post-FD period. The pre-FD period is from 2000 to 2001 and the 
post-FD period is from 2003 to 2007.  
 
Pre-FD (n= 24,969) 
P-value 
(SPre-FD= 
SPost-FD) 
Post-FD (n=136,374) 
All 
(n=161,343) Overshooting 
probability 
Undershooting 
Probability 
S 
Overshooting 
probability 
Undershooting 
Probability 
S 
0.719 0.325 0.522 1.45 0.682 0.352 0.517 0.518 
 
< Row-wise mean comparison > 
Satterthwaite t-value : 1.45 
Probability : 0.146 
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Table 5.6 Distribution of Herding Propensity (P) in Analysts’ Forecasts  
 
Herding propensity (P) developed by Clement et al., (2005), is computed for different sub-samples: order 
is the order in the sequence of forecasts; broker size is the number of analysts hired by the broker. 
 
< Panel A> Pre-FD period (n= 24,969) 
By Year Herding propensity (P) 
(n=5,014) 2000 0.63 
(n=19,955) 2001 0.61 
By Days to Earnings Announcement  
25% To-announce<=107 0.54 
50% 107< To-announce<=198 0.59 
75% 198< To-announce<=299 0.63 
100% 299< To-announce 0.72 
By Forecast Order   
25% Order <=14 0.72 
50% 15< Order<=39 0.61 
75% 39<Order<=90 0.59 
100% 90<Order 0.56 
By Broker Size   
25% Broker <=22 0.68 
50% 22< Broker<=40 0.66 
75% 40< Broker<=49 0.65 
100% 49< Broker 0.49 
 
< Panel B> Post-FD period (n=136,374) 
By Year Herding propensity 
(n=21,773) 2003 0.64 
(n=21,424) 2004 0.63 
(n=41,270) 2005 0.61 
(n=33,543) 2006 0.60 
(n=18,365) 2007 0.65 
By Days to Earnings Announcement Herding propensity 
25% To-announce<=115 0.55 
50% 115< To-announce<=216 0.59 
75% 216< To-announce<=313 0.64 
100% 313< To-announce 0.70 
By Forecast Order   
25% Order <=30 0.65 
50% 30< Order<=81 0.63 
75% 81<Order<=169 0.61 
100% 169<Order 0.59 
By Broker Size   
25% Broker size<=22 0.62 
50% 22< Broker size <=29 0.61 
75% 29< Broker size <=42 0.62 
100% 42< Broker size 0.63 
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Table 5.7 Distribution of Herding Propensity (S) in Analysts’ Forecasts  
 
 
Herding propensity (S) developed by BCK (2006) is computed for different sub-samples: order is the 
order in the sequence of forecasts; broker size is the number of analysts hired by the broker 
 
< Panel A> Pre-FD period (n= 24,969) 
By Year 
Overshooting 
probability 
Undershooting 
Probability 
S-Statistics 
(n=5,014) 2000 0.69 0.35 0.52 
(n=19,955) 2001 0.73 0.32 0.52 
By Days to Earnings Announcement    
25% To-announce<=107 0.67 0.37 0.52 
50% 107< To-announce<=198 0.69 0.34 0.52 
75% 198< To-announce<=299 0.73 0.30 0.52 
100% 299< To-announce 0.78 0.29 0.55 
By Forecast Order     
25% Order <=14 0.78 0.32 0.55 
50% 15< Order<=39 0.74 0.32 0.53 
75% 39<Order<=90 0.70 0.29 0.50 
100% 90<Order 0.65 0.37 0.51 
By Broker Size     
25% Broker <=22 0.71 0.32 0.52 
50% 22< Broker<=40 0.71 0.35 0.53 
75% 40< Broker<=49 0.76 0.31 0.54 
100% 49< Broker 0.69 0.32 0.51 
 
< Panel B> Post-FD period (n=136,374) 
By Year 
Overshooting 
probability 
Undershooting 
Probability 
S-Statistics 
(n=21,773) 2003 0.67 0.37 0.52 
(n=21,424) 2004 0.64 0.40 0.52 
(n=41,270) 2005 0.67 0.36 0.52 
(n=33,543) 2006 0.71 0.31 0.51 
(n=18,365) 2007 0.71 0.32 0.52 
By Days to Earnings Announcement    
25% To-announce<=115 0.63 0.36 0.50 
50% 115< To-announce<=216 0.66 0.34 0.40 
75% 216< To-announce<=313 0.69 0.34 0.52 
100% 313< To-announce 0.75 0.36 0.56 
By Forecast Order     
25% Order <=30 0.75 0.34 0.55 
50% 30< Order<=81 0.71 0.32 0.52 
75% 81<Order<=169 0.69 0.33 0.51 
100% 169<Order 0.58 0.41 0.50 
By Broker Size     
25% Broker size<=22 0.66 0.37 0.52 
50% 22< Broker size <=29 0.68 0.34 0.51 
75% 29< Broker size <=42 0.68 0.35 0.52 
100% 42< Broker size 0.71 0.34 0.53 
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Table 5.8 Comparison of CARs for Herding Forecasts (P and S) 
 
 
This table presents the difference in stock price effect to herding and anti-herding behaviour (based on the 
herding propensity by Clement et al., 2005 and BCK, 2006) around analysts‘ recommendations release in 
the pre-FD (2000-2001) versus post-FD period (2003-2007). The event date (D) is defined as the 
analysts‘ recommendations release date. CAR is the cumulative abnormal returns for three windows 
([day+0, day+1], [day+0, day+5], [day+0, day+21]). Z-test (Wilcoxon signed test) is used to measure 
whether the medians are statistically different from each other while t-test is used to measure whether the 
means between herding forecasts and anti-herding forecasts are statistically different from each other. P-
values for both tests are reported. * Significant at the 10% level or better; ** Significant at the 5% level or 
better; *** Significant at the 1% level or better. 
 
 
 
 
< Panel A: Herding Propensity (P) >  
Herding Difference Anti-Herding 
Obs. Mean Median t-test Variables z-test Obs. Mean Median 
Sell-side recommendations          
1,029 -0.0056 -0.0072  -0.32 CAR (D+0, D+1)  -0.48 1,281 -0.0048 -0.0063 
1,029 -0.0090 -0.0138  0.12 CAR (D+0, D+5)   0.48 1,281 -0.0096 -0.0147 
1,029 -0.0366 -0.0578  -0.43 CAR (D+0, D+21)  -0.71 1,281 -0.0336 -0.0513 
Buy-side recommendations          
38,897 0.0030 0.0003 *** -3.32 CAR (D+0, D+1) *** -3.71 61,434 0.0039 0.0009 
38,897 0.0035 0.0004 *** -2.61 CAR (D+0, D+5) ** -2.35 61,434 0.0047 0.0015 
38,897 0.0032 -0.0046  0.74 CAR (D+0, D+21)  -0.93 61,434 0.0026 -0.0032 
 
 
< Panel B: Herding Propensity (S) >  
Herding Difference Anti-Herding 
Obs. Mean Median t-test Variables z-test Obs. Mean Median 
Sell-side recommendations          
1,519 -0.0062 -0.0074  -1.13 CAR (D+0, D+1)  -1.19 791 -0.0032 -0.0062 
1,519 -0.0119 -0.0156 * -1.81 CAR (D+0, D+5)  -1.47   781 -0.0041 -0.0111 
1,519 -0.0421 -0.0673 *** -3.02 CAR (D+0, D+21) *** -5.00   791 -0.0204 -0.0338 
Buy-side recommendations          
38,525 0.0031 0.0001 *** -3.93 CAR (D+0, D+1) *** -4.75 61,806 0.0041 0.0013 
38,525 0.0036 0.0004 *** -3.75 CAR (D+0, D+5) *** -4.01 61,806 0.0052 0.0017 
38,525 0.0013 -0.0056 *** -4.35 CAR (D+0, D+21) *** -5.11 61,806 0.0046 -0.0022 
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Table 5.9 Comparison of CARs for Herding Forecasts (DEVI) 
 
 
This table presents the difference in stock price effect to herding and anti-herding behaviour (based on 
Jegadeesh et al., 2008) around analysts‘ recommendations release in the pre-FD (2000-2001) versus post-
FD period (2003-2007). The event date (D) is defined as the analysts‘ recommendations release date. 
CAR is the cumulative abnormal returns. Z-test (Wilcoxon signed test) is used to measure whether the 
medians are statistically different from each other while t-test is used to measure whether the means 
between herding forecasts and anti-herding forecasts are statistically different from each other. P-values 
for both tests are reported. For brebity, we omit the medians on the similar results. * Significant at the 
10% level or better; ** Significant at the 5% level or better; *** Significant at the 1% level or better. 
 
 
Herding 
(N=69,707) 
Difference Anti-Herding 
(N= 91,636) t-test Variables z-test 
 0.0002  *** -15.23 CAR (D+0, D+1) *** -15.93  0.0035 
-0.0006  *** -14.51 CAR (D+0, D+5) *** -15.44  0.0037 
-0.0022  *** -8.67 CAR (D+0, D+10) *** -9.34  0.0016 
-0.0040  *** -10.59 CAR (D+0, D+21) *** -12.30  0.0029 
-0.0074  *** -10.63 CAR (D+0, D+42) *** -14.27  0.0027 
-0.0313  *** -14.41 CAR (D+0, D+126) *** -20.79 -0.0046 
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 Table 5.10 Regression of Herding Propensity (P and S) 
 
This table reports the results of regressions to examine the variation in herding propensity for 161,343 
observations from 2000 to 2007 (excluding year 2002). The pre-FD period is from 2000 to 2001 and the 
post-FD period is from 2003 to 2007. The dependent variable is defined as herding propensity (P, S) by 
Clement et al., (2005) and BCK (2006). Independent variables are post-FD period (FD), analyst following 
(ANALY), forecast horizon (HORI), firm size (SIZE) and broker size (SECU). * Significant at the 10% 
level or better; ** Significant at the 5% level or better; *** Significant at the 1% level or better. 
 
 
Herding Propensity (P,S)i,t= α + β1FD+ β2 ANALYi,t + β3HORIi,t + β4SIZEi,t + β5SECUi,t + εi,j,t 
< Panel A : Herding propensity (P) > 
 Coef. t P>|t| 
CONSTANT α 0.4353  *** 56.57 0.000 
FD β1 -0.0045   -1.22 0.223 
ANALY β2 0.0025  *** 20.61 0.000 
HORI β3 0.0004  *** 40.13 0.000 
SIZE β4 0.0119  *** 5.66 0.000 
SECU β5 -0.0002  *** -2.64 0.008 
  
Number of obs =161,343 
Adj R-squared = 0.00169 
< Panel B : Herding propensity (S) > 
 Coef. t P>|t| 
CONSTANT α 0.2858  *** 36.17 0.000 
FD β1 -0.0024   -0.62 0.534 
ANALY β2 0.0010  *** 7.98 0.000 
HORI β3 0.0002  *** 17.34 0.000 
SIZE β4 0.0357  *** 16.53 0.000 
SECU β5 -0.0000   -0.32 0.751 
  
Number of obs =161,343 
Adj R-squared = 0.0072 
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Table 5.11 Regression of CARs to Herding Forecasts (P) 
 
This table reports the results of regressions to examine the variation in abnormal stock returns to herding 
behaviour and anti-herding behaviour (based on herding propensity by Clement et al., 2005) in 
accordance of the level of recommendations for 102,641 observations from 2000 to 2007 (excluding year 
2002). The pre-FD period is from 2000 to 2001 and the post-FD period is from 2003 to 2007. The 
dependent variable is defined as the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for three windows ([day+0, 
day+1], [day+0, day+5], [day+0, day+21]). Independent variables are herding forecasts (P), analyst 
following (ANALY), firm size (SIZE), broker size (SECU) and standard deviation of daily stock price 
(VOLA). * Significant at the 10% level or better; ** Significant at the 5% level or better; *** Significant 
at the 1% level or better. 
 
 
CAR i,t = α + β1Pi,t + β2ANALYi,t + β3SIZEi,t + β4SECUi,t + β5VOLAi,t + εi,j,t 
Sell-side 
recommendations  
< Day+0, Day+1> < Day+0, Day+5> < Day+0, Day+21> 
Coef. t P>|t| Coef. t P>|t| Coef. t P>|t| 
CONSTANT α -0.0207   -1.35 0.177 -0.0212   -0.84 0.401 -0.0919   -2.10 0.036 
P β1 -0.0045   -1.52 0.130 -0.0121  ** -2.50 0.013 -0.0065   -0.78 0.437 
ANALY β2 -0.0001   -0.78 0.437 -0.0003   -0.89 0.373 -0.0007   -1.52 0.128 
SIZE β3 0.0032   0.94 0.345 0.0053   0.97 0.333 0.0212  ** 2.23 0.026 
SECU β4 0.0000   0.32 0.750 -0.0001   -0.79 0.431 -0.0002   -0.81 0.421 
VOLA β5 0.0143   1.42 0.155 0.0187   1.13 0.258 0.0325   1.14 0.256 
  Number of obs = 2,310 
Adj R-squared = 0.0048 
Number of obs = 2,310 
Adj R-squared = 0.0069 
Number of obs = 2,310 
Adj R-squared = 0.0051 
Buy-side 
recommendations  
< Day+0, Day+1> < Day+0, Day+5> < Day+0, Day+21> 
CONSTANT α 0.0050  *** 4.41 0.000 0.0005   0.27 0.784 -0.0179  *** -5.33 0.000 
P β1 0.0011  *** 4.05 0.000 0.0012  *** 2.74 0.006 -0.0010   -1.24 0.216 
ANALY β2 -0.0000  * -1.86 0.063 0.0000   0.08 0.938 0.0001  ** 2.31 0.021 
SIZE β3 -0.0015  *** -6.21 0.000 -0.0010  ** -2.55 0.011 0.0020  *** 2.78 0.005 
SECU β4 0.0001  *** 7.03 0.000 0.0001  *** 6.52 0.000 0.0001  *** 4.93 0.000 
VOLA β5 0.0036  *** 3.62 0.000 0.0067  *** 4.15 0.000 0.0164  *** 5.51 0.000 
  Number of obs = 100,331 
Adj R-squared = 0.0025 
Number of obs = 100,331 
Adj R-squared = 0.0011 
Number of obs = 100,331 
Adj R-squared = 0.0009 
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Table 5.12 Regression of CARs to Herding Forecasts (S) 
 
This table reports the results of regressions to examine the variation in abnormal stock returns to herding 
behaviour and anti-herding behaviour (based on herding propensity by BCK, 2006) in accordance of the 
level of recommendations for 102,641 observations from 2000 to 2007 (excluding year 2002). The pre-
FD period is from 2000 to 2001 and the post-FD period is from 2003 to 2007. The dependent variable is 
defined as the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for three windows ([day+0, day+1], [day+0, day+5], 
[day+0, day+21]). Independent variables are herding forecasts (S), analyst following (ANALY), firm size 
(SIZE), broker size (SECU) and standard deviation of daily stock price (VOLA). * Significant at the 10% 
level or better; ** Significant at the 5% level or better; *** Significant at the 1% level or better. 
 
 
CAR i,t = α + β1Si,t + β2ANALYi,t + β3SIZEi,t + β4SECUi,t + β5VOLAi,t + εi,j,t 
Sell-side 
recommendations  
< Day+0, Day+1> < Day+0, Day+5> < Day+0, Day+21> 
Coef. t P>|t| Coef. t P>|t| Coef. t P>|t| 
CONSTANT α -0.0279  * -1.84 0.066 -0.0272   -1.09 0.276 -0.1257  *** -2.89 0.004 
S β1 0.0049  * 1.66 0.096 0.0064   1.32 0.187 0.0229  *** 2.70 0.007 
ANALY β2 -0.0002   -1.15 0.250 -0.0003   -1.11 0.267 -0.0009  * -1.81 0.071 
SIZE β3 0.0039   1.18 0.239 0.0046   0.85 0.394 0.0251  *** 2.64 0.008 
SECU β4 0.0000   0.33 0.740 -0.0001   -0.51 0.613 -0.0002   -0.74 0.461 
VOLA β5 0.0161   1.61 0.107 0.0155   0.94 0.345 0.0473  * 1.65 0.099 
  Number of obs = 2,310 
Adj R-squared = 0.0053 
Number of obs = 2,310 
Adj R-squared = 0.0026 
Number of obs = 2,310 
Adj R-squared = 0.0106 
Buy-side 
recommendations  
< Day+0, Day+1> < Day+0, Day+5> < Day+0, Day+21> 
CONSTANT α 0.0053  *** 4.68 0.000 0.0007   0.38 0.704 -0.0185  *** -5.55 0.000 
S β1 0.0009  *** 3.54 0.000 0.0013  *** 3.17 0.002 0.0021  *** 2.72 0.007 
ANALY β2 -0.0000  ** -2.11 0.035 -0.0000   -0.09 0.930 0.0001  ** 2.30 0.022 
SIZE β3 -0.0015  *** -6.36 0.000 -0.0010  *** -2.69 0.007 0.0017  ** 2.46 0.014 
SECU β4 0.0001  *** 6.92 0.000 0.0001  *** 6.54 0.000 0.0001  *** 4.93 0.000 
VOLA β5 0.0041  *** 4.13 0.000 0.0072  *** 4.45 0.000 0.0164  *** 5.53 0.000 
  Number of obs = 100,331 
Adj R-squared = 0.0027 
Number of obs = 100,331 
Adj R-squared = 0.0012 
Number of obs = 100,331 
Adj R-squared = 0.0009 
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Table 5.13 Regression of CARs to Herding Forecasts (DEVI) 
 
This table reports the results of regressions to examine the variation in abnormal stock returns to herding 
behaviour and anti-herding behaviour (based on herding propensity by Jegadeesh et al., 2008) in 
accordance of the level of recommendations for 102,641 observations from 2000 to 2007 (excluding year 
2002). The pre-FD period is from 2000 to 2001 and the post-FD period is from 2003 to 2007. The 
dependent variable is defined as the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for six windows ([day+0, 
day+1], [day+0, day+3], [day+0, day+10], [day+0, day+21], [day+0, day+42], and [day+0, day+126]). 
Independent variables are buy-side recommendations (BUY, dummy variable), herding forecasts (DEVI), 
analyst following (ANALY), firm size (SIZE), broker size (SECU) and standard deviation of daily stock 
price (VOLA). * Significant at the 10% level or better; ** Significant at the 5% level or better; *** 
Significant at the 1% level or better. 
 
CAR i,t = α + β1BUYi,t + β2DEVIi,t + β3ANALYi,t + β4SIZEi,t + β5SECUi,t + β6VOLAi,t + εi,j,t 
 < Day+0, Day+1> < Day+0, Day+3> < Day+0, Day+10> 
Coef. t P>|t| Coef. t P>|t| Coef. t P>|t| 
CONSTANT α -0.0055  *** -3.21 0.001 -0.0118  *** -5.04 0.000 0.0156  *** 6.42 0.000 
BUY β1 0.0114  *** 9.49 0.000 0.0165  *** 10.11 0.000 0.0022  ** 2.04 0.041 
DEVI β2 0.0021  *** 3.89 0.000 0.0022  *** 3.10 0.002 0.0000  * 1.84 0.065 
ANALY β3 0.0000  *** -2.69 0.007 0.0000  ** -1.98 0.048 0.0005   1.03 0.302 
SIZE β4 -0.0015  *** -6.53 0.000 -0.0013  *** -4.13 0.000 0.0001  *** 5.53 0.000 
SECU β5 0.0001  *** 6.58 0.000 0.0001  *** 5.20 0.000 0.0060  *** 2.98 0.003 
VOLA β6 0.0040  *** 4.04 0.000 0.0051  *** 3.75 0.000 -0.0237  *** -6.78 0.000 
  Number of obs = 102,641 
Adj R-squared = 0.0034 
Number of obs = 102,641 
Adj R-squared = 0.0023 
Number of obs = 102,641 
Adj R-squared = 0.0009 
  < Day+0, Day+21> < Day+0, Day+42> < Day+0, Day+126> 
CONSTANT α -0.0508  *** -9.98 0.000 -0.1041  *** -13.98 0.000 -0.2530  *** -16.77 0.000 
BUY β1 0.0329  *** 9.29 0.000 0.0585  *** 11.31 0.000 0.1365  *** 13.02 0.000 
DEVI β2 0.0038  ** 2.41 0.016 0.0069  *** 2.99 0.003 0.0140  *** 3.02 0.003 
ANALY β3 0.0001  *** 2.67 0.008 0.0001   0.98 0.328 -0.0003  *** -2.83 0.005 
SIZE β4 0.0017  ** 2.47 0.014 0.0065  *** 6.38 0.000 0.0261  *** 12.58 0.000 
SECU β5 0.0001  *** 5.10 0.000 0.0002  *** 5.37 0.000 0.0004  *** 5.05 0.000 
VOLA β6 0.0145  *** 4.93 0.000 0.0337  *** 7.86 0.000 0.0335  *** 3.85 0.000 
  Number of obs = 102,641 
Adj R-squared = 0.0017 
Number of obs = 102,641 
Adj R-squared = 0.0027 
Number of obs = 102,641 
Adj R-squared = 0.0044 
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Table 5.14 Regression of CARs to Herding Forecasts (S) 
 
This table reports the results of regressions to examine the variation in abnormal stock returns to herding 
behaviour and anti-herding behaviour (based on herding propensity by BCK, 2006) in accordance of the 
level of recommendations for 102,641 observations from 2000 to 2007 (excluding year 2002). The pre-
FD period is from 2000 to 2001 and the post-FD period is from 2003 to 2007. The dependent variable is 
defined as the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for six windows ([day+0, day+1], [day+0, day+3], 
[day+0, day+10], [day+0, day+21], [day+0, day+42], and [day+0, day+126]). Independent variables are 
anti-herding forecasts (ANTIHERD), analyst following (ANALY), firm size (SIZE) and broker size 
(SECU) and standard deviation of daily stock price (VOLA). * Significant at the 10% level or better; ** 
Significant at the 5% level or better; *** Significant at the 1% level or better. 
 
CAR i,t = α + β1BUYi,t + β2Si,t + β3ANALYi,t + β4SIZEi,t + β5SECUi,t + β6VOLAi,t + εi,j,t 
 < Day+0, Day+1> < Day+0, Day+3> < Day+0, Day+10> 
Coef. t P>|t| Coef. t P>|t| Coef. t P>|t| 
CONSTANT α -0.0045  *** -2.75 0.006 -0.0104  *** -4.68 0.000 -0.0227  *** -6.84 0.000 
BUY β1 0.0096  *** 8.55 0.000 0.0144  *** 9.46 0.000 0.0139  *** 6.14 0.000 
S β2 0.0010  *** 3.73 0.000 0.0011  *** 3.25 0.001 0.0015  *** 2.84 0.004 
ANALY β3 0.0000  ** -2.25 0.024 0.0000  * -1.74 0.081 0.0000   1.41 0.160 
SIZE β4 -0.0015  *** -6.16 0.000 -0.0012  *** -3.81 0.000 0.0006   1.27 0.203 
SECU β5 0.0001  *** 6.93 0.000 0.0001  *** 5.19 0.000 0.0001  *** 5.17 0.000 
VOLA β6 0.0043  *** 4.29 0.000 0.0053  *** 3.93 0.000 0.0071  *** 3.52 0.000 
  Number of obs = 102,641 
Adj R-squared = 0.0032 
Number of obs = 102,641 
Adj R-squared = 0.0022 
Number of obs = 102,641 
Adj R-squared = 0.0009 
  < Day+0, Day+21> < Day+0, Day+42> < Day+0, Day+126> 
CONSTANT α -0.0489  *** -10.12 0.000 -0.0993  *** -14.04 0.000 -0.2470  *** -17.24 0.000 
BUY β1 0.0300  *** 9.09 0.000 0.0519  *** 10.75 0.000 0.1243  *** 12.71 0.000 
S β2 0.0023  *** 3.05 0.002 0.0053  *** 4.72 0.000 0.0155  *** 6.84 0.000 
ANALY β3 0.0001  ** 2.10 0.036 0.0000   0.81 0.415 -0.0003  *** -2.87 0.004 
SIZE β4 0.0019  *** 2.71 0.007 0.0067  *** 6.50 0.000 0.0262  *** 12.65 0.000 
SECU β5 0.0001  *** 4.76 0.000 0.0002  *** 5.05 0.000 0.0004  *** 4.95 0.000 
VOLA β6 0.0165  *** 5.58 0.000 0.0354  *** 8.22 0.000 0.0360  *** 4.12 0.000 
  Number of obs = 102,641 
Adj R-squared = 0.0017 
Number of obs = 102,641 
Adj R-squared = 0.0028 
Number of obs = 102,641 
Adj R-squared = 0.0048 
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CHAPTER 6 
INFORMATION LEAKAGE AND INFORMED TRADING 
6.1. Introduction  
Market participants have various ways to gain information. They can acquire private 
information either under selective disclosure or under fair disclosure. The Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) stated that selective disclosure has evils similar to 
informed trading in that both are not conducted openly or in public view.  
 
Selective disclosure has an adverse impact on market integrity that is 
similar to the adverse impact from illegal insider trading: investors lose 
confidence in the fairness of the markets when they know that other 
participants may exploit “unerodable informational advantages” derived 
not from hard work or insights, but from their access to corporate 
insiders.81 
 
 
 
With the induction of Regulation FD, SEC imposed literally fairness on the disclosure 
practice of firms.82 Regulation FD forces all market participants to have fair access to 
material information disclosed by firms. From the point of view of legislation, although 
Regulation FD seems to be the best remedy for information asymmetry, the effect of the 
regulation on the financial information environment remains controversial. Critics 
suggests that Regulation FD makes it more difficult for analysts to produce earnings 
forecasts since the regulation curtails the private channel to companies that they had 
                                                 
81 See Securities and Exchange Commission (2000, Release Nos. 33-7881) Final Rule: Selective 
Disclosure and Insider Trading.  
82 Regulation FD requires that when firms release material information to the capital market, they should 
disclose it to the public simultaneously (form intentional disclosure) or promptly (for non-intentional 
disclosures).  
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formerly enjoyed (Association for Investment Management and Research [AIMR, 2000, 
now the CFA Institute] and Securities Industry Association [SIA, 2000]). At the same 
time, proponents report that there is no significant difference in quality of information 
and firms tend to release more public information (Bailey et al., 2003; Heflin et al., 
2003).  
 
In the previous chapter, we found that Regulation FD contributes to changes in analysts‘ 
information environments and ascribed the results to the decrease in private information 
following Regulation FD. If Regulation FD contributes to equal access to their material 
information, firms should stop the selective disclosure that reduced the average 
information quality prior to the regulation. There are, therefore, two important questions 
about the effect of Regulation FD on the quality of information released by firms and 
analysts: (1) Has Regulation FD influenced informed trading prior to unscheduled 
earnings announcements? (2) Has Regulation FD influenced informed trading prior to 
the release of analysts‘ recommendations? 
 
First, we focus on the effect of Regulation FD on informed trading prior to the 
unscheduled earnings announcement. In order to examine the above issues, we test 
whether stock returns and trading volume increase prior to unscheduled earnings 
announcement. Informed trading allows informed traders to profit at the expense of the 
uninformed trader (Carter et al., 2003). In this paper, we consider two important 
benchmarks in measuring informed trading to the event day: earnings announcements 
and analysts‘ recommendations release. Prior literature reports evidence of an increase 
in a firm‘s trading volume when asymmetric information among investors increases due 
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to the different investors‘ information environment (e.g., Kim et al., 1991 and 1994; 
Atiase et al., 1994).83 Specifically, following Liu et al., (1990), we measure the 
difference of stock returns and volume reactions around unscheduled earnings 
announcement and analysts‘ recommendations release. We use abnormal volumes (AV) 
and abnormal returns (AR) from nine trading days before event day to three trading days 
after event day [Day-9, Day+3]. The earnings announcement contains important 
information. Lundholm (1988), Stickel (1989) and Barron et al. (2002) suggest that the 
earnings announcement is a critical news event for analysts since the announcement 
helps analysts reduce errors in their earnings forecasts. Kim et al., (1997) find that the 
earnings announcement conveys private information and causes abnormal trading. If 
some investors access material information unrevealed in public, they can enjoy excess 
stock returns relative to normal investors. Information leaks through various ways, such 
as firms‘ insiders, financial professionals, and family members. As an information 
producer, insiders have an incentive to profit from their superior information about firm 
value.  
 
On the other hand, as an information recipient, financial professionals such as 
institutional investors and analysts have significantly more resources and incentives to 
gain available information compared with general investors (Liu 2009). A typical 
example of an information source for analysts is conference calls. Frankel et al., (1999) 
find that conference calls provide better information to investors than the corresponding 
                                                 
83 In the presence of cases such as scheduled announcements, this relationship can be inverted because 
uninformed traders delay trading to avoid adverse selection costs due to information asymmetry (e.g., 
Chae, 2005; Fabiano, 2008).  
 190 
press release. Jorgensen et al., (2004) and Bowen et al., (2002) suggest that most firms 
used conference calls prior to the stock market opening to release earnings information.  
 
Prior to Regulation FD, conference calls lead to selective disclosure while, after 
Regulation FD, managers may release the information simultaneously during the 
conference call. If firms disclose material information publicly instead of using selective 
disclosure, informed trading reduces after the adoption of Regulation FD.  
 
Using 2,531 observations made for unscheduled earnings announcements, we 
hypothesize whether firms would leak earnings information before their earnings 
announcement in the post-FD period. We find that cumulative abnormal volumes (CAV) 
and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) prior to earnings announcements in the post-FD 
period have significantly decreased in the post-FD period. These findings are supported 
by Mac (2002). Mac (2002) finds that there has been a significant decrease in unfair 
trading before event day subsequent to the Regulation FD. Ahmed et al., (2007) find 
evidence of reduction in the difference in information quality between investors in the 
post-FD period. The results indicate that Regulation FD curtails information leakage 
before earnings announcement.  
 
Second, our study complements the above research by examining whether Regulation 
FD reduces informed trading prior to the release of analysts‘ recommendations. The 
Korean securities business mainly focuses on the brokerage service.  On the basis of 
annual revenue, the income of brokerage service amounts to 62% in the 2007 fiscal 
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year.84 In practice, conflicts of interest by Korean analysts are expected to centralize on 
the brokerage service, the largest source of securities‘ income. Therefore, the brokerage 
service is likely to create incentives for securities companies to secure brokerage 
commission. Using 113,164 observations made for buy-side and sell-side 
recommendations, we examine whether analysts leak their recommendations 
information to favoured clients prior to their recommendations release after the adoption 
of Regulation FD. We find that there is a significant decrease in cumulative trading 
volume and stock returns in the post-FD period, compared to the pre-FD period. The 
findings are supported by Heflin et al., (2003) and Cornett et al., (2007). They find that 
cumulative stock returns to analysts‘ recommendations release have significantly 
decreased in the post-FD period. The results indicate that Regulation FD encourages 
firms to offer material information to investors publicly instead of using selective 
disclosure.  
 
We contribute to the study of both Regulation FD and information leakage, by 
examining the impact of Regulation FD on the information environment of analysts and 
firms. First, we contribute to the existing literature by providing additional insights on 
whether Regulation FD influences managers‘ information leakage. Second, we examine 
the changes in stock returns and trading volumes prior to analysts‘ recommendations 
release as a way of providing more convincing evidence on the effect of Regulation FD 
on the analysts‘ information leakage. Third, we provide evidence based on more 
comprehensive samples than prior research concerning the effect of Regulation FD. 
                                                 
84 The main source of securities companies‘ income of three countries (Korea, U.S., Japan) in the 2007 
fiscal year by press release from Korea Financial Investment Association Korea is as follows:  
−Korea(brokerage 62%, proprietary trading 13%, fund sales 10%, underwriting service 3%) 
−U.S. (brokerage service 27%, wrap account service 16%, fund sales 13%, underwriting service 13%) 
−Japan (brokerage service 24%, proprietary trading 16%, fund sales 10%, underwriting service 3%) 
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This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 6.2 introduces and develops the hypotheses. 
Section 6.3 describes the sample selection procedure. Section 6.4 discusses research 
design. Section 6.5 presents the main empirical results on the effect of Regulation FD. 
The final section provides a brief summary and presents conclusions. 
 
6.2. Hypotheses Development 
6.2.1. Informed Trading around Earnings Announcements 
Prior empirical studies indicate that information leakage is positively related to the 
length of the interval between informed trading and the unscheduled earnings 
announcement. Previous literature uses trading volumes as a proxy for an indicator for 
information leakage (Beaver, 1968; Kim et al., 1994, 1997; Straser, 2002). For example, 
Beaver (1968) finds that trading volume reflects a lack of consensus regarding price, in 
that change in trading volume is induced by the inflow of the new information. Kim et 
al., (1994) attribute abnormal volume trading around the earnings announcement date to 
private information around pre-announcement, and superior public information post-
announcement. Kim et al., (1997) suggest that trading arises when investors have pre-
disclosure earnings information because the information may lead market participants to 
disagree about firm prospects. Straser (2002) finds that informed trading is caused by 
only private information.  
 
Previous literature shows evidence that individual investors cannot generally have 
excess stock returns based on private information (Lin et al., 1995; Carter et al., 2003). 
On the other hand, financial professionals are viewed as informed investors because 
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they tend to have superior access to private information from firms. Gaved (1997) 
argues that large institutional shareholders normally have the opportunity to gain private 
information from managers. Ali et al., (2004) suggest that institutional investors trade 
on superior information about forthcoming earnings. Grinblatt et al., (1989) argue that 
the excess returns that fund managers may earn is based on superior information. Ke et 
al., (2006) suggest that analysts have an incentive to use optimistically biased earnings 
forecasts to please management so that they can gain better access to management‘s 
private information.  
 
Before the adoption of Regulation FD, this scenario would happen. If a firm‘s earnings 
were exceeding the analysts‘ forecasts, the manager would tell the favoured analysts 
that he/she expected outstanding earnings performance. The analysts would pass on the 
information to their important customers and the customers would buy stock. The 
clients have already realized profits when the earnings announcement is released to the 
public. Therefore, for firms with earnings increases, stock volumes would increase and 
stock returns would go up prior to earnings announcement in the pre-FD period. 
However, after Regulation FD took effect, a lower trading volume is expected due to 
there being less informed trading prior to the earnings announcement. This expectation 
is consistent with Ahmed (2007), who supports the view that informed trading declines 
after the implementation of Regulation FD.  
 
In addition, if Regulation FD leads firms to replace selective disclosure with public 
disclosure, general investors reduce their uncertainty about forthcoming earnings. 
Heflin et al., (2003) report that flow of information to market participants has improved 
and returns volatility surrounding earnings announcements has been lower since 
 194 
Regulation FD. Therefore, there will be significant differences in trading volume and 
stock returns after the adoption of Regulation FD. We expect that Regulation FD will 
make trading volume and stock returns decrease prior to the earnings announcement. 
Based on this expectation, we hypothesize that there is a decrease in informed trading 
before earnings announcement. Our first and second empirical hypotheses (H1 and H2) 
are as follows: 
 
H1: Abnormal trading volume to earnings announcements decreases after the 
adoption of Regulation FD. 
 
H2: Abnormal stock returns to earnings announcements decreases after the 
adoption of Regulation FD. 
 
 
6.2.2. Informed Trading around Analysts’ Recommendations 
Investment banks may create conflicts of interest with their clients since they have three 
main sources of income: (1) underwriting service (i.e., corporate financing and the 
issuing of securities) (2) brokerage services and (3) proprietary trading. In recent years, 
numerous studies have attempted to explore the conflicts of interest between analysts‘ 
recommendations and banks‘ corporate finance business. (Lin et al., 1998; Michaely et 
al., 1999; Bradley, et al., 2003; Kim et al., 1997; Cowen et al., 2006).  
 
For example, Lin et al. (1998) find that underwriter analysts‘ recommendations are 
significantly more favourable than those of unaffiliated analysts. Michaely et al., (1999) 
show that stocks that underwriter analysts recommend underperform more poorly than 
buy-side recommendations by unaffiliated brokers at the time of recommendation 
release. The results are consistent with Bradley et al., (2003). These findings reflect the 
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fact that affiliated analysts have incentives to issue favourable recommendations to 
maintain client relations.  
 
On the other hand, Kim et al., (1997) suggest that there is a conflict of interest in the 
brokerage business and analysts‘ recommendations. They find that important clients of 
investment banks possess private information on the analysts‘ forecasts during the 
period between the pre-release of information and the public announcement. Cowen et 
al., (2006) suggest that both institutional investors and retail investors are expected to 
trade on the basis of analysts‘ recommendations.85 It is possible that analysts are 
mainly motivated to maximize their brokerage commissions by providing their clients 
with high-quality information in advance.  
 
Some of the most compelling studies focus on the relation of stock returns and analysts‘ 
recommendations (Womack, 1996; Barber et al., 1993; Kim et al., 1997; Kim et al., 
2006). For example, Womack (1996) and Barber et al., (1993) suggest that investors 
earn abnormal returns of approximately 3% and -4% following buy and sell 
recommendations, respectively. Kim et al., (1997) suggests that first buy 
recommendations have an average excess stock returns of 4% for NYSE/AMEX stocks 
and 7% for NASDAQ stocks. They find that private information is incorporated in stock 
prices within 15 minutes of the opening trade for each market. Kim et al., (2006) find 
that abnormal returns start to rise from 20 days prior to announcement date when 
Korean analysts revise their stock recommendations upward. The results imply that the 
information has been reflected in the stock prices prior to the public announcement.  
                                                 
85 Cowen et al., (2006) suggest that institutional investors generally pay commission or soft dollars to 
specific research and this payment allows institutional investors to track analysts‘ performance, while 
retail investors pay the cost of research though brokerage commission. 
 196 
 
Prior to Regulation FD, it was possible that important clients of the securities 
companies were the first to receive information about an analyst‘s recommendations, 
and subsequently general investors had access the information. Thus, informed traders 
trade stocks more before the release of analysts‘ recommendations, if they get 
recommendation information from this private channel. However, as Regulation FD 
leads to improvement of the information inflow to market participants and eliminates 
private access to selective disclosure, earnings-related news make stock returns less 
volatile. Similar to the previous section, our third and fourth empirical hypotheses (H3 
and H4) are as follows: 
 
H3: Abnormal trading volume to the analysts‟ recommendations decreases 
after the adoption of Regulation FD. 
 
H4: Abnormal stock returns to the analysts‟ recommendations decrease after 
the adoption of Regulation FD. 
 
 
6.3. Sample Selection 
In order to test for the effect of Regulation FD on the amount of private information in 
analysts‘ forecasts and informed trading prior to unscheduled earnings announcements 
and analysts‘ recommendations, we use samples from FSS and FNguide. Financial 
information is retrieved from FSS and analysts‘ forecasts observations, stock returns 
and trading volume are obtained from the FNguide. The release date of each 
unscheduled earnings announcement is also obtained from FNguide. Our sample 
consists of two sub-samples: Sample A (2,531 observations), and Sample B (113,164 
observations).  
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[Insert Table 4.2 about here] 
 
These sub-samples consider all releases made during the sample period extending from 
2000, when FNguide was established, to 2007. However, for Sample A (2,531 
observations), annual actual earnings exclude the data for 2002 in both periods, because 
Regulation FD was enacted in November. 2002. On the other hand, unlike previous 
chapters, we include the observations forecasted in 2002 in Sample B because we do not 
use variables based on annual reported earnings such as forecast accuracy and forecast 
dispersion in measuring informed trading around analysts‘ recommendations. Therefore, 
the pre-FD period is from 2000 to October 2002 while the post-FD period is from 
November 2002 to December 2007 in Sample B.  
 
First, for the research on informed trading prior to unscheduled earnings announcements, 
we use Sample A (2,531 observations). This sample constitutes unscheduled earnings 
announcement. The sample is split into two categories based on the firms‘ earnings 
performance: earnings increase firms and earnings decrease firms. As we described in 
the previous chapter, we define earnings increase firms (earnings decrease firms) as 
when a firm reports profit (loss) and an increase (decrease) in earnings from last year‘s 
earnings. Sample B constitutes 113,164 analysts‘ recommendations. The sample is 
divided into two groups: sell-side recommendations (strong sell and sell) and buy-side 
recommendations (strong buy and buy). Hold recommendations and no-rating 
recommendations are excluded. Similar to Sample A, the informed trading to be 
examined includes both stock returns and abnormal trading volumes around the public 
release of analysts‘ recommendations.  
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6.4. Research Design 
6.4.1. Measurement of Informed Trading  
The aim of this chapter is to test for changes in information leakage and informed 
trading prior to event day in the Korean stock market. Since we cannot directly measure 
information leakage in the market, we investigate the stock returns and trading volume 
prior to the earnings announcement and analysts‘ recommendations release. Following 
Collet (2004)‘s event study methodology, we calculate daily abnormal stock returns and 
abnormal trading volumes around the release of analysts‘ recommendations and 
unscheduled earnings announcement.  
 
There are two methods to measure information leakage, consisting of volume effect and 
valuation effect. First, measuring unexpected trading volume requires a benchmark for 
expected trading volume. There are two benchmarks generally used in research on 
information leakage: (1) unadjusted percentage of firms‘ outstanding shares and (2) 
abnormal trading volumes. Collet (2004) identifies the percentage of outstanding shares 
on the day of announcement. In order to measure the volume effect of information 
leakage, we calculate the unadjusted percentage of firms‘ outstanding (VOLj,t) as 
follows: 
 
,
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                     (6.1) 
where: 
VOLj,t  
SHRTRDj,t  
SHROUTj,t 
= 
= 
= 
volume for firm j for day t:  
number of firms j‘s shares traded on Korean exchange for day t. 
number of firms j‘s shares outstanding for day t. 
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Abnormal trading volumes (AV) are calculated as the daily volume less mean daily 
volume during the various event windows. We choose six different event windows to 
capture the effect of Regulation FD on the informed trading. 
 
, ,j t j t tAV VOL VOL                          
 (6.2)
 
where: 
AVj,t  
tVOL  
= 
= 
abnormal volume for firm j for day t: 
mean daily volume of firm j‘s during the estimation period. 
 
Second, in order to measure the valuation effect, for each forecast recommendation and 
unscheduled earnings announcement, we report abnormal stock returns based on 
market-adjusted returns around event day. Abnormal returns (ARji) is defined as the 
difference between the actual return and the market return on the day.  
 
, , , j t j t m tAR R R                               
 (6.3)
 
 
where: 
Rj,t 
 
Rm,t 
 
= 
= 
returns on stock j for day t. 
returns on the market portfolio (KOSPI or KOSDAQ composite index) 
for day t. 
 
In addition, cumulative abnormal returns (CARj,tA) is calculated as: 
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CAR AR                          (6.4) 
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6.4.2. Regression Models of Information Leakage 
In order to further test for prior-announcement information leakage, following Heggen 
et al., (2008) and Jackson et al., (2003), we examine the six windows CAVs and CARs 
around unscheduled earnings announcement and analysts‘ recommendations. CAVs and 
CARs are computed over six windows (i.e., [Day-9, Day-1], [Day-7, Day-1], [Day-5, 
Day-1], [Day-3, Day-1], [Day+0, Day+1], [Day+0, Day+3]) ranging in length from 
nine days prior to public release to three days after the release. The primary regression 
models, Equation (6.5) and Equation (6.6), are constructed for information leakage 
prior to unscheduled earnings announcement. We partition our sample into two subsets: 
earnings increase firms (1,301 observations) and earnings decrease firms (1,230 
observations).  
 
CAV= α + β1FD + β2ANALY + β3UE + β4SIZE+ β5LEVER + ε             (6.5) 
CAR= α + β1FD + β2ANALY + β3UE + β4SIZE+ β5LEVER + β6CAV + ε     (6.6) 
 
Next regression models, Equation (6.7) and Equation (6.8), are applied to information 
leakage prior to analysts‘ recommendations release. Similar to the above regression 
models, we also divide our sample into two subsets: buy-side recommendations 
(100,673 observations) and sell-side recommendations (2,491 observations).  
 
CAV= α + β1FD + β2ANALY + β3SIZE + β4SECU+ β5VOLA + ε           (6.7) 
CAR= α + β1FD + β2ANALY + β3SIZE + β4SECU+ β5VOLA + β6CAV + ε   (6.8) 
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All variables are defined in Table 6.1. The coefficients tested in the regression models 
will provide evidence on the information leakage after the adoption of Regulation FD. 
β1s of FD, represent the change in market reaction (CAV or CAR) in the post-FD period 
compared to those in the pre-FD period. Therefore, we expect that β1s, coefficients of 
FD in Equation (6.5), (6.6), (6.7) and (6.8), are to be significant and negative,86 which 
suggests that informed trading prior to unscheduled earnings announcement and 
analysts‘ recommendations release has decreased after the adoption of Regulation FD.  
 
The control variables in Equation (6.5), (6.6), (6.6), and (6.7) are used in the previous 
chapter: analysts following (ANALY), firms size (SIZE), broker size (SECU), volatility 
of daily stock returns (VOLA) and cumulative abnormal volumes (CAV). Prior research 
suggests that these variables are important determinants in market reaction (Jackson et 
al., 2003; Hegen et al., 2008). 
 
6.5. Empirical Results 
6.5.1. Informed Trading and Earnings Announcements   
6.5.1.1. Univariate Results 
The crux of this analysis is on trading volume and stock returns prior to earnings 
announcement before and after the adoption of Regulation FD. We examine whether the 
market was previously aware of information prior to the final unscheduled earnings 
announcements. According to our hypotheses H1 and H2, managers holding the 
information do not leak the earnings information after the adoption of Regulation FD. 
                                                 
86 However, we expect that for sell-side recommendations and earnings decreases firms, β1s of FD in 
CAR are significantly positive.  
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Table 6.3, 6.4, 6.5, and 6.6 present abnormal returns (AR) and abnormal volumes (AV), 
as well as cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) and cumulative abnormal volumes (CAV) 
for earnings decrease firms and earnings increase firms before and after Regulation FD. 
Table 6.3 describes the daily abnormal volumes (AV) and their corresponding t-statistics 
and z-statistics from [Day-9] to [Day+3]. For earnings decrease firms, AVs for six 
trading days [Day-9, Day-4] prior to the earnings announcement are significantly 
positive in the pre-FD period.  
 
After the adoption of Regulation FD, there is no significantly positive AV prior to the 
event day. Table 6.4 and Panel A of Figure 6-1 show the significant differences in 
CAVs for earnings decrease firms. CAVs for [Day-9, Day-1], [Day-7, Day-1], and [Day-
5, Day-1] in the pre-FD period are significantly higher than those of the post-FD period 
while CAVs for [Day+0, Day+1] and [Day+0, Day+3] in the pre-FD period show the 
contrary results, compared to the post-FD period.  
 
[Insert Table 6.3, 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6 and Figure 6.1 about here]  
 
Similarly, for earnings increase firms, AVs for six trading days [Day-9, Day-4] prior to 
earnings announcement, each significant positive AV is observed in the pre-FD period. 
On the other hand, after the adoption of Regulation FD, significant positive AV prior to 
earnings announcement is not observed while AVs for event day [Day+0] and following 
day after event day [Day+1] are 0.32% and 0.18% respectively, significant at the level 
of 1%. AVs in these windows are also significantly different, when comparing the pre-
FD period and post-FD period.  
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In the pre-FD period, CAVs for [Day-9, Day-1], [Day-7, Day-1] and [Day-5, Day-1] 
increase while the CAV for [Day+0, Day+1] decreases substantially. Moving to the 
post-FD period, conversely, all CAVs prior to earnings announcements are not 
significant while CAVs for [Day+0, Day+1] and [Day+0, Day+3] following event day 
increase. As shown in Table 6.4, there are significant changes in CAVs for [Day-9, Day-
1], [Day-7, Day-1] [Day-5, Day-1] and [Day+0, Day+1] from the pre-FD to the post-
FD period. The results of Table 6.4 are also presented in Panel B of Figure 6.1, which 
shows the plot of both CAVs from [Day-9] to [Day-3]. We find that there is a decrease 
in informed trading, a difference in the quality of information after the adoption of 
Regulation FD. The results seem to indicate that Regulation FD curtails information 
leakage and that firms limit selective disclosure.  
 
Further, Table 6.5 and Table 6.6 provide the results on the abnormal returns (AR) and 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for H2. For earnings decrease firms, ARs for [Day-
5], [Day-3] and [Day-2] are significantly negative in the pre-FD period while ARs for 
[Day-9] and [Day-2] are significantly negative in the post-FD period. On the other hand, 
for earnings increase firms, ARs for [Day-9], [Day-6] [Day-4], and [Day-1] are 
significantly positive in the pre-FD period while ARs for [Day-8] and [Day-1] are 
significantly negative in the post-FD period. For earnings decrease firms, CARs for 
[Day-7, Day-1], [Day-5, Day-1] and [Day-3, Day-1] in the pre-FD period are -0.69%, -
1.18% and -1.10% while, CAR for [Day-9, Day-1] and [Day-5, Day-1] in the post-FD 
period are -0.46% and -0.33%.  
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On the other hand, for earnings increase firms, CARs for [Day-9, Day-1], and [Day-7, 
Day-1] in the pre-FD period are 2.26% and 0.71% while, CARs for [Day-7, Day-1], 
[Day-5, Day-1] and [Day-3, Day-1] in the post-FD period are 0.36%, 0.33%, and 0.28%. 
 
[Insert Table 6.5 and Table 6.6 and Figure 6.2 about here] 
 
As shown in Table 6.6 and Panel A of Figure 6.2, among the earnings decrease firms, 
there are significant changes in cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for [Day-5, Day-1] 
and [Day-3, Day-1] from the pre-FD to the post-FD period. For earnings increase firms, 
there are also significant differences in ARs for [Day-9], [Day-6], [Day-4] and [Day-1] 
are significantly positive in the pre-FD period while there is no significantly positive AR 
in the post-FD period. Similar results that are consistent with our hypotheses H1 and H2 
are obtained when comparing the pre-FD and post-FD periods. Table 6.6 and Panel B of 
Figure 6.2 show the path of CARs starting from 9 days before the earnings 
announcement. We find that the CAR for [Day-9, Day-1] in the pre-FD (2.26%) is 
significantly positive compared to the post-FD period (0.22%). The results are 
consistent with Gadarowski et al., (2002) who find lower stock returns prior to earnings 
announcement in the post-FD period compared to pre-FD period.  
 
6.5.1.2. Multivariate Results 
Table 6.7 and 6.8 reports the results for the primary two regression models in Equation 
(6.5) and (6.6), which include the control variables representing analysts following 
(ANALY), unexpected earnings (UE), firm size (SIZE), leverage (LEVER) and 
cumulative abnormal volumes (CAV). Table 6.7 presents that β1s of FD in CAV 
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earnings decrease firms and earnings increase firms are significantly negative over the 
three event windows ([Day-9, Day-1], [Day-9, Day-1] and [Day-5, Day-1]) prior to the 
unscheduled announcement day. The results are consistent with our hypotheses (H1 and 
H2) and previous literature. Mac (2002) finds that there is a significant decrease in 
unfair trading before event day subsequent to Regulation FD.  
 
On the other hand, β1s of FD in CAV for earnings increase firms are significantly 
positive over [Day+0, Day+1] and [Day+0, Day+3]. The results are consistent with 
Bailey et al., (2003), who report a significant increase in abnormal trading volume after 
earnings announcement in the post-FD period and ascribe it to increased differences in 
opinion resulting from an improvement in analysts‘ information gathering. Table 6.8 
presents that β1s of FD in CAR for earnings decrease firms show generally insignificant 
results. However, β1s of FD in CAR for earnings increase firms are significantly 
negative over the four event windows ([Day-9, Day-1], [Day-7, Day-1], [Day-3, Day-1], 
and [Day+0, Day+1]) around unscheduled announcement date. The results are 
consistent with our expectation and previous literature. Ahmed et al., (2007) suggest 
that stock reaction to earnings announcement would be weak if Regulation FD increases 
the quality of information voluntarily released by firms. Again, these results support H1 
and H2 that Regulation FD influences a change in firms‘ disclosure practice by 
restricting the selective disclosure available exclusively to favoured investors.  
 
On the other hand, a brief explanation of the results from Table 6.7 and Table 6.8 
indicate the relationship between four firm characteristics (ANALY, UE, SIZE, LEVER) 
and two market reaction indicators (CAR, CAV) is insignificant across the six event 
windows. However, Table 6.8 presents that CAR appears to have a consistent 
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relationship with the CAV, indicating that abnormal returns are correlated with informed 
trading volume.  
 
Taken together, our findings indicate that managers‘ information leakage prior to 
unscheduled earnings release has decreased after the adoption of Regulation FD. 
 
6.5.2. Informed trading and Analysts Recommendations  
6.5.2.1. Univariate Results 
In this section, H3 and H4 are tested. If Regulation FD is effective, it should help to 
reduce information asymmetry. Our hypotheses (H3 and H4) state that abnormal trading 
volume and stock returns have decreased after the adoption of Regulation FD. We begin 
the analysis by comparing trading volume and stock returns to sell-side 
recommendations and buy-side recommendations before and after Regulation FD.  
 
Table 6.9 reports the average magnitude of abnormal volumes (AV) for sell-side 
recommendations and buy-side recommendations both before and after the adoption of 
Regulation FD. The table lists the two sided p-values of t-test and z-test for the 
significant of the difference between the two periods. We first look at the difference in 
AVs (i.e., AV=0) between both periods. For sell-side recommendations, the AVs prior to 
event day are small and not generally significant so there is no evidence of informed 
trading during both periods. In Table 6.10, we report cumulative abnormal volumes 
(CAVs) around the day of the release of recommendations before and after the 
Regulation FD. These abnormal volumes (AV) are graphed in Panel A of Figure 6.3. 
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For sell-side recommendations, there is no significant positive CAV prior to event day 
during both periods.  
 
[Insert Table 6.9 and Table 6.10 and Figure 6.3 about here] 
 
For buy-side recommendations, most AVs before event day are significantly different 
from zero during the both periods in Table 6.10 (i.e., AVs≠0). The results indicate that 
there is information disparity among market participants. However, Table 6.10 and 
Panel B of Figure 6.3 show that there is significant difference in the CAVs before and 
after Regulation FD. CAVs for [Day-9, Day-1], [Day-7, Day-1], [Day-5, Day-1] and 
[Day-3, Day-1] before Regulation FD are 0.40%, 0.38%, 0.32% and 0.23% while CAVs 
for [Day-9, Day-1], [Day-7, Day-1], [Day-5, Day-1] and [Day-3, Day-1] after 
Regulation FD are 0.17%, 0.13, 0.12% and 0.10% respectively. The differences in 
CAVs are highly significant. The results are also consistent with our hypotheses and the 
assertion in the previous section that Regulation FD improves information flow to 
investors.  
 
Table 6.11 presents the abnormal stock returns (AR) for both recommendations around 
Regulation FD. For sell-side recommendations, ARs for [Day-7], [Day-6] [Day-5] and 
[Day-1] in the pre-FD period are significantly negative while ARs for [Day-9], [Day-8] 
[Day-1] in the post-FD period are significantly negative (i.e., AR≠0). For buy-side 
recommendations, most ARs prior to event day show the significant positive during both 
periods.  
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[Insert Table 6.11 and Table 6.12 and Figure 6.4 about here] 
 
As shown in Table 6.12 and Panel A of Figure 6.4., for sell-side recommendations, 
CARs for [Day-9, Day-1], [Day-7, Day-1] and [Day-5, Day-1] in the pre-FD period are -
1.36%, -0.57% and -0.71% while, CAR for [Day-9, Day-1] in the post-FD period it is -
1.01%, significant at the level of 1%. On the other hand, for buy-side recommendations, 
CARs for [Day-9, Day-1], [Day-7, Day-1], [Day-5, Day-1] and for sell-side 
recommendations, all β1s of FD are insignificant while those for buy-side 
recommendations in the pre-FD period are 1.39%, 1.23%, 0.86% and 0.59% while, 
CARs for [Day-9, Day-1], [Day-7, Day-1], [Day-5, Day-1] and [Day-3, Day-1] in the 
post-FD period are 0.35%, 0.47%, 0.40% and 0.30%.  
 
As shown in Table 6.12 and Figure 6.4, however, there are significant differences in the 
all CARs prior to event day in the post-FD period, compared to the pre-FD period. 
Similar to the previous section, the results are generally consistent with our hypotheses 
(H3 and H4) and previous research. Cornett et al., (2007) find that stock returns to 
analysts‘ recommendations change has significantly decreased in the post-FD period. 
Our results indicate that it seems to reduce uncertainty on future earnings in the post-FD 
period.  
 
6.5.2.2. Multivariate Results 
The results of cross-sectional analysis of CAV and CAR in each of six windows are 
displayed in Table 6.13 and Table 6.14. Table 6.13 presents the regression results of 
CAV for sell-side recommendations and buy-side recommendations. The coefficient, β1 
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of FD, captures the difference in CAV between the pre-FD and the post-FD period. In 
all event windows, for sell-side recommendations, all β1s of FD are insignificant. The 
results indicate that securities companies (or analysts) tend to keep the information 
regarding forthcoming their analysts‘ sell-side recommendations from important clients 
prior to the open.  
 
On the other hand, for buy-side recommendations, all β1s are negatively significant. The 
results are consistent with our hypotheses (H3 and H4) and univariate results, indicating 
that Regulation FD contributes to the elimination of selective disclosure of private 
information. Table 6.14 presents the regression results of CAR for six windows around 
analysts‘ recommendations release. For sell-side recommendations, except for [Day-7, 
Day-1], other β1s of FD are insignificant. However, as expected, the all coefficients 
(β1s) of FD for buy-side recommendations are significantly negative, which is consistent 
with our expectations (H4).  
 
In order to corroborate our results, we additionally examine the CAV and CAR for first 
two buy-side recommendations. Table 6.16 presents that all β1s of CAV for first two 
recommendations prior to recommendations release date are significantly negative. On 
the other hand, Table 6.17 presents the β1s of CAR for [Day-9, Day-1] and [Day-7, Day-
1], prior to event day are significantly negative.  
 
The results in Table 6.16 and Table 6.17 confirm the prior findings and our hypotheses 
(H3 and H4) of decreased in informed trading prior to the analysts‘ recommendations 
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release in the post-FD period.87 Taking these results together, Regulation FD may level 
the playing field by giving individual investors the same information as other market 
participants.  
 
6.6. Summary and Conclusions 
We provide an empirical study of the effect of Regulation FD on the informed trading 
prior to the earnings announcement and release of analysts‘ recommendations. With 
Regulation FD‘s aim of levelling the playing field, we expect a decrease in information 
asymmetry. If selective disclosure had been prevalent prior to Regulation FD, there 
would be information leakage before earnings announcement or analysts‘ 
recommendations release. However, we would not expect to see evidence of such 
selective disclosure after the adoption of Regulation FD.  
 
After the adoption of Regulation FD, trading volume and market response prior to event 
day may be smaller, if informed trading decreases and available public information 
increase. For the study, we examine the cumulative abnormal volumes (CAV) and 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) prior to the earnings announcement both in the pre-
FD and in the post-FD period. We find evidence that a general sharp increase in CAVs 
prior to event day does not persist in the post-FD period, which indicates that 
Regulation FD influences a decrease in informed trading. The results are consistent with 
Mac (2002), who finds that informed trading does not exist in the post-FD due to the 
elimination of selective disclosure. We also find that there is a significant difference in 
                                                 
87 To further our investigation, we measure the informed trading prior to first buy-side recommendations 
and first three buy-side recommendations. The results are similar to the above results.  
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CARs in the post-FD period, which indicates that average information quality has 
increased in the post-FD period. The results are consistent with Gadarowski et al., 
(2002) who find lower stock returns prior to earnings announcement in the post-FD 
period compared to the pre-FD period.  
 
Next, we examine the changes in informed trading prior to analysts‘ recommendations. 
For buy-side recommendations, there is informed trading prior to analysts‘ 
recommendations during the pre-FD and post-FD periods. However, we find that 
information disparity among market participants decreases after the adoption of 
Regulation FD. We also find evidence that there is a significant decrease in market 
response prior to the recommendations release after the adoption of Regulation FD. 
These results are consistent with Cornett et al., (2007), who suggest that market reaction 
to analysts‘ recommendations has significantly decreased in the post-FD period. Our 
results indicate that it seems to eliminate the private information that was selectively 
disclosed prior to Regulation FD or provide public information on future earnings. In 
other words, these results suggest that Regulation FD reduces differences in information 
quality and informed trading between investors and disseminates material information 
to the public instead of promoting selective disclosure.  
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ANNEX 5 
Table 6.1 Definition of Variables  
 
This table outlines the definitions of variables used in our hypothesis testing.  
CAV 
CAR  
ANALY  
UE         
SIZE  
LEVER          
VOLA 
SECU 
FD 
 
 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
=
= 
= 
= 
 
 
cumulative abnormal volumes; 
cumulative abnormal returns;  
the number of analysts providing earnings forecasts;  
reported earnings less consensus forecasts earnings; 
the natural log of the total asset at the end of the last year of forecast; 
leverage ratio; 
standard deviation of daily stock returns for one year prior to analysts‘ recommendations;  
the number of broker‘s analysts;  
dummy variable that equals 1 for firms take in the post-FD (year 2003-2007) period and 0 
otherwise. 
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Table 6.2 Sample Selection 
 
Sample A is based on the firms-year observations while Sample B is based on the forecasts-year 
observations. Sample A and Sample B consist of 2,531 observations and 113,164 observations from 2000 
to 2007. Sample A excludes the observations reported in year 2002).  
 
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total 
Sample A 274 300 - 264 208 426 520 539 2,531 
Sample B 2,770 10,782 12,155 13,655 26,486 22,923 13,870 102,641 113,164 
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Table 6.3 AVs around Earnings Announcement   
 
This table presents the volume effect around unscheduled earnings announcement made by Korean 
Exchange-listed firms, over the sample period of 2000 to 2007 (excluding 2002). The event date (D) is 
defined as the unscheduled earnings announcement release date. A t-test is used to measure whether the 
mean is statistically different from zero and z-test (Wilcoxon signed test) is used to measure whether the 
median is statistically different from zero. P-values for both tests are reported. * Significant at the 10% 
level or better; ** Significant at the 5% level or better; *** Significant at the 1% level or better. 
 
 
< Panel A: Earnings Decrease Firms > 
 
Pre-FD periods (n=308) Post-FD periods (n=922) 
AV 
Difference (AV=0) 
CAV AV 
Difference (AV=0) 
CAV 
t-test z-test t-test z-test 
Day-9 0.0045  *** 3.12 *** 3.23 0.0045  -0.0004   -1.21 ** -1.99 -0.0004  
Day-8 0.0060  *** 3.98 *** 3.72 0.0106  0.0001   0.18  -1.48 -0.0003  
Day-7 0.0076  *** 5.12 *** 4.96 0.0181  0.0004   0.77 ** -2.05 0.0001  
Day-6 0.0031  ** 2.24   0.91 0.0212  0.0006   1.03  -1.26 0.0006  
Day-5 0.0038  *** 2.80 * 1.93 0.0250  -0.0001   -0.14 ** -2.38 0.0005  
Day-4 0.0048  *** 3.42 *** 3.74 0.0298  -0.0005   -1.19 ** -2.45 -0.0000  
Day-3 0.0019   1.21  -1.07 0.0317  -0.0002   -0.38 *** -3.74 -0.0002  
Day-2 0.0020   1.29  -1.23 0.0337  -0.0004   -0.86 *** -4.00 -0.0006  
Day-1 0.0004   0.37  -0.99 0.0341  -0.0003   -0.64 ** -2.01 -0.0009  
Day+0 0.0003   0.18 *** 2.61 0.0344  0.0012  * 1.74  0.02 0.0003  
Day+1 -0.0001   -0.11 *** -3.00 0.0342  0.0014  ** 2.34 ** 2.45 0.0016  
Day+2 -0.0008   -0.64 *** -3.45 0.0334  0.0013  * 1.67  0.24 0.0029  
Day+3 -0.0011   -0.72 *** -4.31 0.0323  0.0010   1.62  -0.45 0.0039  
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< Panel B: Earnings Increase Firms > 
  
Pre-FD periods (n=266) Post-FD periods (n=1,035) 
AV 
Difference (AV=0) 
CAV AV 
Difference (AV=0) 
CAV 
t-test z-test t-test z-test 
Day-9 0.0033  ** 2.53 *** 2.75 0.0033  0.0001   0.30  -0.36 0.0001  
Day-8 0.0065  *** 3.45 *** 4.12 0.0098  0.0002   0.67  -0.62 0.0003  
Day-7 0.0060  *** 3.80 *** 3.35 0.0158  0.0005   1.42  1.22 0.0008  
Day-6 0.0038  *** 2.65 ** 2.00 0.0196  0.0004   0.90  -0.78 0.0012  
Day-5 0.0028  * 1.86 *** 2.70 0.0224  0.0003   0.69  -1.42 0.0014  
Day-4 0.0022   1.55 * 1.88 0.0246  -0.0000   -0.08 ** -2.34 0.0014  
Day-3 0.0011   0.78  -0.23 0.0257  -0.0003   -0.90  -0.99 0.0011  
Day-2 0.0004    0.25  -1.08 0.0261  -0.0003   -0.79  -0.84 0.0008  
Day-1 -0.0007   -0.52  -1.48 0.0254  -0.0004   -1.47  -1.02 0.0004  
Day+0 -0.0008   -0.65 ** -2.23 0.0246  0.0032  *** 4.70 *** 5.54 0.0037  
Day+1 -0.0013   -1.00 *** -2.47 0.0233  0.0018  *** 4.16 *** 6.31 0.0055  
Day+2 0.0004   0.24 *** -2.72 0.0238  0.0007   1.59  1.50 0.0062  
Day+3 0.0039   1.48 * -1.74 0.0277  0.0005   1.48 *** 2.67 0.0067  
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Table 6.4 Comparison of CAVs around Earnings Announcement 
 
This table presents the volume effect around unscheduled earnings announcement made by Korean 
Exchange-listed firms, over the sample period of 2000 to 2007 (excluding 2002). The event date (D) is 
defined as the unscheduled earnings announcement release date. Z-test is used to measure whether the 
median is statistically different from each other while t-test is used to measure whether the mean between 
pre-FD period and post-FD period is statistically different each other (2) or the mean is statistically 
different form the zero (1). P-values for both tests are reported. * Significant at the 10% level or better; ** 
Significant at the 5% level or better; *** Significant at the 1% level or better. 
 
< Panel A: Earnings Decrease Firms > 
Variables 
Pre-FD periods (n=308) Difference (CAVpre-FD = CAVpost-FD) Post-FD periods(n=922) 
 
t-test (CAV=0)(1) t-test (2) z-test  t-test (CAV=0) 
CAV(D-9, D-1) 0.0341  3.83 *** 4.96 *** 5.02 *** -0.0009  -0.31  
CAV(D-7, D-1) 0.0235  3.19 *** 4.02 *** 4.18 *** -0.0005  -0.22  
CAV(D-5, D-1) 0.0129  2.22 ** 3.15 *** 2.84 *** -0.0015  -0.84  
CAV(D-3, D-1) 0.0043  1.14  1.71 * 0.40  -0.0009  -0.73  
CAV(D+0, D+1) 0.0001  0.05  -1.00  -4.36 *** 0.0025  2.35 ** 
CAV(D+0, D+3) -0.0018  -0.38  -1.46  -4.70 *** 0.0047  2.32 ** 
 
< Panel B: Earnings Increase Firms > 
Variables 
Pre-FD periods (n=266) Difference (CAVpre-FD = CAVpost-FD) Post-FD periods(n=1,035) 
 
t-test (CAV=0)(1) t-test (2) z-test  t-test (CAV=0) 
CAV(D-9, D-1) 0.0254  2.84 *** 4.03 *** 4.41 *** 0.0004  0.20  
CAV(D-7, D-1) 0.0156  2.14 ** 3.05 *** 3.24 *** 0.0001  0.07  
CAV(D-5, D-1) 0.0058  1.01  1.68 * 1.93 * -0.0007  -0.56  
CAV(D-3, D-1) 0.0008  0.23  0.74  -0.47  -0.0010  -1.21  
CAV(D+0, D+1) -0.0020  -0.83  -3.05 *** -4.77 *** 0.0050  5.06 *** 
CAV(D+0, D+3) 0.0023  0.43  -0.98  -3.56 *** 0.0063  4.02 *** 
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Table 6.5 ARs around Earnings Announcement  
 
This table presents the valuation effect around unscheduled earnings announcement made by Korean 
Exchange-listed firms, over the sample period of 2000 to 2007 (excluding 2002). The event date (D) is 
defined as the unscheduled earnings announcement release date. A t-test is used to measure whether the 
mean is statistically different from zero and z-test (Wilcoxon signed test) is used to measure whether the 
median is statistically different from zero. P-values for both tests are reported. * Significant at the 10% 
level or better; ** Significant at the 5% level or better; *** Significant at the 1% level or better. 
 
< Panel A: Earnings Decrease Firms > 
 
Pre-FD periods (n=308) Post-FD periods (n=922) 
AR 
Difference (AR=0) 
CAR AR 
Difference (AR=0) 
CAR 
t-test z-test t-test z-test 
Day-9 0.0051  ** 2.13 ** 2.00 0.0051  -0.0030  *** -2.62 *** -4.11 -0.0030  
Day-8 -0.0005   -0.28  -1.34 0.0046  0.0009   -0.26 ** -2.00 -0.0021  
Day-7 0.0019   0.97  -0.40 0.0065  0.0026  *** 3.17 ** 2.00 0.0005  
Day-6 0.0030   1.61   0.62 0.0095  -0.0003   -0.85 *** -3.10 0.0002  
Day-5 -0.0088  *** -4.42 *** -7.05 0.0007  -0.0011   -0.91 ** -2.30 -0.0009  
Day-4 0.0080  *** 3.41  1.53 0.0087  -0.0004   -0.57 ** -1.65 -0.0013  
Day-3 -0.0037  ** -2.00 ** -2.11 0.0050  0.0008   0.85  0.31 -0.0005  
Day-2 -0.0087  *** -5.09 *** -6.93 -0.0037  -0.0011  ** -2.41 *** -3.59 -0.0016  
Day-1 0.0014   0.81  0.07 -0.0023  -0.0006   -0.99 ** -2.20 -0.0022  
Day+0 0.0079  *** 2.74 *** 5.92 0.0056  0.0025  *** 3.03 *** 4.25 0.0002  
Day+1 0.0001    0.04   0.27 0.0057  -0.0024  ** -2.10 *** -3.65 -0.0022  
Day+2 -0.0100  *** -4.70 *** -5.37 -0.0044  -0.0002    0.31 * -1.61 -0.0024  
Day+3 -0.0092  *** -4.46 *** -5.13 -0.0136  0.0009   1.64  -0.10 -0.0015  
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< Panel B: Earnings Increase Firms > 
 
Pre-FD periods (n=266) Post-FD periods (n=1,035) 
AR 
Difference (AR=0) 
CAR AR 
Difference (AR=0) 
CAR 
t-test z-test t-test z-test 
Day-9 0.0140  *** 5.78 *** 4.68 0.0140  -0.0015  ** -2.42 *** -2.74 -0.0015  
Day-8 0.0016   0.75  -0.41 0.0156  0.0008   1.40  0.12 -0.0007  
Day-7 0.0012   0.64  -0.23 0.0168  0.0011  * 1.85  0.52 0.0004  
Day-6 0.0071  *** 3.62 *** 3.18 0.0238  -0.0009   -1.54 *** -2.95 -0.0005  
Day-5 -0.0089  *** -4.55 *** -6.82 0.0149  0.0007   1.38  -0.28 0.0002  
Day-4 0.0047  ** 2.36  0.95 0.0196  -0.0004   -0.82 * -1.86 -0.0002  
Day-3 0.0018    0.83   0.16 0.0214  0.0003   0.83  0.10 0.0002  
Day-2 -0.0064  *** -4.01 *** -5.28 0.0149  -0.0003    0.07  -0.92 -0.0001  
Day-1 0.0077  *** 5.40 *** 5.10 0.0226  0.0014  *** 2.74 ** 2.05 0.0012  
Day+0 0.0026   1.51 *** 2.87 0.0253  -0.0025  *** -2.77  -1.42 -0.0013  
Day+1 0.0053  ** 2.26 * 1.74 0.0306  0.0006   1.59  0.14 -0.0007  
Day+2 -0.0095  *** -4.65 *** -5.31 0.0210  -0.0002    0.41  -1.09 -0.0008  
Day+3 0.0011   0.48   0.16 0.0221  -0.0005    0.07 * -1.88 -0.0013  
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Table 6.6 CARs around Earnings Announcement  
 
This table presents the valuation effect around unscheduled earnings announcement made by Korean 
Exchange-listed firms, over the sample period of 2000 to 2007 (excluding 2002). The event date (D) is 
defined as the unscheduled earnings announcement release date. Z-test is used to measure whether the 
median is statistically different each other while t-test is used to measure whether the mean between pre-
FD period and post-FD period is statistically different from each other (2) or the mean is statistically 
different from the zero (1). P-values for both tests are reported. * Significant at the 10% level or better; ** 
Significant at the 5% level or better; *** Significant at the 1% level or better. 
 
 
< Panel A: Earnings Decrease Firms > 
Variables 
Pre-FD periods (n=308) Difference (CARpre-FD = CARpost-FD) Post-FD periods(n=922) 
 
t-test (CAR=0)(1) t-test (2) z-test  t-test (CAR=0)(1) 
CAR(D-9, D-1) -0.0023  -0.47  0.48  0.18  -0.0046  -2.02 ** 
CAR(D-7, D-1) -0.0069  -1.67 * -1.29  -2.08 ** -0.0014  -0.69  
CAR(D-5, D-1) -0.0118  -3.00 *** -2.22 ** -3.30 *** -0.0033  -1.87 * 
CAR(D-3, D-1) -0.0110  -3.60 *** -2.94 *** -3.05 *** -0.0021  -1.44  
CAR(D+0,D+1) 0.0080  2.83 *** 2.55 ** 3.66 *** 0.0007  0.53  
CAR(D+0,D+3) -0.0113  -2.53 ** -3.32 *** -2.77 *** 0.0024  1.36  
 
 
< Panel B: Earnings Increase Firms > 
Variables 
Pre-FD periods (n=266) Difference (CARpre-FD = CARpost-FD) Post-FD periods(n=1,035) 
 
t-test (CAR=0)(1) t-test (2) z-test  t-test (CAR=0)(1) 
CAR(D-9, D-1) 0.0226  5.16 *** 4.46 *** 3.65 *** 0.0022  1.06  
CAR(D-7, D-1) 0.0071  1.92 * -0.87   0.43  0.0036  2.05 ** 
CAR(D-5, D-1) -0.0012  -0.34  -1.28  -2.25 ** 0.0033   2.14 ** 
CAR(D-3, D-1) 0.0030   1.02   0.07  -0.81  0.0028  2.21 ** 
CAR(D+0,D+1) 0.0079  2.76 *** 3.05 *** 3.02 *** -0.0010  -0.78  
CAR(D+0,D+3) -0.0006  -0.15  -0.66   0.30  -0.0006  -0.37  
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Table 6.7 Regression of CAVs around Earnings Announcement 
 
This table presents the volume effect around earnings announcement for 2,531 observations from 2000 to 
2007 (excluding year 2002). The pre-FD period is from 2000 to 2001 and the post-FD period is from 
2003 to 2007. The dependent variable is cumulative abnormal volumes (CAV) for each event window. 
The explanatory variables are post-FD period (FD), analyst following (ANALY), unexpected earnings 
(UE), firms size (SIZE), and leverage (LEVER). * Significant at the 10% level or better; ** Significant at 
the 5% level or better; *** Significant at the 1% level or better. 
 
< Panel A: Earnings Decrease Firms > 
CAV= α + β1FD + β2ANALY + β3UE + β4SIZE + β5LEVER + ε 
 CAV(D-9, D-1) CAV(D-7, D-1) 
 Coef. t P>|t| Coef. t P>|t| 
INTERCEPT α 0.0494  ** 2.02 0.044 0.0259   1.25 0.213 
FD β1 -0.0310  *** -3.60 0.000 -0.0218  *** -2.98 0.003 
ANALY β2 0.0001   1.16 0.247 0.0000   0.32 0.748 
UE β3 0.0144   0.57 0.571 0.0146   0.68 0.497 
SIZE β4 -0.0099   -1.21 0.225 -0.0035   -0.51 0.611 
LEVER β5 0.0233   0.65 0.513 0.0141   0.46 0.642 
  Number of obs = 1,230 
Adj R-squared = 0.0200 
Number of obs = 1,230 
Adj R-squared = 0.0130 
  CAV(D-5, D-1) CAV(D-3, D-1) 
  Coef. t P>|t| Coef. t P>|t| 
INTERCEPT α 0.0133   0.83 0.409 0.0005   0.05 0.962 
FD β1 -0.0135  ** -2.39 0.017 -0.0040   -1.09 0.277 
ANALY β2 0.0000   0.09 0.930 0.0000   -0.30 0.764 
UE β3 0.0224   1.35 0.178 0.0171   1.59 0.112 
SIZE β4 -0.0013   -0.24 0.814 0.0004   0.12 0.903 
LEVER β5 0.0096   0.41 0.683 0.0123   0.81 0.416 
  Number of obs = 1,230 
Adj R-squared = 0.0095 
Number of obs = 1,230 
Adj R-squared = 0.0053 
  CAV(D+0, D+1) CAV(D+0, D+3) 
  Coef. t P>|t| Coef. t P>|t| 
INTERCEPT α -0.0005   -0.06 0.950 0.0022   0.15 0.878 
FD β1 0.0038   1.44 0.150 0.0080   1.59 0.112 
ANALY β2 0.0000   -0.32 0.751 0.0000   0.26 0.796 
UE β3 0.0011   0.14 0.888 -0.0051   -0.35 0.729 
SIZE β4 -0.0005   -0.21 0.833 -0.0027   -0.57 0.565 
LEVER β5 -0.0062   -0.58 0.565 -0.0141   -0.68 0.499 
  Number of obs = 1,230 
Adj R-squared = 0.0033 
N Number of obs = 1,230 
Adj R-squared = 0.0042 
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< Panel B: Earnings Increase Firms > 
CAV = α + β1FD + β2ANALY + β3UE + β4SIZE + β5LEVER + ε 
 CAV(D-9, D-1) CAV(D-7, D-1) 
 Coef. t P>|t| Coef. t P>|t| 
INTERCEPT α 0.0550  *** 3.01 0.003 0.0321  ** 2.14 0.032 
FD β1 -0.0249  *** -3.56 0.000 -0.0165  *** -2.88 0.004 
ANALY β2 0.0001   1.43 0.154 0.0000   0.95 0.342 
UE β3 -0.0798  * -1.87 0.062 -0.0594  * -1.69 0.091 
SIZE β4 -0.0114  * -1.87 0.061 -0.0064   -1.28 0.201 
LEVER β5 0.0099   0.38 0.704 0.0120   0.56 0.575 
  Number of obs = 1,301 
Adj R-squared = 0.0247 
Number of obs = 1,301 
Adj R-squared = 0.0168 
  CAV(D-5, D-1) CAV(D-3, D-1) 
  Coef. t P>|t| Coef. t P>|t| 
INTERCEPT α 0.0160   1.40 0.161 0.0044   0.63 0.532 
FD β1 -0.0097  ** -2.22 0.026 -0.0041   -1.54 0.125 
ANALY β2 0.0000   0.80 0.425 0.0000   0.52 0.602 
UE β3 -0.0118   -0.44 0.658 -0.0049   -0.30 0.765 
SIZE β4 -0.0033   -0.86 0.392 -0.0009   -0.36 0.716 
LEVER β5 0.0076   0.47 0.641 -0.0003   -0.03 0.978 
  Number of obs = 1,301 
Adj R-squared = 0.0079 
Number of obs = 1,301 
Adj R-squared = 0.0030 
  CAV(D+0, D+1) CAV(D+0, D+3) 
  Coef. t P>|t| Coef. t P>|t| 
INTERCEPT α -0.0100  * -1.75 0.080 -0.0154   -1.42 0.155 
FD β1 0.0064  *** 2.92 0.004 0.0079  * 1.91 0.056 
ANALY β2 0.0000   -1.48 0.139 0.0000   -0.98 0.327 
UE β3 -0.0095   -0.71 0.478 -0.0228   -0.90 0.368 
SIZE β4 0.0024   1.27 0.203 0.0040   1.12 0.263 
LEVER β5 0.0048   0.59 0.552 0.0061   0.40 0.691 
  Number of obs = 1,301 
Adj R-squared = 0.0123 
Number of obs = 1,301 
Adj R-squared = 0.0066 
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Table 6.8 Regression of CARs around Earnings Announcement 
 
This table presents the valuation effect around earnings announcement for 2,531 observations from 2000 
to 2007 (excluding year 2002). The dependent variable is cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for each 
event window. The explanatory variables are post-FD period (FD), analyst following (ANALY), 
unexpected earnings (UE), firms size (SIZE), leverage (LEVER) and cumulative abnormal volumes (CAV). 
* Significant at the 10% level or better; ** Significant at the 5% level or better; *** Significant at the 1% 
level or better. 
 
 
< Panel A: Earnings Decrease Firms > 
CAR= α + β1FD + β2ANALY + β3UE + β4SIZE + β5LEVER + β6CAV + ε 
 CAR(D-9, D-1) CAR(D-7, D-1) 
 Coef. t P>|t| Coef. t P>|t| 
INTERCEPT α -0.0123   -0.74 0.458 -0.0037   -0.26 0.795 
FD β1 -0.0063   -1.08 0.282 0.0017   0.33 0.741 
ANALY β2 0.0000   -0.95 0.341 0.0000   0.20 0.844 
UE β3 0.0332  * 1.94 0.052 0.0202   1.37 0.171 
SIZE β4 0.0044   0.80 0.427 -0.0003   -0.06 0.952 
LEVER β5 0.0142   0.59 0.554 -0.0049   -0.24 0.812 
CAV β6 0.1838  *** 7.83 0.000 0.2084  *** 8.74 0.000 
  Number of obs = 1,230 
Adj R-squared = 0.0793 
Number of obs = 1,230 
Adj R-squared = 0.0879 
  CAR(D-5, D-1) CAR(D-3, D-1) 
  Coef. t P>|t| Coef. t P>|t| 
INTERCEPT α -0.0081   -0.64 0.523 -0.0126   -1.23 0.219 
FD β1 0.0041   0.93 0.353 0.0069  * 1.92 0.055 
ANALY β2 0.0000   0.61 0.541 0.0000   -0.93 0.355 
UE β3 0.0214   1.64 0.101 0.0039   0.37 0.710 
SIZE β4 -0.0001   -0.01 0.900 0.0018   0.54 0.588 
LEVER β5 -0.0041   -0.22 0.825 -0.0091   -0.61 0.543 
CAV β6 0.2460  *** 9.01 0.000 0.0954  *** 2.77 0.006 
  Number of obs = 1,230 
Adj R-squared = 0.0957 
Number of obs = 1,230 
Adj R-squared = 0.0153 
  CAR(D+0, D+1) CAR(D+0, D+3) 
  Coef. t P>|t| Coef. t P>|t| 
INTERCEPT α 0.0029   0.31 0.756 -0.0387  *** -2.78 0.006 
FD β1 -0.0057  * -1.72 0.086 0.0090  * 1.84 0.066 
ANALY β2 0.0000   -1.17 0.242 -0.0001  * -1.96 0.051 
UE β3 -0.0036   -0.37 0.711 -0.0010   -0.07 0.947 
SIZE β4 0.0023   0.73 0.466 0.0124  *** 2.67 0.008 
LEVER β5 -0.0131   -0.96 0.337 -0.0125   -0.61 0.539 
CAV β6 -0.0874  ** -1.99 0.047 0.0044   0.13 0.896 
  Number of obs = 1,230 
Adj R-squared = 0.0120 
N Number of obs = 1,230 
Adj R-squared = 0.0156 
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< Panel B: Earnings Increase Firms > 
CAR= α + β1FD + β2ANALY + β3UE + β4SIZE + β5LEVER + β6CAV + ε 
 CAR(D-9, D-1) CAR(D-7, D-1) 
 Coef. t P>|t| Coef. t P>|t| 
INTERCEPT α 0.0211   1.51 0.132 -0.0113   -0.95 0.343 
FD β1 -0.0257  *** -4.77 0.000 -0.0078  * -1.70 0.090 
ANALY β2 0.0000   0.69 0.489 0.0000   -0.44 0.658 
UE β3 0.0569  * 1.74 0.083 0.0665  ** 2.37 0.018 
SIZE β4 0.0008   0.16 0.871 0.0064   1.59 0.112 
LEVER β5 0.0119   0.60 0.549 0.0181   1.06 0.288 
CAV β6 0.1478  *** 5.85 0.000 0.1440  *** 5.48 0.000 
  Number of obs = 1,301 
Adj R-squared = 0.0701 
Number of obs = 1,301 
Adj R-squared = 0.0442 
  CAR(D-5, D-1) CAR(D-3, D-1) 
  Coef. t P>|t| Coef. t P>|t| 
INTERCEPT α -0.0087   -0.85 0.397 -0.0083   -0.94 0.346 
FD β1 -0.0007   -0.18 0.854 -0.0063  * -1.87 0.062 
ANALY β2 0.0000   -0.74 0.458 0.0000  * -1.81 0.070 
UE β3 0.0255   1.06 0.289 -0.0076   -0.37 0.712 
SIZE β4 0.0043   1.25 0.212 0.0063  ** 2.15 0.032 
LEVER β5 -0.0067   -0.46 0.646 -0.0155   -1.24 0.216 
CAV β6 0.1491  *** 5.02 0.000 0.1487  *** 3.61 0.000 
  Number of obs = 1,301 
Adj R-squared = 0.0297 
Number of obs = 1,301 
Adj R-squared = 0.0245 
  CAR(D+0, D+1) CAR(D+0, D+3) 
  Coef. t P>|t| Coef. t P>|t| 
INTERCEPT α 0.0067    0.78 0.434 0.0007   0.06 0.953 
FD β1 -0.0055  * -1.67 0.095 -0.0009   -0.19 0.848 
ANALY β2 0.0000    -0.67 0.503 0.0000   -0.91 0.365 
UE β3 0.0086    0.43 0.667 0.0150   0.55 0.584 
SIZE β4 0.0001    0.04 0.971 0.0014   0.36 0.722 
LEVER β5 -0.0150    -1.23 0.218 -0.0294  * -1.76 0.078 
CAV β6 -0.1441  ***  -2.92 0.004 0.0369   1.03 0.302 
  Number of obs = 1,301 
Adj R-squared = 0.0057 
N Number of obs = 1,301 
Adj R-squared = 0.0059 
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Table 6.9 AVs around Analysts’ Recommendations 
 
 
This table presents the volume effect around analysts‘ sell-side and buy-side recommendations made by 
Korean analysts, over the sample period of 2000 to 2007. The pre-FD period is from 2000 to October 
2002 and the post-FD period is from November 2002 to 2007.The event date (D) is defined as the release 
of analysts‘ recommendations. A t-test is used to measure whether the mean is statistically different from 
zero and z-test (Wilcoxon signed test) is used to measure whether the median is statistically different 
from zero. P-values for both tests are reported. * Significant at the 10% level or better; ** Significant at 
the 5% level or better; *** Significant at the 1% level or better. 
 
< Panel A: Sell-Side Recommendations > 
 
Pre-FD periods (n=1,722) Post-FD periods (n=769) 
AV 
Difference (AV=0) 
CAV AV 
Difference (AV=0) 
CAV 
t-test z-test t-test z-test 
Day-9 -0.0001   -0.20  -0.92 -0.0001  0.0002   0.30  0.43 0.0002  
Day-8 -0.0009   -1.23  -1.02 -0.0010  0.0003   0.52  0.91 0.0005  
Day-7 0.0011   1.40  0.35 0.0001  -0.0008   -1.21  -1.59 -0.0002  
Day-6 -0.0015  ** -2.01 *** -2.94 -0.0015  -0.0011  * -1.67 ** -2.05 -0.0014  
Day-5 -0.0019  ** -2.42 *** -4.77 -0.0033  -0.0011   -1.55 ** -2.23 -0.0024  
Day-4 -0.0001   -0.06  -0.44 -0.0034  0.0008   0.97  0.27 -0.0017  
Day-3 0.0017  * 1.85 * 1.86 -0.0017  0.0003   0.40  0.70 -0.0013  
Day-2 0.0008   0.88  -1.04 -0.0009  0.0005   0.63  1.42 -0.0008  
Day-1 -0.0004   -0.48  -1.32 -0.0013  0.0007   0.81  1.34 -0.0001  
Day+0 0.0003   0.31 * 1.92 -0.0011  0.0022  ** 2.29 ** 1.82 0.0021  
Day+1 0.0001   0.10  1.01 -0.0010  0.0009   1.05  0.38 0.0030  
Day+2 0.0004   0.37  1.05 -0.0006  0.0008   1.03  0.58 0.0039  
Day+3 0.0001   0.17  0.24 -0.0004  0.0012   1.37  0.14 0.0051  
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< Panel B: Buy-Side Recommendations > 
 
Pre-FD periods (n=19,162) Post-FD periods (n=91,511) 
AV 
Difference (AV=0) 
CAV AV 
Difference (AV=0) 
CAV 
t-test z-test t-test z-test 
Day-9 0.0001   1.08  1.41 0.0001  0.0002  *** 4.81 *** 2.79 0.0002  
Day-8 0.0001   0.32  1.03 0.0002  0.0001  *** 3.60 *** 2.99 0.0003  
Day-7 0.0004  *** 3.03 *** 2.83 0.0006  0.0001  ** 2.40 * 1.85 0.0004  
Day-6 0.0002   1.27  0.24 0.0008  0.0000   0.20  -1.12 0.0004  
Day-5 0.0004  *** 2.74 * 1.87 0.0012  -0.0000   -0.82 * -1.81 0.0004  
Day-4 0.0006  *** 3.81 *** 3.45 0.0018  0.0003  *** 6.02 ** 2.28 0.0007  
Day-3 0.0006  *** 4.59 *** 3.78 0.0024  0.0002  *** 4.49 *** 3.12 0.0009  
Day-2 0.0009  *** 5.67 *** 3.36 0.0033  0.0002  *** 5.47 *** 2.92 0.0011  
Day-1 0.0007  *** 4.93 *** 2.78 0.0040  0.0006  *** 11.51 *** 4.80 0.0017  
Day+0 0.0016  *** 9.79 *** 8.26 0.0056  0.0012  *** 24.11 *** 20.05 0.0029  
Day+1 0.0014  *** 9.07 *** 6.95 0.0070  0.0008  *** 15.17 *** 13.18 0.0037  
Day+2 0.0010  *** 6.43 *** 3.56 0.0080  0.0003  *** 7.67 *** 7.61 0.0040  
Day+3 0.0009  *** 5.33 *** 2.72 0.0089  0.0002  *** 3.11 * 1.90 0.0042  
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Table 6.10 Comparison of CAVs around Analysts’ Recommendations 
 
The pre-FD period is from 2000 to October 2002 and the post-FD period is from November 2002 to 2007. 
The event date (D) is defined as the release of analysts‘ recommendations. Z-test is used to measure 
whether the median is statistically different each other while t-test is used to measure whether the mean 
between pre-FD period and post-FD period is statistically different from each other (2) or the mean is 
statistically different from  zero (1). P-values for both tests are reported. * Significant at the 10% level or 
better; ** Significant at the 5% level or better; *** Significant at the 1% level or better. 
 
< Panel A: Sell-Side Recommendations > 
Variables 
Pre-FD periods 
(n=1,722) 
Difference (CAVpre-FD = CAVpost-FD) 
Post-FD periods 
(n=769) 
 
t-test (CAV=0)(1) t-test (2) z-test  t-test (CAV=0)(1) 
CAV(D-9, D-1) -0.0013  -0.27  -0.15  0.30  -0.0001  -0.03  
CAV(D-7, D-1) -0.0003  -0.08  0.05  0.36  -0.0007  -0.17  
CAV(D-5, D-1) 0.0001  0.04  -0.21  -0.30  0.0012  0.39  
CAV(D-3, D-1) 0.0020  0.90  0.14  -0.63  0.0015  0.74  
CAV(D+0,D+1) 0.0004  0.22  -0.99  -1.16  0.0031  1.90 * 
CAV(D+0,D+3) 0.0009  0.28  -0.84  -0.36  0.0052  1.72 * 
 
< Panel B: Buy-Side Recommendations > 
Variables 
Pre-FD periods 
(n=19,162) 
Difference (CAVpre-FD = CAVpost-FD) 
Post-FD periods 
(n=91,511) 
 
t-test (CAV=0)(1) t-test (2) z-test  t-test (CAV=0) (1) 
CAV(D-9, D-1) 0.0040  4.26 *** 3.05 *** 8.18 *** 0.0017  5.74 *** 
CAV(D-7, D-1) 0.0038  4.83 *** 3.90 *** 8.26 *** 0.0013  5.57 *** 
CAV(D-5, D-1) 0.0032  5.28 *** 4.13 *** 6.26 *** 0.0012  6.75 *** 
CAV(D-3, D-1) 0.0023  5.76 *** 4.05 *** 4.84 *** 0.0010  8.39 *** 
CAV(D+0,D+1) 0.0030  10.27 *** 4.08 *** 2.90 *** 0.0020  21.76 *** 
CAV(D+0,D+3) 0.0048  8.92 *** 5.29 *** 5.95 *** 0.0025  15.18 *** 
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Table 6.11 ARs around Analysts’ Recommendations 
 
This table presents the valuation effect around analysts‘ sell-side and buy-side recommendations made by 
Korean analysts, over the sample period of 2000 to 2007. The pre-FD period is from 2000 to October 
2002 and the post-FD period is from November 2002 to 2007. The event date (D) is defined as the release 
of analysts‘ recommendations. A t-test is used to measure whether the mean is statistically different from 
zero and z-test (Wilcoxon signed test) is used to measure whether the median is statistically different 
from zero. P-values for both tests are reported. * Significant at the 10% level or better; ** Significant at 
the 5% level or better; *** Significant at the 1% level or better. 
 
< Panel A: Sell-Side Recommendations > 
 
Pre-FD periods (n=1,722) Post-FD periods (n=769) 
AR 
Difference (AR=0) 
CAR AR 
Difference (AR=0) 
CAR 
t-test z-test t-test z-test 
Day-9 0.0002   0.27  0.81 0.0002  -0.0032  *** -3.84 *** -4.70 -0.0032  
Day-8 0.0019  * 1.95  1.22 0.0021  -0.0027  ** -2.34 *** -3.75 -0.0058  
Day-7 -0.0020  ** -2.07 *** -5.46 0.0001  -0.0010   -1.00  -0.98 -0.0069  
Day-6 -0.0067  *** -7.13 *** -9.17 -0.0066  -0.0008   -0.74  -1.05 -0.0077  
Day-5 -0.0044  *** -4.71 *** -7.22 -0.0110  0.0005   0.42  0.70 -0.0073  
Day-4 0.0001   0.10  0.92 -0.0109  -0.0005   -0.42  -1.32 -0.0078  
Day-3 0.0010   1.02 ** 2.02 -0.0100  0.0008   0.74  -0.63 -0.0069  
Day-2 -0.0014   -1.47  -0.88 -0.0114  -0.0011   -1.03  1.07 -0.0081  
Day-1 -0.0023  ** -2.34 *** -4.79 -0.0136  -0.0020  * -1.77 ** -2.15 -0.0101  
Day+0 -0.0016   -1.63  -1.61 -0.0152  -0.0055  *** -4.30 *** -5.32 -0.0156  
Day+1 -0.0022  ** -2.16 *** -3.91 -0.0174  -0.0009   -0.68  -0.98 -0.0165  
Day+2 -0.0033  *** -3.41 *** -7.85 -0.0207  -0.0007   -0.56  -1.11 -0.0171  
Day+3 -0.0047  *** -4.69 *** -8.29 -0.0254  -0.0029  ** -2.49 *** -4.22 -0.0200  
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< Panel B: Buy-Side Recommendations > 
 
Pre-FD periods (n=19,162) Post-FD periods (n=91,511) 
AR 
Difference (AR=0) 
CAR AR 
Difference (AR=0) 
CAR 
t-test z-test t-test z-test 
Day-9 -0.0001   -0.36  -1.38 -0.0001  -0.0018  *** -26.25 *** -41.60 -0.0018  
Day-8 0.0017  *** 7.08 *** 3.75 0.0016  0.0006  *** 6.53 *** 7.40 -0.0012  
Day-7 0.0023  *** 9.68 *** 3.12 0.0039  0.0005  *** 5.54 *** 9.93 -0.0007  
Day-6 0.0014  *** 5.69 *** 2.98 0.0053  0.0002  * 1.79 ** 2.13 -0.0006  
Day-5 0.0010  *** 4.10 *** 3.31 0.0063  0.0005  *** 5.78 *** 8.04 -0.0001  
Day-4 0.0017  *** 6.77 *** 2.95 0.0080  0.0006  *** 6.60 *** 7.08 0.0005  
Day-3 0.0012  *** 4.80 *** 3.31 0.0092  0.0009  *** 10.41 ***  4.75 0.0013  
Day-2 0.0018  *** 7.35 *** 2.95 0.0110  0.0007  *** 8.24 *** 5.85 0.0020  
Day-1 0.0029  *** 11.91 *** 3.52 0.0139  0.0014  *** 15.68 *** 10.52 0.0035  
Day+0 0.0044  *** 17.39 *** 3.65 0.0183  0.0027  *** 28.95 *** 15.15 0.0061  
Day+1 0.0019  *** 7.63 *** 4.64 0.0202  0.0010  *** 11.17 *** 10.42 0.0071  
Day+2 0.0012  *** 4.98 *** 8.92 0.0213  0.0004  *** 4.31 *** 3.56 0.0074  
Day+3 0.0004  * 1.77 ** 2.56 0.0218  -0.0001   -1.49 ** -2.21 0.0073  
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Table 6.12 Comparison of CARs around Analysts’ Recommendations  
 
 
The pre-FD period is from 2000 to October 2002 and the post-FD period is from November 2002 to 2007. 
The event date (D) is defined as the release of analysts‘ recommendations. Z-test is used to measure 
whether the median is statistically different each other while t-test is used to measure whether the mean 
between pre-FD period and post-FD period is statistically different from each other (2) or the mean is 
statistically different from zero (1). P-values for both tests are reported. * Significant at the 10% level or 
better; ** Significant at the 5% level or better; *** Significant at the 1% level or better. 
 
< Panel A: Sell-Side Recommendations > 
Variables 
Pre-FD periods 
(n=1,722) 
Difference (CARpre-FD = CARpost-FD) 
Post-FD periods 
(n=769) 
 
t-test (CAV=0)(1) t-test (2) z-test  t-test (CAV=0)(1) 
CAR(D-9, D-1) -0.0136  -4.76 *** -0.72  -1.52  -0.0101  -2.83 *** 
CAR(D-7, D-1) -0.0157  -6.17 *** -2.60 *** -3.02 *** -0.0043  -1.30  
CAR(D-5, D-1) -0.0071  -3.41 *** -1.31  -2.34 ** -0.0024  -0.87  
CAR(D-3, D-1) -0.0027  -1.64  -0.13  -1.56  -0.0023  -1.13  
CAR(D+0,D+1) -0.0037  -2.47 ** 1.08  0.20  -0.0065  -3.48 *** 
CAR(D+0,D+3) -0.0117  -3.88 *** -0.56  -1.23  -0.0098  -3.88 *** 
 
< Panel B: Buy-Side Recommendations > 
Variables 
Pre-FD periods 
(n=19,162) 
Difference (CARpre-FD = CARpost-FD) 
Post-FD periods 
(n=91,511) 
 
t-test (CAV=0)(1) t-test (2) z-test  t-test (CAV=0)(1) 
CAR(D-9, D-1) 0.0139  19.03 *** 16.52 *** 13.95 *** 0.0035  14.06 *** 
CAR(D-7, D-1) 0.0123  18.50 *** 13.19 *** 11.86 *** 0.0047  20.71 *** 
CAR(D-5, D-1) 0.0086  15.14 *** 9.10 *** 6.95 *** 0.0040  20.80 *** 
CAR(D-3, D-1) 0.0059  13.33 *** 7.26 *** 4.38 *** 0.0030  19.21 *** 
CAR(D+0,D+1) 0.0063  17.11 *** 8.08 *** 3.15 *** 0.0036  27.86 *** 
CAR(D+0,D+3) 0.0079  15.82 *** 8.97 *** 5.15 *** 0.0039  21.82 *** 
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Table 6.13 Regression of CAVs around Analysts’ Recommendations 
 
This table presents the volume effect around analysts‘ recommendations release from 2000 to 2007 
(excluding year 2002). The pre-FD period is from 2000 to October 2002 and the post-FD period is from 
November 2002 to 2007. The dependent variable is cumulative abnormal volumes (CAV) for each event 
window. The explanatory variables are post-FD period (FD), analyst following (ANALY), firms size 
(SIZE), broker size (SECU) and standard deviation of daily stock price (VOLA). * Significant at the 10% 
level or better; ** Significant at the 5% level or better; *** Significant at the 1% level or better. 
 
 
< Panel A: Sell-side Recommendations > 
CAV= α + β1FD + β2ANALY + β3SIZE + β4SECU+ β5VOLA + ε 
 CAV(D-9, D-1) CAV(D-7, D-1) 
 Coef. t P>|t| Coef. t P>|t| 
INTERCEPT α -0.2812  *** -8.10 0.000 -0.2411  *** -8.46 0.000 
FD β1 -0.0044   -0.40 0.687 -0.0005    -0.05 0.957 
ANALY β2 0.0007   1.60 0.109 0.0006    1.52 0.128 
SIZE β3 -0.0323  *** -2.67 0.008 -0.0220  ** -2.22 0.027 
SECU β4 0.0004   1.34 0.179 0.0003    1.31 0.191 
VOLA β5 0.0463   0.53 0.593 0.0344    0.48 0.629 
  Number of obs = 2,491 
Adj R-squared = 0.0054 
Number of obs = 2,491 
Adj R-squared = 0.0038 
  CAV(D-5, D-1) CAV(D-3, D-1) 
  Coef. t P>|t| Coef. t P>|t| 
INTERCEPT α -0.1860  *** -8.51 0.000 -0.1091  *** -7.71 0.000 
FD β1 0.0013   0.19 0.853 0.0005    0.10 0.919 
ANALY β2 0.0004   1.34 0.182 0.0002    1.17 0.244 
SIZE β3 -0.0129  * -1.69 0.090 -0.0100  ** -2.02 0.043 
SECU β4 0.0002   0.89 0.376 0.0001    0.92 0.355 
VOLA β5 0.0426   0.78 0.435 0.0440    1.25 0.213 
  Number of obs = 2,491 
Adj R-squared = 0.0022 
Number of obs = 2,491 
Adj R-squared = 0.0032 
  CAV(D+0, D+1) CAV(D+0, D+3) 
  Coef. t P>|t| Coef. t P>|t| 
INTERCEPT α -0.0970  *** -9.88 0.000 -0.2335  *** -13.89 0.000 
FD β1 0.0035   1.14 0.256 0.0113  ** 2.16 0.031 
ANALY β2 0.0000   0.28 0.776 0.0002   0.75 0.451 
SIZE β3 -0.0012   -0.34 0.731 0.0055   0.93 0.350 
SECU β4 0.0002  ** 1.96 0.050 0.0002   1.10 0.271 
VOLA β5 0.0151   0.62 0.538 0.0610   1.45 0.146 
  Number of obs = 2,491 
Adj R-squared = 0.0022 
Number of obs = 2,491 
Adj R-squared = 0.0048 
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< Panel A: Buy-side Recommendations > 
CAV= α + β1FD + β2ANALY + β3SIZE + β4SECU+ β5VOLA + ε 
 CAV(D-9, D-1) CAV(D-7, D-1) 
 Coef. t P>|t| Coef. t P>|t| 
INTERCEPT α 0.0486  *** 35.98 0.000 0.0407  *** 35.51 0.000 
FD β1 -0.0070  *** -10.98 0.000 -0.0063  *** -11.8 0.000 
ANALY β2 0.0000   1.61 0.107 0.0000   1.35 0.175 
SIZE β3 -0.0087  *** -23.77 0.000 -0.0072  *** -23.00 0.000 
SECU β4 0.0000  *** -2.61 0.009 0.0000  *** -2.92 0.004 
VOLA β5 -0.0045   -0.81 0.416 -0.0054   -1.16 0.248 
  Number of obs = 100,673 
Adj R-squared = 0.0109 
Number of obs = 100,673 
Adj R-squared = 0.0106 
  CAV(D-5, D-1) CAV(D-3, D-1) 
  Coef. t P>|t| Coef. t P>|t| 
INTERCEPT α 0.0311  *** 34.8 0.000 0.0195  *** 32.79 0.000 
FD β1 -0.0048  *** -11.54 0.000 -0.0031  *** -11.11 0.000 
ANALY β2 0.0000    0.93 0.352 0.0000    0.30 0.764 
SIZE β3 -0.0054  *** -22.29 0.000 -0.0033  *** -20.57 0.000 
SECU β4 0.0000  *** -3.02 0.003 0.0000  *** -2.67 0.008 
VOLA β5 -0.0035    -0.98 0.329 -0.0006    -0.27 0.789 
  Number of obs = 100,673 
Adj R-squared = 0.0102 
Number of obs = 100,673 
Adj R-squared = 0.0091 
  CAV(D+0, D+1) CAV(D+0, D+3) 
  Coef. t P>|t| Coef. t P>|t| 
INTERCEPT α 0.0195  *** 41.71 0.000 0.0344  *** 42.75 0.000 
FD β1 -0.0020  *** -9.23 0.000 -0.0051  *** -13.60 0.000 
ANALY β2 0.0000  *** -4.63 0.000 -0.0001  *** -4.58 0.000 
SIZE β3 -0.0034  *** -26.83 0.000 -0.0058  *** -26.65 0.000 
SECU β4 0.0000   -0.96 0.338 0.0000   -0.24 0.811 
VOLA β5 0.0001   0.06 0.951 0.0059  * 1.81 0.070 
  Number of obs = 100,673 
Adj R-squared = 0.0161 
Number of obs = 100,673 
Adj R-squared = 0.0180 
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Table 6.14 Regression of CARs around Analysts’ Recommendations 
 
 
This table presents the valuation effect around analysts‘ recommendations release from 2000 to 2007 
(excluding year 2002). The pre-FD period is from 2000 to October 2002 and the post-FD period is from 
November 2002 to 2007. The dependent variable is cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for each event 
window. The explanatory variables are post-FD period (FD), analyst following (ANALY), firms size 
(SIZE), broker size (SECU), standard deviation of daily stock price (VOLA) and cumulative abnormal 
volumes (CAV). * Significant at the 10% level or better; ** Significant at the 5% level or better; *** 
Significant at the 1% level or better. 
 
 
< Panel A: Sell-side Recommendations > 
CAR= α + β1FD + β2ANALY + β3SIZE + β4SECU+ β5VOLA + β6CAV + ε 
 CAR(D-9, D-1) CAR(D-7, D-1) 
 Coef. t P>|t| Coef. t P>|t| 
INTERCEPT α -0.0248   -1.58 0.115 0.0073   0.51 0.607 
FD β1 0.0046   0.94 0.345 0.0080  * 1.83 0.067 
ANALY β2 0.0007  *** 3.50 0.000 0.0007  *** 3.89 0.000 
SIZE β3 0.0082   1.51 0.130 -0.0013   -0.27 0.789 
SECU β4 -0.0002   -1.20 0.230 -0.0002   -1.36 0.174 
VOLA β5 -0.0499   -1.29 0.197 -0.0171   -0.49 0.626 
CAV β6 0.0659  *** 6.83 0.000 0.0806  *** 7.59 0.000 
  Number of obs = 2,491 
Adj R-squared = 0.0351 
Number of obs = 2,491 
Adj R-squared = 0.0371 
  CAR(D-5, D-1) CAR(D-3, D-1) 
  Coef. t P>|t| Coef. t P>|t| 
INTERCEPT α 0.0179   1.42 0.155 0.0212  ** 2.21 0.027 
FD β1 0.0063   1.64 0.101 0.0010   0.32 0.747 
ANALY β2 0.0003  ** 2.00 0.045 0.0001   0.47 0.640 
SIZE β3 -0.0016   -0.36 0.716 0.0000   -0.01 0.995 
SECU β4 -0.0002   -1.59 0.111 -0.0002  *** -2.72 0.007 
VOLA β5 0.0115   0.37 0.710 -0.0182   -0.77 0.443 
CAV β6 0.1085  *** 8.90 0.000 0.1432  *** 9.87 0.000 
  Number of obs = 2,491 
Adj R-squared = 0.0401 
Number of obs = 2,491 
Adj R-squared = 0.0468 
  CAR(D, D+1) CAR(D, D+3) 
  Coef. t P>|t| Coef. t P>|t| 
INTERCEPT α 0.0261  *** 3.41 0.001 -0.0057   -0.57 0.568 
FD β1 0.0007   0.30 0.761 0.0072  ** 2.42 0.016 
ANALY β2 0.0001   1.39 0.165 0.0003  ** 2.40 0.017 
SIZE β3 -0.0036   -1.40 0.162 0.0012   0.37 0.713 
SECU β4 0.0000   0.52 0.603 -0.0001   -0.73 0.466 
VOLA β5 0.0118   0.63 0.528 0.0208   0.88 0.381 
CAV β6 0.2008  *** 12.21 0.000 0.0788  *** 6.45 0.000 
  Number of obs = 2,491 
Adj R-squared = 0.0669 
Number of obs = 2,491 
Adj R-squared = 0.0277 
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< Panel B: Buy-side Recommendations >  
CAR= α + β1FD + β2ANALY + β3SIZE + β4SECU+ β5VOLA + β6CAV + ε 
 CAR(D-9, D-1) CAR(D-7, D-1) 
 Coef. t P>|t| Coef. t P>|t| 
INTERCEPT α 0.0169  *** 11.88 0.000 0.0128  *** 9.87 0.000 
FD β1 -0.0087  *** -13.09 0.000 -0.0050  *** -8.32 0.000 
ANALY β2 0.0000   0.36 0.717 0.0000  ** 2.10 0.035 
SIZE β3 -0.0005   -1.21 0.225 -0.0008  ** -2.22 0.026 
SECU β4 -0.0001  *** -5.23 0.000 0.0000   -1.55 0.122 
VOLA β5 -0.0621  *** -10.83 0.000 -0.0639  *** -12.2 0.000 
CAV β6 0.2097  *** 65.32 0.000 0.2428  *** 70.41 0.000 
  Number of obs = 100,673 
Adj R-squared = 0.0421 
Number of obs = 100,673 
Adj R-squared = 0.0472 
  CAR(D-5, D-1) CAR(D-3, D-1) 
  Coef. t P>|t| Coef. t P>|t| 
INTERCEPT α 0.0081  *** 7.22 0.000 0.0065  *** 7.25 0.000 
FD β1 -0.0028  *** -5.44 0.000 -0.0017  *** -4.12 0.000 
ANALY β2 0.0000   0.54 0.589 0.0000   0.73 0.468 
SIZE β3 -0.0003   -1.12 0.263 -0.0004  * -1.70 0.089 
SECU β4 0.0000   -0.07 0.947 0.0000   -1.64 0.102 
VOLA β5 -0.0441  *** -9.78 0.000 -0.0266  *** -7.38 0.000 
CAV β6 0.2578  *** 67.68 0.000 0.2903  *** 63.43 0.000 
  Number of obs = 100,673 
Adj R-squared = 0.0429 
Number of obs = 100,673 
Adj R-squared = 0.0376 
  CAR(D+0, D+1) CAR(D+0, D+3) 
  Coef. t P>|t| Coef. t P>|t| 
INTERCEPT α 0.0050  *** 6.78 0.000 0.0049  *** 4.82 0.000 
FD β1 0.0004   1.20 0.232 -0.0001   -0.26 0.797 
ANALY β2 0.0000   0.42 0.676 0.0000  * 1.88 0.060 
SIZE β3 -0.0012  *** -6.12 0.000 -0.0012  *** -4.39 0.000 
SECU β4 0.0000  *** 5.55 0.000 0.0001  *** 4.63 0.000 
VOLA β5 -0.0017   -0.57 0.572 -0.0036   -0.89 0.373 
CAV β6 0.3590  *** 74.36 0.000 0.2501  *** 65.05 0.000 
  Number of obs = 100,673 
Adj R-squared = 0.0520 
Number of obs = 100,673 
Adj R-squared = 0.0399 
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Table 6.15 CARs and CAVs around First Buy-side Recommendations 
 
 
 
The pre-FD period is from 2000 to October 2002 and the post-FD period is from November 2002 to 2007. 
The event date (D) is defined as the release of analysts‘ initial two buy-side recommendations. Z-test is 
used to measure whether the median is statistically different from each other while t-test is used to 
measure whether the mean between pre-FD period and post-FD period is statistically different from each 
other (2) or the mean is statistically different from zero (1). P-values for both tests are reported. * 
Significant at the 10% level or better; ** Significant at the 5% level or better; *** Significant at the 1% 
level or better. 
 
< Panel A: Cumulative Abnormal Volume > 
Variables 
Pre-FD periods 
(n=501) 
Difference (CAVpre-FD = CAVpost-FD) 
Post-FD periods 
(n=1,926) 
 
t-test (CAV=0)(1) t-test (2) z-test  t-test (CAV=0) (1) 
CAR(D-9, D-1) 0.0280  3.47 *** 2.87 *** 3.04 *** 0.0004  0.08  
CAR(D-7, D-1) 0.0249  3.61 *** 3.03 *** 3.26 *** 0.0004  0.12  
CAR(D-5, D-1) 0.0223  3.95 *** 3.45 *** 3.66 *** 0.0009  0.31  
CAR(D-3, D-1) 0.0129  3.49 *** 2.85 *** 3.12 *** 0.0016  0.89  
CAR(D+0,D+1) 0.0164  5.08 *** 1.18  0.37  0.0124  8.08 *** 
CAR(D+0,D+3) 0.0316  5.58 *** 1.93 * 2.24 ** 0.0195  7.00 *** 
 
 
< Panel B: Cumulative Abnormal Returns > 
Variables 
Pre-FD periods 
(n=501) 
Difference (CARpre-FD = CARpost-FD) 
Post-FD periods 
(n=1,926) 
 
t-test (CAV=0)(1) t-test (2) z-test  t-test (CAV=0)(1) 
CAR(D-9, D-1) 0.0391  4.88 *** 4.16 *** 2.20 ** 0.0151  7.34 *** 
CAR(D-7, D-1) 0.0299  3.99 *** 3.02 ***  1.15  0.0138  7.24 *** 
CAR(D-5, D-1) 0.0224  3.62 ***  1.77 *  0.04  0.0144   8.74 *** 
CAR(D-3, D-1) 0.0166  3.62 ***  1.31  -1.53  0.0119   8.98 *** 
CAR(D+0,D+1) 0.0160  4.62 *** -0.01  -0.64  0.0160  12.47 *** 
CAR(D+0,D+3) 0.0212  4.38 *** 0.68  0.52  0.0182  10.20 *** 
 
 235 
Table 6.16 Regression of CAVs around First Buy-side Recommendations 
 
 
This table presents the volume effect around analysts‘ first two buy-side recommendations release from 
2000 to 2007. The pre-FD period is from 2000 to October 2002 and the post-FD period is from November. 
2002 to 2007. The dependent variable is cumulative abnormal volumes (CAV) for each event window. 
The explanatory variables are post-FD period (FD), analyst following (ANALY), firms size (SIZE), broker 
size (SECU) and standard deviation of daily stock price (VOLA). * Significant at the 10% level or better; 
** Significant at the 5% level or better; *** Significant at the 1% level or better. 
 
CAV= α + β1FD + β2ANALY + β3SIZE + β4SECU+ β5VOLA + ε 
 CAV(D-9, D-1) CAV(D-7, D-1) 
 Coef. t P>|t| Coef. t P>|t| 
INTERCEPT α 0.0646  *** 3.19 0.001 0.0546  *** 3.27 0.001 
FD β1 -0.0248  *** -2.75 0.006 -0.0212  *** -2.86 0.004 
ANALY β2 0.0001   0.34 0.736 0.0001   0.17 0.862 
SIZE β3 -0.0119  * -1.70 0.088 -0.0100  ** -1.73 0.083 
SECU β4 -0.0001   -0.22 0.829 0.0000   -0.12 0.908 
VOLA β5 -0.0818   -1.01 0.314 -0.0603   -0.90 0.368 
  Number of obs = 2,427 
Adj R-squared = 0.0065 
Number of obs = 2,427 
Adj R-squared = 0.0071 
  CAV(D-5, D-1) CAV(D-3, D-1) 
  Coef. t P>|t| Coef. t P>|t| 
INTERCEPT α 0.0517  *** 4.06 0.000 0.0306  *** 3.88 0.000 
FD β1 -0.0173  *** -3.06 0.002 -0.0076  ** -2.15 0.032 
ANALY β2 0.0001    0.28 0.783 0.0001    0.37 0.715 
SIZE β3 -0.0099  ** -2.25 0.024 -0.0064  ** -2.35 0.019 
SECU β4 -0.0001    -0.33 0.741 0.0000    -0.44 0.660 
VOLA β5 -0.0573    -1.12 0.262 -0.0350    -1.10 0.271 
  Number of obs = 2,427 
Adj R-squared = 0.0096 
Number of obs = 2,427 
Adj R-squared = 0.0073 
  CAV(D+0, D+1) CAV(D+0, D+3) 
  Coef. t P>|t| Coef. t P>|t| 
INTERCEPT α 0.0623  *** 9.00 0.000 0.1080  *** 8.46 0.000 
FD β1 0.0002   0.08 0.939 -0.0052   -0.92 0.357 
ANALY β2 0.0002   1.54 0.124 0.0005  * 1.95 0.051 
SIZE β3 -0.0166  *** -6.94 0.000 -0.0276  *** -6.27 0.000 
SECU β4 0.0000   0.14 0.888 0.0000   -0.15 0.882 
VOLA β5 -0.0434   -1.56 0.118 -0.0438   -0.85 0.394 
  Number of obs = 2,427 
Adj R-squared = 0.0315 
Number of obs = 2,427 
Adj R-squared = 0.0251 
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Table 6.17 Regression of CARs around First Buy-side Recommendations 
 
 
This table presents the valuation effect around analysts‘ first two buy-side recommendations release from 
2000 to 2007. The pre-FD period is from 2000 to October 2002 and the post-FD period is from November 
2002 to 2007. The dependent variable is cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for each event window. The 
explanatory variables are post-FD period (FD), analyst following (ANALY), firms size (SIZE), broker size 
(SECU), standard deviation of daily stock price (VOLA) and cumulative abnormal volumes (CAV). * 
Significant at the 10% level or better; ** Significant at the 5% level or better; *** Significant at the 1% 
level or better. 
 
 
CAR= α + β1FD + β2ANALY + β3SIZE + β4SECU+ β5VOLA + β6CAV + ε 
 CAR(D-9, D-1) CAR(D-7, D-1) 
 Coef. t P>|t| Coef. t P>|t| 
INTERCEPT α 0.0790  *** 5.85 0.000 0.0657  *** 5.25 0.000 
FD β1 -0.0218  *** -3.64 0.000 -0.0110  ** -1.97 0.048 
ANALY β2 -0.0002   -0.70 0.486 -0.0002   -0.76 0.448 
SIZE β3 -0.0112  ** -2.40 0.016 -0.0100  ** -2.33 0.020 
SECU β4 -0.0001   -0.39 0.699 -0.0001   -0.91 0.365 
VOLA β5 -0.1588  *** -2.94 0.003 -0.1401  *** -2.80 0.005 
CAV β6 0.1384  *** 9.76 0.000 0.1593  *** 9.98 0.000 
  Number of obs = 2,427 
Adj R-squared = 0.0608 
Number of obs = 2,427 
Adj R-squared = 0.0581 
  CAR(D-5, D-1) CAR(D-3, D-1) 
  Coef. t P>|t| Coef. t P>|t| 
INTERCEPT α 0.0453  *** 4.24 0.000 0.0285  *** 3.41 0.001 
FD β1 -0.0026   -0.56 0.578 -0.0019   -0.51 0.607 
ANALY β2 -0.0001   -0.36 0.719 0.0001   0.39 0.694 
SIZE β3 -0.0077  ** -2.1 0.036 -0.0058  ** -2.02 0.044 
SECU β4 0.0000   -0.08 0.932 0.0001   1.38 0.168 
VOLA β5 -0.1188  *** -2.78 0.005 -0.0874  *** -2.61 0.009 
CAV β6 0.1592  *** 8.92 0.000 0.1523  *** 6.77 0.000 
  Number of obs = 2,427 
Adj R-squared = 0.0446 
Number of obs = 2,427 
Adj R-squared = 0.0273 
  CAR(D+0, D+1) CAR(D+0, D+3) 
  Coef. t P>|t| Coef. t P>|t| 
INTERCEPT α 0.0398  *** 5.61 0.000 0.0426  *** 4.33 0.000 
FD β1 0.0020   0.65 0.515 -0.0001    -0.02 0.982 
ANALY β2 -0.0002   -1.34 0.180 -0.0001    -0.32 0.748 
SIZE β3 -0.0091  *** -3.72 0.000 -0.0115  *** -3.40 0.001 
SECU β4 0.0000   -0.07 0.947 0.0002    1.46 0.143 
VOLA β5 0.0135   0.48 0.628 0.0034    0.09 0.931 
CAV β6 0.3162  *** 14.72 0.000 0.2593  *** 16.00 0.000 
  Number of obs = 2,427 
Adj R-squared = 0.1211 
Number of obs = 2,427 
Adj R-squared = 0.1250 
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Figure 6-1 CAVs around Unscheduled Earnings Announcement 
 
 
 
< Panel A: Earnings Decrease Firms > < Panel B: Earnings Increase Firms > 
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Figure 6-2 CARs around Unscheduled Earnings Announcement 
 
< Panel A: Earnings Decrease Firms > < Panel B: Earnings Increase Firms > 
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Figure 6.3 CAVs around Analysts’ Recommendations 
 
< Panel A: Sell-Side Recommendations > < Panel B: Buy-Side Recommendations > 
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Figure 6.4 CARs around Analysts’ Recommendations  
 
< Panel A: Sell-Side Recommendations > < Panel B: Buy-Side Recommendations > 
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Figure 6.5 CAVs and CARs around First Two Buy-side Recommendations   
 
< Panel A: Cumulative Abnormal Volume > < Panel B: Cumulative Abnormal Returns > 
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CHAPTER 7 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
7.1. Introduction 
Proponents of Regulation FD have argued that selective disclosure should be prohibited 
as it has three negative effects: (1) optimistically biased forecasts (2) unfair informed 
trading (i.e., information asymmetry) (3) increased cost of capital for firms. On the 
other hand, opponents claim that the regulation could have a ―chilling effect‖ on the 
flow of information to financial markets (Zitzewitz, 2002). 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine empirically whether Regulation FD influences 
the Korean securities market. Using a sample of 161,343 observations made of analysts‘ 
forecasts covering 2,311 firms from 2000 to 2007, we provide empirical evidence for 
the following questions: (1) Has Regulation FD changed analysts‘ forecasting ability? 
(2) Has Regulation FD decreased selective disclosure among market participants? (3) 
Has Regulation FD reduced the quality and quantity of public disclosure? We 
empirically test88 the hypotheses for the above three questions by employing six 
different approaches. Specifically, this study examines the effect of Regulation FD on 
(1) forecast accuracy and forecast dispersion (2) private earnings guidance (3) private 
information in analysts‘ forecasts (4) herding behaviour among analysts (5) informed 
trading prior to unscheduled earnings announcement (6) information leakage prior to 
analysts‘ recommendations.   
                                                 
88 All the estimates and tests for the economic models in this study are conducted using the statistical 
software package STATA (version 9.2) and SPSS (PASW statistics 18).  
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7.2. Summary and Conclusions for Empirical Results 
In Chapter 3, controlling for variables that affect analysts‘ forecasts, we analyse changes 
in analysts‘ forecasting ability after the adoption of Regulation FD. Interestingly, we 
find that analysts‘ forecast accuracy has increased after the adoption of Regulation FD. 
These findings are of interest to finance researchers for two reasons. First, prior research 
finds mixed results on changes in forecasting ability in the post-FD period. For instance, 
Agrawal et al., (2006) and Findlay et al., (2006) find evidence that Regulation FD leads 
to increases in forecast errors and forecast dispersion since managers supply less private 
information to analysts in the post-FD period. On the other hand, Heflin et al., (2003) 
have shown that analysts have not seen a worsening in their performance in the post-FD 
period. Second, we view this result to be a consequence of the fact that an increase in 
the quality and quantity of public information positively influences analysts‘ forecasting 
ability in the post-FD period, indicating that firms have effectively substituted public 
communication for private channels to analysts in the Korean market after the adoption 
of Regulation FD.  
 
This interpretation is opposed to the views of some of the previous literature. For 
instance, Gomez et al., (2004) suggest that public communication does not seem to be a 
good substitute for private communication, indicating that analysts‘ information 
advantage came from management‘s selective disclosure. However, we support the 
view of the proponents (i.e., Heflin et al., 2001), who find that the amount of public 
communication from firms has increased in the post-FD period. Furthermore, the 
decrease in forecast dispersion provides a justification for our explanations. Our study 
provides insights into how Regulation FD influences analysts‘ forecasting ability and 
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firms‘ disclosure practice. Our study does not contradict previous studies showing a 
decrease in forecasting ability in the post-FD period, but it does shed additional light on 
the issue. Regulation FD contributes to prohibiting firms from disclosing selectively and 
disseminating nonpublic information to the public.  
 
In Chapter 4, we examine whether Regulation FD influences the private information in 
analysts‘ forecasts and private earnings guidance. Although recent research shows that 
Regulation FD has decreased private contact between firms and analysts, it remains 
unclear whether the private channels have been completely cut off. For example, at least 
some analysts can still enjoy an information advantage by virtue of their private 
communications with managers after the adoption of Regulation FD. We provide 
evidence on this issue by measuring whether the amount of private information in 
analysts‘ forecasts and private earning guidance decreases as a result of the elimination 
of selective disclosure after the adoption of Regulation FD.  
 
We have two main sets of findings. First, we find that private earnings guidance has 
diminished after the adoption of Regulation FD. In our second set of findings, the 
precision of private information in analysts‘ forecasts has decreased after the adoption 
of Regulation FD. The above results indicate that Regulation FD prevents private access 
to management and public information remains the most important communication 
channel between a firm and analysts. Our explanation for these results supports 
proponents of Regulation FD, Mohanram et al., (2006) and Heflin et al., (2006), 
reporting that analysts have not faced a significant deterioration in the quality of public 
information acquired from firms after the adoption of the regulation. Our study 
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contributes to the understanding of the effect of Regulation FD on private 
communications between managers and analysts. Our results suggest that the regulation 
has forced managers to communicate more effectively through public channels instead 
of using private contacts.  
 
In Chapter 5, we study changes in analysts‘ herding behaviour after the adoption of the 
regulation. Previous literature shows two interpretations of the impact of Regulation FD 
on herding behaviour. First, Regulation FD‘s opponents argue that Regulation FD leads 
to increasing herding behaviour among analysts since the regulation leads firms to do 
away with voluntary disclosure in the capital market (Zitzwitz, 2002; Arya et al., 2005). 
On the other hand, Mensah et al., (2008) find no evidence that Regulation FD results in 
an increase in analysts‘ herding behaviour.  
 
Our results refute suggestions that Regulation FD has led to increasing herding 
behaviour among analysts. Our findings contradict Regulation FD‘s opponents (e.g., 
Association for Investment Management and Research (AIMR), and Security Industry 
Association (SIA). The survey by AIMR and SIA showed that many respondents 
answered that the quantity and quality of information has declined after the adoption of 
Regulation FD.89 Bailey et al., (2003) also cautiously put forward the results of a 
survey conducted by the opponents of Regulation FD in question. Bailey et al., (2003) 
suggest that the survey results may more reflect analysts‘ fears that Regulation FD 
removes their information advantage than their concerns for fairness. Our study adds to 
the growing body of literature that shows that Regulation FD has not reduced the 
                                                 
89 See Chapter 3. 
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quantity of information. Our evidence on the herding behaviour indicates that 
Regulation FD has not caused the quality of these forecasts to deteriorate. 
 
In Chapter 6, we examine two specific issues. First, has there been a change in informed 
trading prior to the unscheduled earnings announcement after the adoption of 
Regulation FD? Second, has there been a change in information leakage prior to the 
analysts‘ recommendations? Like prior studies of the effect of Regulation FD, we find 
evidence of a decrease in abnormal volumes and abnormal returns prior to unscheduled 
earnings announcement in the post-FD period, indicating that differences in information 
quality between investors decreased. We also find strong evidence of a reduction in the 
information leakage of analysts in (first two) buy-side recommendations prior to the 
release of analysts‘ recommendations. This results are driven by earnings increase firms 
and buy-side recommendations. There is no evidence that informed trading patterns 
existed in earnings decrease firms and sell-side recommendations before Regulation FD 
became effective. The results indicate that managers and analysts are reluctant to leak 
bad news prior to public announcement.  
 
Overall, therefore, our findings lend support to the idea that Regulation FD has achieved 
the provision of a more level playing field to all investors. This study also contributes to 
understanding how Regulation FD influences informed trading and information leakage. 
It is widely documented in the previous literature that the significant drop in the 
abnormal volumes prior to unscheduled public announcement indicates that Regulation 
FD succeeded in eliminating selective disclosure.  
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In conclusion, these results suggest that Regulation FD contributes to curtailing 
information leakage and levelling the playing field by giving individual investors the 
same information simultaneously.  
7.3. Limitations of Research  
Our results are subject to some limitations. First, we used annual analysts‘ forecast 
observations because there were no quarterly forecasts observations before Korea 
adopted Regulation FD in 2002. Annual forecast observations may have a limitation in 
assessing analysts‘ forecasting ability and herding behaviour compared to quarterly 
forecast observations because some forecast observations have a longer forecast horizon. 
Therefore, our conclusions may not be generalized to the effect of Regulation FD on the 
analysts‘ forecasts.  
 
Second, even if our study includes various control variables that are identified by 
previous literature, it is always possible that other variables are not controlled for. 
Future research can further refine the methodology developed in our study.  
 
Third, our research depends on various models developed by Dechow et al., (1995), 
Barren et al., (1998), BCK (2006), Clement et al., (2005), Matsumoto (2002) and Wang 
(2007). However, some models are potentially plagued by problems. Therefore, our 
conclusions are constrained by the limitations of the models.  
 
Lastly, our sample consists of the pre-FD period (2 years) and post-FD period (5 years). 
Campbell and Stanley (1966) suggest that the ideal analysis should have both periods of 
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approximately equal size for ideal analysis.90 Our periods are unevenly sized, so our 
results may obtain different findings.  
7.4. Further Research  
There are several ways to extend our research from the research topics. First, in Chapter 
3, we employ the two groups of information uncertainty in order to assess the effect of 
Regulation FD on forecasting ability. This methodology can be easily extended to the 
cases of the effects of Regulation FD on the competitiveness of best-analysts (similar to 
the U.S. All-American Research Team) chosen by votes of institutional investors or on 
changes in the level of recommendations (i.e., upgrade or downgrade). We would 
expect that the performance of best-analysts and analysts issuing upgrade 
recommendations to be less dependent on private communication with managers after 
the adoption of Regulation FD.  
 
Second, we can employ other methods to examine the effect of the regulation on 
management disclosure policy. For example, in Chapter 4, we use Matsumoto (2002) 
and Wang (2005), in order to measure the degree of private earnings guidance. 
Researchers might be interested to use text mining or interviewing survey data. 
Feldmann et al., (2003) examine earnings guidance disclosures based on identification 
of these announcements using text mining techniques. Hutton (2005) uses survey data 
from the National Investor Relations Institute (NIRI) to identify firms conducting 
reviews guided analysts‘ earnings forecasts.  
 
                                                 
90 Campbell and Stanley (1966) suggest that the ideal experiment has the following characteristics: (1) 
approximately equal number of pre-test and post-test periods; (2) an experimental group and a control 
group with observations randomly assigned to both; (3) ability of the researcher to control when the 
intervention occurs; and (4) ability to determine whether there is an intercept shift and a slope shift. 
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Third, in Chapter 6, we do not examine the effect of Regulation FD on the trading 
behaviour of institutional investors. Previous literature addresses the effect of the 
regulation on the trading behaviour of institutional investors (Ke et al., 2008). We 
expect there to be abnormal trading of stocks immediately preceding bad or good news 
in the pre-FD period, but the institutions to not display similar abnormal trading of 
stocks in the post-FD period.  
 
Finally, Gomes et al., (2007) and Duarte et al., (2008) examine the effect of Regulation 
FD on firms‘ costs of capital. Their results indicate that Regulation FD generally leads 
to a higher cost of capital. It would be interesting to examine the role of cost of capital 
in the Korean market. We leave to future research questions related to the regulator‘s 
goals for the regulation.  
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